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Darren Harvey, Darwin College 
Short Summary of PhD Thesis 
The Constitutional Court of More Mature Legal Order: Constitutional Review by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union 
This thesis examines the changing role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
from the perspective of its task of conducting constitutional review of EU legislation. It 
addresses a gap in the existing literature by providing a systematic analysis of how the 
methodology and intensity of constitutional review has changed over time.  
By focusing upon federalism and fundamental rights cases, it argues that a series of 
significant shifts may be detected in the jurisprudence of the Court since the coming into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. In marked contrast with earlier periods in its history, the Court 
now subjects EU legislation to high-intensity review in cases of serious interference with the 
EU’s core constitutional principles. The Court has also adopted an increasingly “process-
oriented” approach to constitutional review in recent years. This involves heightened 
scrutiny of the legislative process and evidence base upon which contested EU legislation 
was enacted. The result has been a gradual infiltration of procedural review into 
constitutional adjudication. 
These developments in the methodology and intensity of constitutional review form the 
basis for evaluating the changing role of the CJEU over time. It is contended that the case 
law reveals much about the contemporary, post-Lisbon role of the Court and, crucially, how 
this differs from previous periods in the history of European integration.  
Whereas the Court has long been criticised for failing to subject EU legislation to meaningful 
judicial scrutiny, there is growing evidence that the Court now takes its responsibility for 
constitutional review more seriously. Furthermore, recent judgments demonstrate the 
Court to be an institutional actor that is responsive to the wider legal and political context in 
which it now operates. 
These developments give rise to a reconsideration of exiting accounts which depict the CJEU 
as an “activist” or unwaveringly “pro-integrationist” institution. When viewed from the 
largely unexplored perspective of the evolution of constitutional review, it is concluded that 
the Court now engages in a finely calibrated, variable intensity approach to such review.  In 
so doing, the Court has finally assumed the role of a veritable Constitutional Court whose 
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The Constitutional Court of a More Mature Legal Order: Constitutional 
Review by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
Chapter 1 





The purpose of this thesis is to examine the changing role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) when reviewing the legality of measures of European Union (EU) 
law.1 It contends that, as a court of general jurisdiction,2 certain of the CJEU’s tasks have 
gradually come to resemble the practice of constitutional review of legislation as (broadly) 
understood in many nation states.3 Additionally, the present analysis argues that the Court’s 
approach to reviewing the constitutionality of EU legislation has changed over the course of 
the history of the European integration project.  
In marked contrast with its earlier jurisprudence, the Court has recently come to subject EU 
legislation to “high-intensity” review. In cases of serious interference with fundamental 
rights or core constitutional principles of the EU legal order, the Court engages in strict 
scrutiny of the legislature’s discretionary policy choices.4 Beyond these rare examples of 
 
1 The CJEU ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’, Article 
19(1) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) [2016] OJ C 202. In carrying out this task, 
the Court is required to provide preliminary rulings on the interpretation and validity of EU legal acts and 
directly review the legality of such acts, Article 263(1) and Article 267(1) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2016] OJ C 202. 
2 As a ‘nonspecialized court of general jurisdiction’ the CJEU ‘handles many different kinds of matters spread 
over a wide range of specialized areas’ M Rosenfeld, ‘Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court 
of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 618, 618. 
3 See generally Mark Tushnet, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation’ in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press 2005). 
4 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 paras 47-48; Case C-601/15 PPU, J N v Staatssecretaris voor 
Veiligheid en Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:2016:84. 
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serious interference, the Court increasingly adopts a “process-oriented” approach to 
constitutional review.5 In so doing, the CJEU emphasises that the political process on the 
European level is primarily responsible for ensuring that the constitutional rights and 
principles enshrined in the EU Treaties are respected. Rather than second-guessing the 
merits of the EU legislature’s policy choices, process-oriented review is utilised to determine 
whether the EU institutions have considered all relevant facts and circumstances when 
legislating.6 This is achieved by scrutinising the legislative process and evidence base upon 
which contested EU legislation was enacted, resulting in “the gradual infiltration of 
procedural review into constitutional adjudication.”7 
These developments in the methodology and intensity of constitutional review of EU 
legislation then form the basis for evaluating the contemporary role of the CJEU within the 
post-Lisbon Treaty European Union.8 As shall be demonstrated below, the existing literature 
on the Court has not yet fully considered how the practice of constitutional review of EU 
legislation has shifted over time.  
In seeking to provide a novel perspective on the changing role of the CJEU (and its 
contribution to the European integration project more generally), it is contended that the 
Lisbon Treaty reforms have had a profound impact upon the Court’s approach to 
constitutional review. 
With regards to constitutional constraints upon EU legislative power, considerable changes 
have been made to the monitoring and enforcement of those principles that seek to uphold 
the EU’s “federal order of competences.”9 Furthermore, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(CFR) now shares the same legal status as the EU Treaties, thus empowering the CJEU to 
 
5 K Lenaerts, ‘The European Court of Justice and Process-Oriented Review’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European 
Law 3. 
6 Jacob Öberg, ‘The Rise of the Procedural Paradigm: Judicial Review of EU Legislation in Vertical Competence 
Disputes’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 248. 
7 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘Semiprocedural Judicial Review’ (2012) 6 Legisprudence 271, 271. 
8 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C 306, p. 1–271. 
9 See in particular the principles of Conferral, Subsidiarity and Proportionality enshrined in Article 5 TEU; Armin 
Von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, ‘The Federal Order of Competences’ in Armin Von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast 
(eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2009). 
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conduct fundamental rights review on the basis of a constitutionally-entrenched Bill of 
Rights.10  
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has also fundamentally altered the concept of 
legislation in the EU.11 Today, for the first time in the history of the European integration 
project, a procedural or parliamentary definition of EU legislative power is provided by the 
EU Treaties.12 EU legislation is now formally defined as legislative acts adopted in 
accordance with specific legislative procedures.13 Ordinarily, this involves the joint adoption 
of Commission proposals by the European Parliament and Council; with the latter two 
institutions representing the European citizenry and the Member States respectively.14  
Finally, Protocol No.2 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty - coupled with a series of “Better 
Regulation” initiatives - have placed the EU legislature under an increased number of 
procedural obligations in recent years.15 This increased degree of “proceduralisation” means 
that the EU institutions must now consult widely, actively consider alternative policy options 
and support their decisions with robust reasoning at all stages of the legislative process.16  
It is contended that the abovementioned shifts in the methodology and intensity of 
constitutional review fit within this wider context of recent constitutional and legislative 
reforms. By engaging in high intensity review of serious infringements of fundamental 
rights, the Court’s jurisprudence is consistent with the elevation of the Charter to the apex 
of the EU’s constitutional order.17 Similarly, by scrutinising the legislative process and 
evidence base of EU legislation when determining its constitutionality, the emergence of 
 
10 Article 6(1) TEU. 
11 Jürgen Bast, ‘New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law’ 
(2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 885. 
12 Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 152. 
13 Article 289(3) TFEU. 
14 Article 10(1) TEU and Article 289(1) TFEU. 
15 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Protocols - Protocol (No 2) on 
the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality [2008] OJ C 115, p. 206–209.; Inter-
institutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the 
European Commission on Better Law-Making,  [2016] OJ L 123, p. 1–14. 
16 Patricia Popelier, ‘Preliminary Comments on the Role of Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs’ (2012) 6 
Legisprudence 257, 257. 
17 Damian Chalmers, ‘Judicial Authority and the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 448, 459. 
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process-oriented review may be seen as a direct response to the increased 
proceduralisation of law-making.18  
It is submitted that these changes in the practice of constitutional review of EU legislation 
demonstrate a Court that is responsive to the wider legal and political context in which it 
now operates. Whereas the Court has long been criticised for failing to subject EU legislation 
to meaningful judicial scrutiny, recent case law establishes that it now takes its 
responsibility for constitutional review more seriously.19 The post-Lisbon Treaty 
jurisprudence displays a finely calibrated, variable intensity approach to constitutional 
review.  
These contemporary developments also require one to reconsider those accounts which 
portray the CJEU as behaving in an “activist” or unwaveringly “pro-integrationist” fashion. In 
putting forward an alternative perspective on the modern role of the Court, it is contended 
that the CJEU now operates as a veritable Constitutional Court whose primary task is that of 
upholding the “checks and balances” of a “more mature” EU legal order.20  
In laying the foundations for these arguments, the remainder of Chapter 1 sets out the key 
changes which led to the emergence of a distinct practice of constitutional review of EU 
legislation. This is followed by an elaboration of the claim that the post-Lisbon Treaty 
jurisprudence of the Court contains a series of shifts in the methodology and intensity of 
constitutional review. The final section of this introductory chapter situates these findings 
within the wider literature on the role of the CJEU and its contribution to the European 
integration process. 
2.) The Rise of Constitutional Review of Legislation in the European Union 
Understood generally as the power of courts to strike down or dis-apply legislation that is 
incompatible with provisions of a hierarchically superior Constitution, the practice of 
 
18 Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of the Evidence-Based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s 
Semiprocedural Review’ (2013) 1 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 327. 
19 For criticisms see Gabriél A Moens and John Trone, ‘The Principle Of Subsidiarity in EU Judicial And 
Legislative Practice: Panacea Or Placebo?’ (2015) 41 Journal of Legislation 65; Jason Coppel and Aidan O’Neill, 
‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 669. 
20 Koen Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks: A Study on Judicial Legitimacy’ (2013) 36 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1302, 1309. 
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constitutional review is now a feature of the majority of national legal systems around the 
world.21 Despite innumerable differences in structure, composition, powers and procedures, 
it is generally accepted that courts empowered with the task of conducting constitutional 
review of legislation typically engage in two key tasks.22  
The first is to resolve boundary disputes between branches or levels of government in legal 
systems that constitutionally divide power. This is often referred to as structural 
constitutional review. In legal orders that distribute power along federal lines, this involves 
“the interpretation and enforcement of the division of powers that is part of federal 
constitutions as well as the enforcement of those provisions establishing the basic 
institutions of government.”23  
The second core task performed by courts entrusted with reviewing the constitutionality of 
legislation is to uphold the fundamental rights of individuals against infringements by the 
actions (or inactions) of those wielding public power.24 
a.) The Origins of Judicial Review in the European Economic Community 
When viewed against this basic template, the original role of the CJEU as set down in the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC)25 was in no way analogous to 
that of national courts tasked with reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.26 Not only 
was there no constitutionally entrenched bill of fundamental rights, but the Court’s 
 
21 Writing in 2008, Ginsberg noted that 158 out of 191 constitutional systems include some formal provision 
for constitutional review Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Global Spread of Constitutional Review’ in Gregory A Caldeira, R 
Daniel Kelemen and Keith E Whittington (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University 
Press 2008) 81. 
22 Martin Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy’ (1998) 32 Israel Law Review 
3, 4; For an overview see Allan-Randolph Brewer Carías, Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: a 
Comparative Law Study (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
23 A Stone, ‘Judicial Review without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Judicial 
Review’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 2; Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial 
Review’ [2006] The Yale Law Journal 1346, 1357–1358. 
24 Shapiro (n 22) 4; According to Cappelletti, “constitutionalism and federalism have been the two major 
political forces leading to, and providing the intellectual justification for, judicial review of legislation” Mauro 
Cappelletti, ‘The Mighty Problem of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis Symposium: 
Conference on Comparative Constitutional Law’ (1979) 53 Southern California Law Review 409, 430. 
25 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. 
26 Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial 
Policymaking (M Nijhoff ; Distributors, for the US and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers 1986) 209. 
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jurisdiction was not directed towards addressing the sorts of division of competences issues 
routinely dealt with in national legal systems.27 
The CJEU was initially designed as an administrative court, whose principal task was to 
review the legality of executive-type measures enacted by the supranational European 
Commission and/or the intergovernmental Council of Ministers.28 In discharging this 
responsibility, Article 173 EEC provided the Court with only four grounds of review. These 
were: lack of competence; infringement of an essential procedural requirement; 
infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application and misuse of 
powers.29 
This administrative law framework of judicial review applied within a European Economic 
Community whose core purpose was to establish a Common Market and progressively 
approximate the economic policies of its Member States. 30 Unlike the wide variety of 
legislative competences enjoyed by the modern European Union of 28 Member States, the 
law-making powers of the EEC were geared towards adopting complex technical regulations 
in policy fields such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The early decades of the 
European integration project were thus characterized by a functional, market making logic. 
As a result, the “core subject matter of the Court’s early jurisdiction” allowed it to focus “on 
issues of relatively low political salience and thus to develop its jurisprudence protected 
behind a veil of technocratic obscurantism.”31 
b.) The Gradual Emergence of “Constitutional” Review  
The Court’s role slowly began to change following successive rounds of Treaty amendment, 
on the one hand, and a series of landmark judgments from the CJEU itself, on the other. In 
 
27 Loïc Azoulai and Renaud Dehousse, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Legal Dynamics of Integration’ in 
Erik Jones, Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 352. 
28 Anne Boerger-De Smedt, ‘Negotiating the Foundations of European Law, 1950–57: The Legal History of the 
Treaties of Paris and Rome’ (2012) 21 Contemporary European History 339, 346–353. Both the Commission 
and Council initially lacked any form of “legislative” power. Under the EEC Treaty, they merely had a power to 
“take decisions.” See Articles 145 and 155 EEC respectively. 
29 Article 173 EEC. 
30 Article 2 EEC. 
31 R Daniel Kelemen, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 79 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 117, 118. 
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particular, an increasingly “constitutional” dimension came to be added to the CJEU’s task of 
reviewing the legality of EU legal acts.32  
The first major development in this regard was the Court establishing that fundamental 
rights formed part of the EEC legal order as unwritten general principles of law.33 This was 
followed by the insertion of the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality into 
the EU Treaties by the Treaty of Maastricht.34 In light of increased concerns about EU 
“competence creep”, these structural constitutional principles were added in an attempt to 
more clearly delineate the division of powers between the EU and its Member States.35 
These novel constitutional limits upon the existence and exercise of EU legislative power 
served to add an increasingly “constitutional function” to the Court’s role.36 Unlike its 
original mandate under the EEC Treaty, the Court came to be increasingly involved in 
reviewing EU legislation for its compliance with Treaty-based principles that sought to 
uphold the EU’s “federal order of competences.”37 Most recently, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has been elevated to the same, “constitutional” status as the EU 
Treaties following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.38  
When taken together, these developments have resulted in the CJEU now being responsible 
for reviewing EU legislation to ensure that it: (i) complies with the EU’s federal order of 
competences; and (ii) does not infringe the rights and principles contained in the Charter. As 
was noted above, when viewed in comparative perspective, these twin tasks serve as the 
 
32 As the Court famously held in Les Verts, ‘the European Economic Community is a Community based on the 
rule of law, inasmuch as...its institutions [cannot] avoid a review of the question whether the measures 
adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’ Case 294/83, Parti 
écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166 para 23. 
33 Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2006). 
34 See Article 5 TEU. 
35 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’ (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 1. 
36 Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Basic Constitutional Charter of a Community Based on the Rule of Law’ in Miguel Poiares 
Maduro and Loïc Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU law : The Classics of EU law Revisited on the 50th 
Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010) 298–303. 
37 Robert Schütze, ‘Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: A Prospective Analysis.’ (2008) 33 European 
Law Review 709; There is a wealth of literature analysing the post-Maastricht Treaty EU in federal terms, see 
generally Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance 
in the United States and the European Union (Oxford University Press 2001). 
38 Article 6(1) TEU. 
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hallmarks of constitutional review of legislation as performed by innumerable national 
constitutional and supreme courts.39 
c.) The Evolving Concept of “EU Legislation”  
Alongside these changes to the system of judicial review, there has also been a continual 
refinement of how the concept of “legislation” is understood in the EU. Initially, the law-
making powers of the institutions of the EEC were not conceived of as being akin to national 
conceptions of primary or parliamentary legislation.40 The dominance of the Commission 
and Council in the law-making process, coupled with minimal input from the Assembly (now 
European Parliament), meant that measures of Community law lacked the imprimatur of a 
veritable, democratically elected parliamentary body.41 As a result, legal acts adopted by 
Community institutions were conceived of as being functionally equivalent to delegated or 
secondary legislation adopted by the executive in national legal systems. 42 
In time, however, a series of amendments to the EU Treaties from the Single European Act 
1987 (SEA) onwards fundamentally altered: (i) the procedures and institutions involved in 
the adoption of EU legislation; (ii) the sources of democratic legitimacy underpinning EU 
legislation; and (ii) the status of EU legislation within the overall hierarchy of EU legal acts.43 
Of particular note here was the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) in 
the Council, and the concurrent empowerment of the directly elected European Parliament 
within in the law-making process.44  
As noted above in the introduction, the Treaty of Lisbon marks a watershed moment in the 
historical evolution of the concept of legislation in the EU. For the first time, a procedural or 
parliamentary definition of legislative power has been provided in the EU Treaties: 
according to which legal acts adopted by a legislative procedure shall constitute legislative 
 
39 Lenaerts, ‘The Basic Constitutional Charter of a Community Based on the Rule of Law’ (n 36) 298–303. 
40 Robert Schütze, ‘The Morphology of Legislative Power in the European Community: Legal Instruments and 
the Federal Division of Powers’ (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law 91, 92. 
41 The Assembly was only empowered to “exercise the powers of deliberation and of control”, Article 137 EEC. 
42 “From the viewpoint of national democracies, it seemed that all decision-making powers of the European 
Community were executive in character.” Schütze, ‘The Morphology of Legislative Power’ (n 40) 92. 
43 See generally Paul Craig, ‘Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance’ in P Craig and G De Búrca (eds), The 
Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
44 ibid 56–59. Direct elections to the European Parliament first occurred in 1979. 
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acts.45 These legislative acts are legally distinct from “non-legislative acts” adopted under 
different law-making procedures, thus elevating the status of legislative acts within the EU’s 
hierarchy of norms.46  Moreover, as the Lisbon Treaty makes clear: 
 
“The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. 
Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member 
States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or 
Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically 
accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.”47  
 
Consequently, primary EU legislation enacted in accordance with a legislative procedure is 
now explicitly founded upon the principle of representative democracy. Whereas the 
Commission represents the EU interest in proposing legislation, it is the European 
Parliament and Council who, together, provide a dual basis of democratic legitimacy to 
contemporary EU legislation.48  
d.) The Changing Subject Matter of Litigation 
This evolution in the Court’s powers of constitutional review and the concept of EU 
legislation has also been accompanied by a continuous expansion in the legislative 
competences of the EU as a whole. The EU has gained increased power to legislate across a 
variety of different fields; ranging from consumer protection and the environment to asylum 
and immigration policy and counter-terrorism measures. 49 Unlike the technical types of 
economic regulation that formed the subject matter of disputes in the past, the post-Lisbon 
Treaty era is one in which the CJEU is increasingly called upon to review the constitutionality 
of EU legislation dealing with highly sensitive, politically charged issues.50  
 
45 Article 289(3) TFEU; Schütze, European Constitutional Law (n 12) 152. 
46 See Articles 290-291 TFEU;  
47 Article 10(1) and (2) TEU. 
48 Alexander H Türk, ‘Lawmaking After Lisbon’ in Biondi et al (ed), EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford University Press 
2012). 
49 See generally Paul Craig, ‘Development of the EU’ in Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European 
Union Law (Oxford University Press 2017). 
50 Kelemen (n 31) 119. 
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For example, the Court has recently examined the constitutionality of EU legislation which: 
empowers national authorities to detain third country nationals who apply for international 
protection51; provides for the mass retention and processing of personal data52; effectively 
bans the trade in products procured from seal hunting 53 and regulates trade in such a way 
as to allegedly place excessive social and economic costs upon particular Member States.54 
Overall:  
“The establishment of a binding Charter of Fundamental rights, as well as the growth 
in the Union’s competences, has led to a European Court that many see as carrying a 
‘constitutional’ function. The European Courts increasingly decide cases that involve 
not just enforcing EU rights in national orders, but balancing various sensitive 
constitutional values (from freedom of expression to labour rights, non-
discrimination and beyond).”55  
Unlike previous epochs in the history of European integration, the post-Lisbon CJEU is 
required to balance a multitude of constitutionally entrenched rights and principles against 
the policy choices of an EU legislature underpinned by the principle of representative 
democracy.56 Consequently, the “interrelation between legislative discretion and judicial 
scrutiny” which forms “an ‘eternal’ question of any system of constitutional justice” has 
taken on increased prominence in recent years.57 
3.) The Changing Role of the Court of Justice  
Having established that a distinct practice of constitutional review of EU legislation now 
takes place within a far more politically contested environment, the question necessarily 
arises as to how the Court goes about performing this task?  
 
51 Case C-601/15, J. N. (n 4). 
52 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (n 4). 
53 Case C‑398/13 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:535. 
54 Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2016:323. 
55 Mark Dawson, ‘Constitutional Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures in the European Union: Prospects 
and Limits’ (2013) 19 European Public Law 369, 370. 
56 Thomas Von Danwitz, ‘Rule of Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ, The’ (2013) 37 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1311, 1328–1330. 
57 ibid 1328. 
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As noted above, the present study argues that there has been a notable shift in both the 
methodology and intensity of constitutional review of EU legislation in the post-Lisbon 
Treaty era. In contrast with its pre-Lisbon Treaty jurisprudence, the Court now subjects EU 
legislation to strict scrutiny whenever it places serious restrictions upon fundamental rights. 
In a further development, the CJEU has increasingly adopted a “process-oriented” approach 
to constitutional review in cases where EU legislation is contested on federalism and 
fundamental rights grounds. The Court places increased emphasis upon the legislative 
process and examines whether the EU institutions took all relevant facts and circumstances 
into account when making policy decisions. In so doing, the Court seeks to “develop guiding 
principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt 
their decisions.”58 
These claims may be situated within the wider literature on the CJEU and its changing role 
over time.  
a.) The Foundational Period: “Constitutionalising” the EEC Treaty 
Generally speaking, we may distinguish between three historical strands in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, each of which reveals something about its changing role over the course of 
the history of the European integration project.59  
During the first, “foundational” period in the early decades of the European Economic 
Community, the Court “constitutionalized” the EEC Treaty via a series of landmark 
judgments.60 According to the “standard constitutionalization thesis”61 that has gained 
widespread acceptance in the literature, the CJEU “fixed the relationship between 
 
58 Lenaerts, ‘Process-Oriented Review’ (n 5) 3. 
59 Dividing the Court’s jurisprudence into three distinct epochs is most commonly associated with the writings 
of the current President of the Court of Justice, see Koen Lenaerts, ‘Some Thoughts about the Interaction 
between Judges and Politicians’ [1992] University of Chicago Legal Forum 93; Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks’ (n 
20). Similar accounts of the changing role of the Court over distinct periods in the history of the European 
integration project include Ditlev Tamm, ‘The History of the Court of Justice of the European Union Since Its 
Origin’ in Allan Rosas, Egil Levits and Yves Bot (eds), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: 
Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-Law (Asser Press 2013); Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘The Changing 
Constitutional Role of the European Court of Justice’ (2006) 34 International Journal of Legal Information 223; 
Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ [1991] Yale Law Journal 2403. 
60 Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 59) 2410–2431. 
61 Paul Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law: Foundations and Challenges (Cambridge University Press 
2015) 410 and literature cited therein. 
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Community law and Member State law and rendered that relationship indistinguishable 
from analogous legal relationships in constitutional federal states.”62 
By finding that: (i) individuals could rely directly on provisions of primary and secondary 
Community law in national courts (direct effect)63; (ii) Community law overrides any 
provision of national law in cases of conflict (supremacy)64; (iii) the grant of internal 
competences to the Community institutions in the Treaties necessarily implies an external, 
treaty-making power (implied powers)65; and (iv) measures of Community law are subject to 
fundamental rights review (fundamental rights)66, the Court “fashioned a constitutional 
framework for a federal-type structure in Europe.”67  
As the familiar narrative goes, the establishment of these doctrines meant that the 
“operating system” of the EEC was no longer governed by the principles of public 
international law, “but by a specified interstate governmental structure defined by a 
constitutional charter and constitutional principles.”68 The Court’s jurisprudence during this 
foundational period “transformed the European Union from an international organization 
into a composite legal order”69 and “helped turn a public-international-law construction into 
a truly novel legal order…containing the essence of a federal system.”70  
b.) Safeguarding the Core of European Integration: Overcoming Legislative Inertia 
Following this phase of constitutionalisation, a second strand in the historical evolution of 
the Court’s jurisprudence may be detected. Having laid the constitutional foundations of the 
Community legal order, the CJEU then moved to “safeguard the core of European 
integration set out in the Treaty.” This was achieved by “providing solutions to problems 
 
62 Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 59) 2413; Turkuler Isiksel, Europe’s Functional Constitution: A 
Theory of Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Oxford University Press 2016) Chapter 2; Matej Avbelj, 
‘Questioning EU Constitutionalisms’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1.  
63 Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
64 Case C-6/64, Flamino Costa v ENEL, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66,. 
65 Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA) ECLI:EU:C:1971:32. 
66 Case 29-69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm - Sozialamt, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57,. 
67 Eric Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 American Journal of 
International Law 1, 1; Renaud Dehousse, The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration (St 
Martin’s Press 1998) Chapter 2. 
68 Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 59) 2407; Paul Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the 
European Union’ (2001) 7 European Law Journal 125, 128 (footnotes omitted). 
69 Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks’ (n 20) 1306. 
70 Lenaerts, ‘Judges and Politicians’ (n 59) 94. 
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that were expected to be tackled by the EU political institutions but were not in practice as 
the latter could not reach the then necessary consensus.”71  
The classic example here is the Court’s landmark judgment in Cassis de Dijon, which 
established the principle of mutual recognition.72 According to this principle, in the absence 
of common rules at Community level, goods lawfully produced in one Member State should 
be admitted into the territory of any other Member State, unless the state of import is able 
to successfully justify a restriction to the general free movement principle.73  
By establishing the principle of mutual recognition, the Court played a key role in liberalising 
intra-Community trade at a time when the law-making process in the Commission and 
Council was suffering from a prolonged period of inertia. Rather than waiting for the 
political process on the European level to respond, the judicially created principle of mutual 
recognition provided the legal means necessary for individuals to contest national 
regulatory practices that impeded free movement within the internal market.74 Through its 
jurisprudence, the Court therefore sought solutions to “political deadlock that prevented 
the completion of the internal market, as free movers sought to tear down barriers to trade 
that could have been eliminated by EU harmonization.”75 By seizing the initiative and driving 
forward the integration process for itself, the judgment in Cassis de Dijon is frequently cited 
in support of the “common view…that the [CJEU] is most expansionist in its interpretations 
when the political process is blocked.”76 
When considered together, the jurisprudence of the CJEU during these first two historical 
strands illustrates the changing role of the Court over time. It also demonstrates the direct 
interaction between political and judicial processes on the Community level.77 By “focusing 
 
71 Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks’ (n 20) 1308. 
72 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesrnonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42. 
73 ibid paras 8, 14-15. 
74 Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 205–206. 
75 Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks’ (n 20) 1308; Karen J Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, ‘Judicial Politics in 
the European Community: European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision’ (1994) 26 
Comparative Political Studies 535, 555. 
76 Karen J Alter, The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press 2009) 4; Joseph 
HH Weiler, ‘The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism’ (1981) 1 Yearbook of European 
Law 267. 
77 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Some Thoughts about the Interaction between Judges and Politicians’ (1992) University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 93, 95. 
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on the pressing institutional and legal needs of the European Community for successive 
periods of time” the CJEU adapted its role in response to those needs.78  
c.) Upholding the Checks and Balances of the EU Legal Order 
This brings us to a third and final strand in the CJEU’s jurisprudence. Following its success in 
laying the constitutional foundations of the Community legal order and establishing the 
conditions necessary for completing the internal market, the Court “moved onto a new 
paradigm.”79 In contrast to its role as an “engine” or “motor”80 of European integration 
during the first two epochs, “the third strand came to the forefront when the political 
process regained the strength to make policy decisions and pass necessary legislation.”81  
The beginnings of this third, distinct epoch in the historical evolution of Court’s role may be 
traced back to the abovementioned reforms of the Single European Act in 1987 and the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1993.82 By extending Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council 
to key fields of policymaking, these reforms greatly enhanced the efficiency of the law-
making process in the Community.83 In addition, an enhanced degree of democratic 
legitimacy was injected into the Community law-making process by continuously expanding 
the powers of the European Parliament.84 Following the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the European Parliament had attained the status of a veritable co-legislature with 
the Council in key areas of Community law-making.85 
These changes to the law-making process had a profound impact upon the balance of power 
between the Community institutions and the Member States, which in turn led to an 
increased number of challenges to the legality of Community legislation. The Council, 
European Parliament and Commission became involved in numerous disputes over the 
correct legal basis (and, by extension, the correct law-making procedure to be followed) for 
 
78 ibid 94. 
79 Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks’ (n 20) 1309. 
80 Mark A Pollack, The Engines of European Integration (Oxford University Press 2003). 
81 Lenaerts, ‘Judges and Politicians’ (n 59) 95 (emphasis original); See also Cruz (n 59) 237–245. 
82 Treaty on European Union (TEU), together with the Complete Text of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (EC) [1992] OJ C 224, p. 1–130. 
83 Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 59) 2456–2461. 
84 Craig, ‘Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance’ (n 43) 56–59. 
85 Article 189b EC. 
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adopting measures of Community law.86 Furthermore, Member States who had been 
outvoted in the Council under the novel QMV rules came to more frequently contest the 
legality of Community legislation before the Court.87 
The SEA and Maastricht reforms thus represent a “turning point in Community history.”88 
With the political process on the European level gathering momentum, the role of the Court 
shifted away from driving forward the process of European integration through a creative, 
teleological approach to Treaty interpretation.89 According to Lenaerts, as “the 
constitutional court of a more mature legal order”, the post-Maastricht CJEU “now tends to 
be less assertive as to the substantive development of EU law.” Instead, it “now sees its role 
primarily as one of upholding the ‘checks and balances’ built into the EU constitutional legal 
order of States and peoples, including the protection of fundamental rights.”90   
4.) Surveying the Landscape: Existing Literature on the Role of the Court 
It is widely recognised in the literature that the CJEU now performs a number of tasks 
analogous to national constitutional and supreme courts.91 For the purposes of the present 
enquiry, it is generally acknowledged that the CJEU of today is “called upon regularly to 
settle questions regarding the allocation of powers among the various bodies within the EU 
legal order and to defend the fundamental rights and principles of good governance, as 
defined by the treaties.”92  
Despite these general points of consensus, however, there has been surprisingly little 
consideration of how the CJEU actually conducts constitutional review of EU legislation and, 
 
86 Kieran St Clair Bradley, ‘The European Court and the Legal Basis of Community Legislation’ (1988) 13 
European Law Review 379. 
87 Leonor Moral Soriano, ‘Vertical Juridical Disputes over Legal Bases’ (2007) 30 West European Politics 321, 
326. 
88 Lenaerts, ‘Judges and Politicians’ (n 59) 132. 
89 For discussion of this possibility see Federico Mancini, ‘The Making of a Constitution for Europe’ (1989) 26 
Common Market Law Review 595, 613. 
90 Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks’ (n 20) 1309; Lenaerts, ‘Judges and Politicians’ (n 59) 132. 
91 Monica Claes and Maartje de Visser, ‘The European Court of Justice as a Federal Constitutional Court: A 
Comparative Perspective’ in Elke Cloots, Geert de Baere and Stefan Sottiaux (eds), Federalism in the European 
Union (Hart Publishing 2012); Alicia Hinarejos, Judicial Control in the European Union (Oxford University Press 
2009) 1 at fn 2 and literature cited therein. 




crucially, whether this has also changed over time.93 In particular, the extent to which shifts 
may be detected in the methodology or intensity of constitutional review of EU legislation 
has not featured prominently in existing works on the Court. Instead, much of the 
scholarship focuses on the Court’s creative approach to interpreting provisions of primary 
and secondary EU law and the impact that this has had upon individuals and/or the legal 
orders of the Member States.94 
And yet, understanding how the CJEU goes about scrutinising EU legislation for compliance 
with a series of constitutionally entrenched rights and principles goes to the very heart of 
understanding its modern role as a constitutional court within a more mature EU legal 
order. Not only does the intensity with which the CJEU reviews EU legislation impact upon 
the balance of power between Court and the EU legislature, it also carries direct 
implications for the balance of competences between the EU and its Member States more 
generally.95  
As Tridimas and Gari point out, “it makes a difference whether a Court which has ultimate 
authority to determine the outer bounds of political power trumps the government’s 
choices frequently, sometimes, or rarely.”96 Thus, the way in which the Court approaches its 
task of reviewing the constitutionality of EU legislation “tells us something about the gap 
between political and judicial values, namely the differential between, on the one hand, 
political wisdom (the outcomes of the balancing exercises drawn by the ruling majority) and, 
on the other hand, the judges' own internalised conception of justice…”97 Moreover, “the 
 
93 A good illustration of this oversight can be seen in ‘Perpetual Momentum? Reconsidering the Power of the 
European Court of Justice’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy. Of the 8 contributions to this special 
issue of the journal, none discussed the Court’s task of reviewing the constitutionality of EU legislation or 
whether its approach had changed over time. 
94 As a representative sample only, see Thomas Horsley, The Court of Justice of the European Union as an 
Institutional Actor: Judicial Lawmaking and Its Limits (Cambridge University Press 2018); R Daniel Kelemen and 
Susanne K Schmidt (eds), The Power of the European Court of Justice (Routledge 2014); Rachel A Cichowski, 
The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, Mobilization and Governance (Cambridge University Press 
2007); Alec Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford University Press 2004); Even Weiler’s 
seminal work on the Transformation of Europe explicitly opts not to examine judicial review of Community 
legal acts; choosing instead to focus on the ways in which the laws of the Member States have been reviewed 
by the Court for their conformity with Community law and policy Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 59) 
2419. 
95 Öberg (n 6) 248–249. 
96 Gabriel Gari and Takis Tridimas, ‘Winners and Losers in Luxembourg: A Statistical Analysis of Judicial Review 
before the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (2001-2005)’ (2010) 35 European Law 
Review 131, 133. 
97 ibid 133–134. 
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larger this ‘value gap’, the greater the competition between the branches of government, 
the less predictable the standing and effect of rule-making, and the greater the temptation 
to use Courts as a means of influencing the decision-making process.”98 
a.) The Judicial Activism Debate 
In many legal systems where courts possess the power to review the constitutionality of 
legislation, the striking down of arguably constitutional actions of the legislative or 
administrative branches of government often carries with it the charge of “judicial 
activism.”99 “At the broadest level, judicial activism is any occasion where a court intervenes 
and strikes down a piece of duly enacted legislation.”100 
Within the EU context, however, the CJEU is seldom criticised as being activist in this 
sense.101 Indeed, the vast majority of contributions to the debate over the perceived judicial 
activism of the CJEU does not address its approach to reviewing the constitutionality of EU 
legislation. Instead, the longstanding disagreement amongst academics “is essentially 
concerned with assessing the extent to which the [CJEU] is considered to have properly or 
improperly overstepped the limits of its judicial function through the exercise of its 
interpretative discretion.”102  
Allegations of judicial activism tend to be supported by references to those landmark 
judgments of the Court that were handed down during the first two epochs in the historical 
evolution of the European integration project (see above). According to this critique, a 
number of the CJEU’s landmark judgments from those periods unacceptably departed from 
the express wording of the Treaties.103 The Court is accused of promoting a pro-
 
98 ibid 134. 
99 Corey Rayburn Yung, ‘Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts’ 
(2015) 105 Northwestern University Law Review 1, 11–12; Keenan D Kmiec, ‘The Origin and Current Meanings 
of “Judicial Activism”’ (2004) 92 California Law Review 1441, 1463; Frederick L Morton, ‘Judicial Activism in 
France’ in Kenneth M Holland (ed), Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan UK 1991). 
100 Greg Jones, ‘Proper Judicial Activism’ (2001) 14 Regent University Law Review 141, 143. 
101 Anthony Arnull, ‘Judicial Activism and the European Court of Justice : How Should Academics Respond?’ in 
Mark Dawson, Bruno de Witte and Elise Muir (eds), Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2013) 216. 
102 Thomas Horsley, ‘Reflections on the Role of the Court of Justice as the "Motor” of European Integration: 
Legal Limits to Judicial Lawmaking’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 931, 931–932 and literature cited at 
fn 2. 
103 Patrick Neil, The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism (European Policy 
Forum/Frankfurter Institut 1995); Rasmussen (n 26). 
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integrationist political agenda and straying beyond the confines of the judicial function, as 
its judges promoted “une certaine idée de l’Europe” of their own.104 
In response, defenders of the Court argue that the Treaties were a result of diplomatic 
compromise which were intentionally drafted in ambiguous language. Moreover, the 
Treaties were clearly imbued with an ethos of creating an ever closer union amongst the 
peoples of Europe through enhanced cooperation between European states. In light of 
these unique conditions, the Court was left with no choice but to fill the gaps in the 
Community legal order through a purposive or teleological approach to Treaty 
interpretation.105 As Tridimas argued:   
“The vision of furthering European integration is inherent, and expressly referred to, 
in the Treaties. No persuasive argument has so far been made why, in exercising its 
interpretative function, it would not be legitimate for the Court to seek guidance 
from the spirit and the scheme of the Treaties and to seek to further integration.”106 
By focusing upon the CJEU’s methodology when interpreting Treaty articles and provisions 
of secondary law, however, both sides in the judicial activism debate tend not to address 
the question of constitutional review of EU legislation in any detail.107 This omission is by no 
means unique to the “classic” judicial activism literature from the latter decades of the 20th 
century. Despite becoming “a fashionable topic of academic commentary once again,”108 
recent contributions to this body of scholarship similarly overlook the Court’s approach to 
constitutional review of EU legislation.109 
 
 
104 Pierre Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law’ (1983) 8 European 
Law Review 155, 157; Arnull (n 101) 218; Neil (n 103) 2. 
105 Takis Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’ (1996) 21 European Law Review 199; Anthony 
Arnull, ‘The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: A Reply to Professor Hartley’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly 
Review 411. 
106 Tridimas (n 105) 205 (footnotes omitted). 
107 Leczykiewicz notes that rather than addressing the Court’s approach to constitutional review, “most 
contributions on the ECJ” focus on its “law-making activity, also described…as judicial activism” Dorota 
Leczykiewicz, ‘“Constitutional Justice” and Judicial Review of EU Legislative Acts’ in Dimitry Kochenov, G De 
Búrca and Andrew Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Hart Publishing 2015) 100. 
108 Mark Dawson, Bruno de Witte and Elise Muir, ‘Introduction’ in Mark Dawson, Bruno de Witte and Elise 
Muir (eds), Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 1. 
109 Horsley (n 102); Iyiola Solanke, ‘“Stop the ECJ”?: An Empirical Analysis of Activism at the Court’ (2011) 17 
European Law Journal 764; Henri de Waele, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration 
Process: A Contemporary and Normative Assessment’ (2010) 6 Hanse Law Review 3. 
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b.) Overlooking the Evolution of Constitutional Review 
All of this should not be taken to mean that the Court’s task of reviewing the legality of 
measures of EU law has been entirely neglected in the literature. There are, of course, many 
works dealing with judicial review on those grounds originally enshrined in Article 173 EEC 
and subsequently fleshed out by general principles of European law.110 
What has been lacking to date, however, is any systematic consideration of how the CJEU’s 
task of reviewing the constitutionality of EU legislation has shifted over time and, more 
broadly, what this means for the contemporary role of the CJEU. Whereas many scholars 
agree that the Courts’ role came to be more closely analogous to that of national 
constitutional courts following the Maastricht Treaty, a key part of that “constitutional” role 
has not yet been fully explored.   
This gap in the existing literature is even more pronounced when one considers that both 
the Court’s powers of review and the concept of EU legislation have changed considerably 
since the early 1990s. Consequently, the Court’s task of upholding the “checks and 
balances” of a more mature EU legal order looks very different today than it did at the time 
of the Maastricht Treaty entering into force. 
As was noted above, recent Treaty reforms and an increased emphasis upon “Better 
Regulation” have sought to improve the means through which compliance with the EU’s 
“federalism” principles can be monitored and enforced.111 Furthermore, the constitutional 
entrenchment of a comprehensive Bill of Rights has placed the Charter at “the very 
centrepiece of the EU legal order.”112 In turn, this has had a considerable impact upon the 
Court’s powers of constitutional review and, by extension, its place within the overall 
balance of powers between the EU institutions. Finally, the concept of legislation has 
 
110 Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law (n 61) Chapters 3 and 4; Tridimas (n 33) Chapter 3; DG 
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112 Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz and Stephen Weatherill, ‘Introduction’ in Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz and Stephen 
Weatherill (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument : Five Years Old and Growing 
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continued to evolve from Maastricht to the present day, with primary EU legislation now 
defined as legislative acts adopted in accordance with a legislative procedure.113  
Overall, “these treaty changes have had a profound effect on the character of the Union and 
the balance of power between the institutions and Member States involved in the legislative 
process.”114 As Granger notes, these momentous changes to both the system of 
constitutional review and the EU legislative process since Maastricht “pose new challenges 
to the Court of Justice, whose implications on integration dynamics have not been fully 
analysed.”115 Indeed, “[m]ost scholarly work on legal and political integration has addressed 
judicial and legislative interactions before the great enlargement of 2004.”116 Accordingly, 
“[s]cholarship on legal integration not only sidelines many of the post-Maastricht 
developments, they also overlook an important area of judicial activity, the review of EU 
measures (annulment actions or preliminary rulings concerning the validity of EU measures) 
and their consequences on EU policy and political processes…”117 
5.) The Shifting Intensity of Constitutional Review 
When it comes to the capacity of a court to review the exercise of legislative or executive 
power, a range of options exist “from classifying it as a non-justiciable (political) question to 
fully substituting a political compromise with a judicial solution.”118 In between these two 
extremes - which sit at opposite ends of a spectrum - courts may subject contested legal 
acts to varying degrees of judicial scrutiny.119 In essence, the question boils down to how 
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intrusively a court should as scrutinise legal acts which establish a particular balance 
between competing interests.120  
a.) Low Intensity Review 
Within the EU legal order, two key variables determine the intensity with which the CJEU 
will review the constitutionality of EU legislation. The first is the scope or margin of 
discretion to be afforded to the EU legislature when enacting policy choices into law. The 
second is the intensity with which the Court chooses to review those exercises of 
discretion.121 As AG Villalón has recently confirmed, “the intensity of the judicial review 
which the Court carries out concerning…a measure adopted by the European Union 
legislature is directly linked to the discretion available to the latter.”122 Simply stated, 
therefore, the wider the scope of discretion afforded to the EU legislature in a given case, 
the lower the intensity with which the CJEU will review the constitutionality of contested EU 
legislation. 
According to established case law, when exercising the powers conferred upon it in the 
Treaties, the EU legislature “must be allowed a broad discretion in areas in which its action 
involves political, economic and social choices and in which it is called upon to undertake 
complex assessments and evaluations.”123 In such circumstances, the Court will only review 
whether the contested legal act is “vitiated by a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of 
powers, or whether the legislature has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion.”124 
Similarly, the Court will often only consider whether such measures are “manifestly 
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to 
pursue.”125 
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For much of the history of the European integration project, this recognition of a wide scope 
of discretion, coupled with a “light-touch” approach to review, was the norm when 
reviewing policy choices of the European institutions.126 In particular, when it came to 
reviewing EU measures against those Treaty-based principles that seek to uphold the EU’s 
federal order of competences (i.e. conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality)127, the general 
perception was that the Court had failed to place meaningful limits upon legislative 
powers.128 
The same was true where European laws were challenged on the grounds that they 
excessively restricted fundamental rights protected by Union law. For the most part, these 
cases concerned claims that rights of an economic nature, such as the right to property or 
freedom to pursue economic activity, had been disproportionately restricted by the 
European legislature.129 Invariably, the Court would uphold the validity of the contested 
measure, swiftly concluding that such restrictions were proportionate, provided they did not 
infringe the essence or substance of the rights in question.130  
Consequently, annulments of European legislation for overstepping the boundaries of 
competence or impermissibly restricting fundamental rights was rather rare.131 Indeed, the 
infrequency with which the Court struck down legislation in the past led some to distinguish 
the CJEU’s practice of review from that of national constitutional and supreme courts.132 
Beyond these empirical assessments of the number of legislative annulments over time, it 
has also been contended that the Court’s jurisprudence evinces a general bias in favour of 
EU legislation and further integration. According to a familiar line of argument, the Court 
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subjects the laws and policies of the Member States to far more rigorous judicial scrutiny 
than EU legal acts when reviewing the former’s legality (particularly within the context of 
the fundamental freedoms of the internal market).133 Echoing aspects of the 
abovementioned judicial activism debate, this double standard of review is often viewed as 
part of the Court’s wider, pro-integrationist agenda.134 
b.) Constitutional Review in the Post-Lisbon Treaty Era 
In questioning the continued validity of these assertions, the chapters which follow 
demonstrate how the methodology and intensity of constitutional review of EU legislation 
has changed in recent years. Following the abovementioned changes to the CJEU’s powers 
of review, on the one hand, and the EU legislative process, on the other, it is contended that 
the modern jurisprudence of the Court reveals a marked departure with past practice. 
Whilst the Treaty reforms at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice made considerable changes 
to the EU’s legal and political framework, it was not until the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty that discernible shifts in the case law of the Court began to emerge. 
Crucially, the present study does not provide an empirical assessment of the number of 
annulments of EU legal acts in previous eras and then compare them with the post-Lisbon 
situation.135 Instead, the aim is to look beyond the binary nature of findings of validity or 
invalidity to consider the evolving reasoning of the CJEU in constitutional review cases. 
Whilst empirical analyses of the frequency of annulments are useful for predicting the 
likelihood of success in challenging measures of EU law in different policy fields, they cannot 
register shifts in the intensity with which judicial review is conducted over time.  
As we shall discover in due course, the novel practice of variable intensity review has not 
always resulted in the contested measure being annulled. However, these changes in levels 
of judicial scrutiny have not gone unnoticed by the EU legislature, who is on notice that 
future legislative enactments will be subject to similarly robust examination. The approach 
taken here thus follows that of Weiler, who notes that “from what the Court says 
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(constitutionally) we can learn a lot about what the Court is, or more accurately, what the 
Court believes itself to be, or, at least, claims to be.”136  
Taking this insight as its starting point, it is argued that recent judgments confirm that the 
Court will abandon its traditional, light-touch approach to review in cases where EU 
legislation places serious restrictions upon fundamental rights or core constitutional 
principles. For example, in the landmark Schrems judgment of 2015, the Court held for the 
first time ever that where EU legislation compromises the “essence” of fundamental rights, 
it will be annulled on that basis alone.137 As a result, infringements of the “essence” of rights 
protected by the Charter cannot be justified with reference to objectives in the EU’s general 
interest.138 There is no need for the Court to review the balance struck by the EU legislature 
between fundamental rights and the pursuit of policy objectives in the EU general interest. 
Once the threshold of “essence” has been crossed, the EU legislation will henceforth be 
deemed unconstitutional.  
Beyond interferences with the essence of fundamental rights, the CJEU has also recently 
held in another first that, “the extent of the EU legislature’s discretion may prove to be 
limited, depending on a number of factors, including…the area concerned, the nature of the 
right at issue guaranteed by the Charter, the nature and seriousness of the interference and 
the object pursued by the interference.”139 In Digital Rights Ireland, the nature of the rights 
at issue in the case, coupled with the seriousness of the interference caused by the 
contested EU legislation, meant that “the EU legislature’s discretion is reduced, with the 
result that review of that discretion should be strict.”140 In carrying out this novel, high-
intensity approach to review, the Court closely scrutinised the substance of the contested 
legislation in order to determine whether it was “limited to what is strictly necessary in the 
light of the objective pursued.”141 
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This reduction in the scope of discretion and subsequent intensification of the standard of 
constitutional review has also recently been deployed when scrutinising whether EU 
legislation has infringed the principle of subsidiarity.142 In a notable shift away from the pre-
Lisbon position, AG Kokott has recently stated for the first time in the Court’s history that a 
“stricter judicial review of subsidiarity may be necessary where an EU measure exceptionally 
affects matters of national identity of the Member States (Article 4(2) TEU).”143 In the case at 
hand, however, there was “absolutely no suggestion of this and the review standard of a 
manifest error of assessment can therefore be retained.”144 Nonetheless, by relying directly 
upon the Court’s reasoning in Digital Rights Ireland, members of the Court have indicated a 
willingness to also engage in high-intensity or strict scrutiny of EU legislation in both 
federalism and fundamental rights cases. 
A subtle yet significant change in approach may also be detected in a number of post-Lisbon 
cases where EU legislation restricts or impinges upon constitutionally protected rights and 
principles to a certain (but not serious) extent.  
Here, the default position of the Court has been to show considerable deference to the EU 
legislature’s policy choices. It has emphasised that the political process on the EU level is 
primarily responsible for resolving substantive disputes over the federal balance of 
competences and the trade-offs between fundamental rights and general objectives. Rather 
than second-guessing the appropriateness of the EU legislature’s policy choices, the Court 
has increasingly examined whether the EU legislature has “done its work properly.”145 This is 
achieved by scrutinising the law-making process and evidence base upon which EU 
legislation was enacted, in order to determine whether the EU legislature took all relevant 
interests into account when legislating.146  
In federalism cases, the Court has made numerous references to Protocol.No2 annexed to 
the Lisbon Treaty, Impact Assessments and other preparatory documents utilised by the EU 
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institutions throughout the legislative process.147 Given the difficulties faced when trying to 
draw bright line distinctions between federal and state powers in many federal systems, the 
CJEU’s powers of review have recently been “directed toward maintaining a vital system of 
political and institutional checks on federal power, not on policing some absolute sphere of 
state autonomy.”148  
By examining whether the EU institutions actively considered different policy options and 
took concerns about Member State regulatory autonomy into account, the Court uses its 
powers of constitutional review to prompt the political process on the EU level to “operate 
in a fashion that is responsive to federalism concerns.”149 In this way, the emergence of 
process-oriented review in the contemporary EU legal order is reminiscent of procedural 
theories of judicial review stemming predominantly from the United States: “while we count 
on the political process to resolve most substantive disputes about governmental policy, we 
rely on courts to enforce the basic rules of that process.”150  
A similarly process-oriented style of review may be detected in a number of post-Lisbon 
Treaty fundamental rights cases. In particular, the CJEU has opted to review whether the EU 
legislature considered alternative policy options during the legislative process that were less 
restrictive of the rights in question.151 As a result, the Court scrutinises the process by which 
the EU legislature stuck the balance between rights and policy objective, rather than the 
merits of the balance ultimately struck itself.152 
6.) Conclusions: What Role for the CJEU? 
In light of these changes to the practice of constitutional review of EU legislation, it is 
contended that longstanding views of the Court as a “pro-integrationist” institution that 
seeks to enlarge and empower the Union at every opportunity should be revisited. For the 
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same reasons, it is necessary to re-evaluate accusations that the Court continues to behave 
in a “policymaking” or “activist” fashion by ignoring the clear wording of the Treaties in 
order to attain pro-integrationist policy outcomes. 153  
Recent shifts in the methodology and intensity of review offer an alternative perspective on 
the contemporary role of the CJEU and its wider contribution to the European integration 
project. By engaging in high intensity review of serious infringements of fundamental rights, 
the Court’s jurisprudence is consistent with the elevation of the Charter to the apex of the 
EU’s constitutional order. Similarly, by scrutinising the legislative process and evidence base 
of EU legislation when determining its constitutionality, the emergence of process-oriented 
review may be seen as a direct response to the increased proceduralisation of law-making. 
Far from operating in accordance with its own agenda in a manner that is divorced from the 
constitutional framework of the EU Treaties, therefore, post-Lisbon case law reveals a Court 
that is responsive to the wider legal and political context in which it now operates. By 
engaging in a finely calibrated, variable intensity approach to constitutional review of EU 
legislation, the contemporary role of the CJEU is that of a veritable constitutional court 
within a more mature EU legal order. 
These arguments shall be presented in 8 Chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the origins of judicial 
review under the EEC Treaty and the initial, administrative court role envisaged for the 
CJEU. Chapter 3 examines the jurisprudence of the Court within the legal and political 
context of the pre-SEA European Economic Community. It is contended that in both 
competence and fundamental rights contexts, the case law was emblematic of an era of 
“low-intensity constitutionalism” in the history of European integration. Chapter 4 deals 
with the first major reforms to the EEC Treaty and the changing nature of the Court’s role 
during this period. The Maastricht Treaty and the insertion of a series of federalism 
principles into the EU legal order is then analysed in Chapter 5. Despite significant changes 
to the constitutional framework of the EU during this period, it is argued that the post-
Maastricht era continued to evince a light-touch, tersely reasoned approach to 
constitutional review of EU legislation. Chapter 6 contains an overview of the salient 
reforms to the EU legal and political order as brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon. As we 
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shall see, these reforms have brought about a series of subtle yet significant shifts in the 
way in which the CJEU conducts constitutional review of EU legislation. This is first 
illustrated in Chapter 7, which argues that an increasingly process-oriented approach to 
constitutional review may be detected in federalism cases. This is complimented by Chapter 
8, which demonstrates that contemporary fundamental rights cases are characterised by a 
finely calibrated, variable intensity approach to constitutional review. Chapter 9 concludes 
by arguing that these shifts in the methodology and intensity of constitutional review 
demonstrate that the contemporary role of the CJEU is that of a veritable constitutional 




The Foundations of Judicial Review 
 
1.) Introduction 
In laying the foundations for analysing the changing role of the Court over time, Chapter 2 
begins with a general overview of the core elements of constitutional review of legislation 
as understood in many national legal systems. Once established, this is compared with both 
the concept of legislation and the judicial review powers of the Court of Justice under the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC) 
Treaties.1 Finally, the low intensity, tersely reasoned approach that the Court initially 
adopted when reviewing the legality of Community legal acts is analysed.  
2.) Constitutional Review in Comparative Perspective 
a.) Constitutional Supremacy 
The justification for constitutional review of legislation (also referred to simply as judicial 
review) ultimately stems from the status of the constitution as the highest ranking body of 
law within a given legal system. This was explicitly stated in the seminal US Supreme Court 
decision of Marbury v Madison, in which Chief Justice Marshall characterised the US 
constitution as the “fundamental and paramount law of the nation.”2 Typically, 
constitutions hold the status of the supreme law of the land because they establish the 
institutions of government, set out their powers, duties and responsibilities and provide for 
limitations on the exercise of public power.3  
In legal orders where constitutional review exists, courts are required to ensure that 
whenever legislation or other measures conflict with provisions of the hierarchically 
superior constitution, the latter prevails.4 
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“In democratic regimes, all judicial review methods have as their main purpose the 
guarantee of the supremacy of the constitution. Consequently, when constitutional 
courts exercise judicial review, they have the task of comparing statutes or primary 
legislation with the provisions of the Constitution. That is why judicial review is, 
fundamentally, a constitutional control of legislation or the exercise of judicial 
control over the constitutionality of legislation.”5 
The very premise upon which constitutional review of legislation is founded represents a 
break from the relatively stable constitutional orthodoxy of the 19th century. With the 
exception of the United States, the prevailing view throughout this period was that 
“constitutions could typically be revised at the discretion of the legislature; they prohibited 
review of the legality of statutes by the judiciary; and they did not contain substantive 
constraints, such as rights, on legislative authority.”6 Consequently, conflicts between 
legislation and a constitutional provision were either ignored by the judiciary or resolved in 
favour of the former.7 
b.) The Spread of Constitutional Review  
Today, despite many differences in structure and jurisdiction, the basic idea of entrusting 
courts with upholding the supremacy of the constitution against all other conflicting legal 
norms “has grown and spread to all parts of the world, and is now clearly a global 
phenomenon.”8 This “global spread” of constitutional review of legislation throughout the 
20th century thus represents a radical departure from the classic position that legislation 
enacted by the elected representatives of the people in Parliament was the supreme law of 
the land.9  
 
5 Allan-Randolph Brewer Carías, Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: a Comparative Law Study 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 20. 
6 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges (Oxford University Press 2000) 31. 
7 ibid. 
8 Albert HY Chen and Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘The Judiciary and Constitutional Review’ in Mark Tushnet, 
Thomas Fleiner and Cheryl Saunders (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (2013) 102. 
9 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review: And Why It May Not Matter’ (2003) 101 
Michigan Law Review 2744, 2744–2745; Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Global Spread of Constitutional Review’ in 
Gregory A Caldeira, R Daniel Kelemen and Keith E Whittington (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 




When viewed in comparative perspective, the practice of constitutional review of legislation 
typically involves two distinct categories of cases. The first is to settle competence disputes 
between different branches and/or levels of government in constitutional legal orders that 
divide power. The second is to protect fundamental human rights from excessive 
interference by those exercising public power.10 
As initially practiced in both the United States and continental European systems, however, 
constitutional review was exclusively concerned with the first of these two tasks.11 The 
constitutional jurisdiction of the courts was reserved for questions over which branch or 
level of government was competent to act in legal systems that divided power.12 As Shapiro 
noted towards the end of the 20th century: 
“Until recently we might have been quite confident that the really crucial part [of the 
constitution] must be the division of powers part. For until recently only political 
systems of a federal or quasi-federal nature enjoyed successful constitutional judicial 
review… But what of the rights part. The U.S. Supreme Court only began an active 
rights jurisprudence more than a hundred years after its founding.”13 
Fundamental rights adjudication was therefore not initially part of the mandate of those 
courts entrusted with constitutional review. Reviewing legislation for compliance with 
constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights was either not included in the text of the 
constitution itself, or such rights were considered to be non-justiciable and thus not part of 
the mandate of the judiciary.14  
Following the atrocities of the Second World War, however, constitutional law as a 
discipline (and the role of courts therein) witnessed a marked shift in emphasis.15 Protecting 
the fundamental rights of the individual now took on paramount importance. A “new 
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constitutionalism” emerged, involving an expansive role for courts in reviewing legislation 
against a number of constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights norms.16 In post-war 
continental Europe in particular, written constitutions were enacted that created powerful 
constitutional courts tasked with reviewing the constitutionality of legislation on both 
structural and fundamental rights grounds.17 As a result, constraining government within a 
system of democratic controls and protecting the fundamental rights of individuals suddenly 
rose to the top of the agenda.18 “As democratic reconstruction proceeded, higher-law 
constitutionalism became the new orthodoxy, replacing that of legislative sovereignty and 
the General Will.”19 
c.) Constitutional Review versus Democracy 
Despite this worldwide proliferation of constitutional review, however, the very legitimacy 
of courts striking down or otherwise declaring legislation to be unconstitutional continues to 
be widely debated in the literature.20 In nation states with strong traditions of government 
by elected majority, the prospect of constitutional review leading to a “government of 
judges” - whereby the judiciary substitutes its views for that of the democratic majority - has 
long been deliberated.21 Perhaps the most famous articulation of this problem is Bickel’s 
“countermajoritarian difficulty” as it pertains to the United States: 
“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our 
system. ... When the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the 
action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual 
people of the here and now; it exercises control, not on behalf of the prevailing 
majority, but against it. That, without mystical overtones, is what actually 
happens...”22 
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Many of the debates surrounding constitutional review of legislation thus come back, 
ultimately, to a fundamental tension between “two of our most important political ideals – 
constitutionalism and democracy – and between various ways of realizing these ideals in 
political institutions and practices.”23 Whereas the abovementioned spread of constitutional 
supremacy presupposes that provisions of the constitution can override all other norms in 
the legal system, “the basic idea of democracy (though not the only one, of course) is that a 
duly constituted legislature has the right to make decisions for the polity.”24 
In the United States, the foundational legitimacy of judicial review of legislation has long 
preoccupied scholars since the practice is not explicitly provided for in the constitution.25 
With its very origins stemming from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the 
provenance and source of legitimacy for judicial review remains ambiguous and thus 
contested.26 In many other common law jurisdictions, academics have long grappled with 
the difficulties posed by judicial review of primary legislation (particularly against 
legislatively enshrined fundamental rights standards) in systems founded upon the doctrine 
of Parliamentary sovereignty.27 In contrast, questions over the foundational legitimacy of 
constitutional review tend not to arise in continental European systems that make explicit 
provision for comprehensive constitutional review by centralised constitutional courts.28  
That being said, the fact that such courts derive their authority to engage in constitutional 
review of legislation explicitly from the constitution does not render their jurisprudence 
immune from scrutiny. In reviewing legislation on both structural and fundamental rights 
grounds, constitutional courts are necessarily required to interpret the meaning and scope 
of open-ended and often ambiguous constitutional provisions. Furthermore, it is clear that 
many constitutionally protected fundamental rights are not absolute in nature.29 Many such 
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rights may be legally restricted by the legislature or other public bodies in the pursuit of 
certain legitimate interests of the society as a whole. In reviewing the balance struck 
between these rights and objectives, courts have increasingly had recourse to the principle 
of proportionality in order to determine whether legislation is suitable to achieving a 
legitimate objective and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those 
objectives.30 
Often lacking clear guidance from the text of the constitution itself, these tasks provide 
courts with a degree of discretion as to what provisions of the constitution mean and how 
they should be enforced. Furthermore, the determinations made by courts on these matters 
can lead to conflict with the views of the democratically elected branches of government.  
For example, where courts opt for a wide interpretation of the federal government’s 
legislative competences, federal legislation is less likely to be declared unconstitutional for 
going beyond the scope of constitutionally-defined powers. This approach not only allows 
for federal legislation to be adopted in ever greater policy fields, but also impacts upon the 
scope of the legislative powers of the constituent units/states in federal systems.31 Similarly, 
a judicial determination that all encroachments upon the right to freedom of expression (no 
matter how trivial) must be strictly scrutinised to ensure that they go no further than is 
absolutely necessary to protect national security places considerable limits upon legislative 
power. Absent robust justification on national security grounds, legislation restricting 
freedom of expression will be declared unconstitutional; thus tilting the balance between 
pursuing general policy objectives and protecting individual rights in favour of the latter.32   
As these two rudimentary examples demonstrate, much of the debate surrounding the 
practice of constitutional review of legislation arises beyond (or in addition to) the first 
order question of its foundational legitimacy. Across many legal systems where 
constitutional review of legislation exists, fundamental questions arise with regards to the 
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appropriate standards and intensities of review and the extent to which courts should defer 
to the choices of the elected branches of government.33 
d.) Constitutional Review and the Court of Justice. 
Against this background, we can now turn to examine the original role of the Court of 
Justice under the ECSC and EEC Treaties. As was noted in Chapter 1, the present study 
contends that the CJEU of today is responsible for conducting constitutional review of 
primary EU legislation on both federalism and fundamental rights grounds. What is more, 
recent jurisprudence evinces a notable shift in both the methodology and intensity of 
constitutional review, thus giving rise to wider considerations about the contemporary role 
of the Court. 
Before advancing these arguments in detail, however, it is first necessary to consider the 
origins of judicial review in the Communities and the Court’s initial role within the European 
integration project more generally.  
As shall be demonstrated below, the law-making process in both the ECSC and EEC was in 
no way comparable to parliamentary forms of legislating in the nation state context. 
Without any significant input from a directly elected parliamentary body, the process was 
dominated by the supranational Commission and intergovernmental Council of Ministers. 
Consequently, the concept of Community legislation was conceived of in functional terms as 
all acts of general application. This rendered it more akin to delegated or secondary 
legislation adopted by the executive branch in the legal systems of the Member States. 
Married to this functional conception of (executive) legislation was a system of judicial 
review that was premised upon the principles of French administrative law and bore little 
resemblance to national systems of constitutional review of legislation. Fearing that a 
powerful court could interfere with the output of the Community law-making process, the 
drafters of the Treaties deliberately created a system of review that limited the Court’s 
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ability to scrutinise the discretionary policy choices of the European institutions against 
substantive rights and principles.34 
3.) The Concept of Legislative Power 
Turning first to the nature of legal acts adopted by the Community institutions under the 
ECSC and EEC Treaties, it is to be noted that two competing conceptions of legislation have 
emerged in the modern era. 35 
a.) Procedural/ Parliamentary Conceptions of Legislation 
The parliamentary conception of legislation (also known as formal or procedural legislation) 
is linked to an understanding of who should be in charge of the legislative function.36 
Viewed in this way, “[l]egislation is formally defined as every legal act adopted according to 
the parliamentary legislative procedure.”37 This understanding ultimately stems from the 
view that legislation may only be enacted by the peoples’ representatives in Parliament. It is 
based on a “presumption that parliament, which became the pre-dominant legislative 
authority claiming to represent the people, could adopt all necessary legal acts of general 
application.”38  
“Where legislation is used in a formal [parliamentary] sense, it refers to a legal act 
that is defined by formal criteria. In this case a written constitution or an unwritten 
constitutional principle determines the procedure to be followed and the institution 
authorised for the adoption of such a legislative act. In the classical tradition of the 
principle of the separation of powers, the authority to adopt such acts is in principle 
vested in parliament, as the institution directly elected by the people.”39 
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Whilst the central involvement of a directly elected Parliamentary body is evidently a core 
component of this understanding of legislation, it is important to note that it is the 
legislative procedure itself which provides the resulting legislation with its legitimacy. By 
mandating that different institutions and individuals representing a wide variety of interests 
participate in the process of scrutinising and influencing legislation, the outcome of the 
legislative process enjoys a high degree of legitimacy.40 Consequently, legislation enacted 
through a designated (parliamentary) legislative procedure often enjoys particular privileges 
within a given legal system. Examples here include satisfying strict standing requirements 
when seeking to contest the constitutionality of legislation in court and a high degree of 
judicial deference on the merits when those procedural hurdles have been overcome.41 
b.) Material/Functional Conceptions of Legislation 
This procedural/parliamentary conception of legislation may be contrasted with a material 
understanding of legislation (also known as functional legislation or legislation in substance). 
Under this material conception, legislation is understood as the “adoption of legal acts of 
general application without regard to the institution or procedure in which they were 
adopted.”42 Rather than being defined by who or how legislation is enacted, the material 
conception defines what legislation should be; namely, legal rules of general application.43  
The distinction between procedural and material notions of legislation gained increased 
attention in the first half of the twentieth century. Following the expansion of state activity 
into ever greater areas of everyday life, wide-ranging legislative action by the executive 
branch of government became increasingly necessary.44 As Türk notes, this emergence of 
the executive as a legislative body brought about a split in the concept of legislation and led 
to a distinction being drawn in the literature between legislation in form and legislation in 
substance.45 “The demand for efficient law-making in modern legal systems requires and 
justifies the law-making activity by the executive and other bodies. Such regulatory activity 
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is considered as legislation in substance, where it results in the adoption of acts of general 
application.”46 This alternative, functional conception of legislation therefore encompasses 
delegated legislation as adopted by the executive branch in many nation states.47  
4.) Legislation in the ECSC and EEC  
Having analysed the key characteristics of parliamentary and material conceptions of 
legislation, we can now turn to examine the nature of legal acts adopted by the institutions 
of the ECSC and EEC.  
a.) Executive Acts of General Application  
Initially, the ECSC Treaty entailed a deliberate transfer of sovereignty from the Member 
States to European institutions tasked with taking legally binding decisions within the coal 
and steel sectors of the economy.48 This approach was “functional” in the sense that the 
ECSC treaty “set a specific aim - the establishment of a common market in coal and steel - 
and transferred genuine legislative and executive powers to the Community in order to 
achieve it.”49 
Lacking a veritable parliamentary chamber and providing no single law-making procedure, 
the ECSC Treaty vested the power to take “executive acts” in the hands of an independent, 
supranational High Authority.50 Indeed, the text of the ECSC Treaty made no reference to 
the concept of legislation at all, instead empowering the High Authority to adopt: (i) 
Decisions that were binding in all their details; and (ii) Recommendations that were binding 
with respect to the objectives to be achieved.51 
The entire system was thus “characterized by a limited transfer, from the spheres of 
national administrative authorities, of power to regulate the economic matters falling under 
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the narrow compass of the ECSC-Treaty.”52 “The ECSC Treaty gave the Community a real 
executive, the supranational High Authority, which had wide regulatory and administrative 
powers not just over the Member States but also over individual firms.”53  
As is clear from these pronouncements, legal acts adopted by the High Authority were not 
conceived of as being equivalent to parliamentary or procedural forms of legislation.54 
Instead, acts of general application were understood as legislation in the material sense and 
were thus akin to delegated legislation within the nation state context.55 
b.) The Expansion of Law-Making Competences  
The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) would provide 
the Community institutions with far greater law-making powers than under the ECSC 
framework. Designed as a “Traité-cadre” (a framework Treaty), the scope of the EEC Treaty 
was not restricted to specific sectors of the economy. 56  
The basic tasks of the Community were set out in Article 2 EEC. By establishing a common 
market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, the 
Community would, inter alia, seek to promote a harmonious development of economic 
activities throughout the EEC and raise the standard of living of the citizens of the Member 
States.57 This was accompanied by Article 3 EEC, which set out the various activities of the 
Community which were to be undertaken in order to pursue the tasks set out in Article 2 
EEC. Included amongst these activities were the abolition of customs duties on goods traded 
between the Member States, the adoption of a Common Agricultural Policy and the 
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approximation of the laws of Member States in order to ensure the proper functioning of 
the common market.58 
The law-making powers of the Community institutions within a given policy field were 
specified in various legal bases (competences) scattered throughout the Treaty. These legal 
bases set out the aims to be achieved by Community policy in that area and proscribed the 
law-making procedure to be followed for those purposes.59  
c.) The Law-Making Powers of the Commission and Council 
In contrast to the ECSC Treaty which vested the majority of law-making powers in the High 
Authority, the EEC Treaty required a greater degree of power sharing between the 
Commission (formerly High Authority) and the Council of Ministers.60 For the most part, the 
Commission was entrusted with initiating policy proposals, whereas the Council of Ministers 
was responsible for enacting these proposals into law.61 “[I]t was generally accepted that 
the Council had to be the central decision-making organ due to the sensitive and wide-
reaching economic and political nature of building a common market, and as a result the 
Commission should take a more limited and different role than the HA.”62 Thus, the 
disposition of law-making power within the EEC was encapsulated by the mantra “the 
Commission proposes, Council disposes.”63 However, both the Commission and Council 
possessed the power to adopt different types of legally binding measures under the EEC 
Treaty.64 
According to Article 189 EEC, the Council and the Commission were empowered to adopt 
legally binding acts in the form of Regulations, Directives and Decisions. In terms of the 
nature of these legal acts, Article 189 EEC further provided:  
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“A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States. A directive shall be binding, as to the result 
to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to 
the national authorities the choice of form and methods. A decision shall be binding 
in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed...”65 
Like the ECSC Treaty before it, the EEC Treaty made no reference to the concept of 
legislation. Rather than providing the Commission and Council with veritable “legislative” 
powers (pouvoir législatif), the drafters of the EEC Treaty deliberately stipulated that they 
could merely “dispose of a power of decision” (un pouvoir de decision).66 This was because 
considering the Community institutions as a “legislature” would have implied a 
parliamentary composition under the separation of powers doctrine.67  
Under the institutional framework of the EEC Treaty, the only parliamentary-type body was 
the Assembly (latterly the European Parliament). Unlike veritable parliamentary bodies in 
nation states, the EEC Assembly did not possess any legislative powers of its own. It was 
entitled only to exercise an advisory function by providing non-binding opinions on 
proposed Community legal acts.68 This allowed the Member States to “ensure that 
sovereignty could be transferred in small, controllable doses” since it “would have been 
much more difficult to control the transfer of sovereignty if a Community parliament had 
been endowed with important legislative powers.”69  
As Schütze observes: 
“[w]hen the European Community was established, its ‘regulatory’ competences 
were not immediately conceived of as of a ‘legislative’ quality. The nature of the 
Community in general, and its decisionmaking procedures in particular, defied the 
parliamentary conception of legislation...From the viewpoint of national 
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democracies, it seemed that all decision-making powers of the European Community 
were ‘executive’ in character.”70  
Unlike many national legal orders, the EEC Treaty did not create a hierarchy of legal acts on 
the basis of the institutions and or procedures involved in their enactment e.g. 
parliamentary legislation, delegated legislation etc.71 Thus, the status of legal acts within the 
Community legal system was not linked to the democratic standing of the institution 
responsible for their adoption.72 Instead, the Treaty of Rome distinguished between 
different types of Community legal acts on the basis of their scope of application and legal 
effects.73 With both the Commission and Council capable of enacting acts of general 
application and decisions binding upon individuals, a functional understanding of both the 
separation of powers and the concept of legislation prevailed in the EEC: 
“The legislative power relates to the function of enacting rules with a general and 
abstractly defined scope of application; the executive power relates to the function 
of applying the said legislative rules to individual cases or specific categories of cases; 
finally, the judicial power relates to the function of settling litigation that arises on 
the occasion of the application of the legislative rules to individual cases or specific 
categories of cases.”74 
The concept of legislation in the EEC was thus defined in material or functional terms as all 
acts of general application. 75 “This understanding is also clear from the jurisprudence of the 
Court, which provided that the “essential characteristic of a decision arises from the 
limitation of persons to whom it is addressed, whereas a regulation, being essentially of a 
 
70 Robert Schütze, ‘The Morphology of Legislative Power in the European Community: Legal Instruments and 
the Federal Division of Powers’ (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law 91, 92. See footnote 7 for the relevant 
German literature referring to the characterization of Community legislation as ‘executive legislation’. 
71 Alan Dashwood, ‘Community Legislative Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on European Union’ (2004) 19 
European Law Review 343, 343; Jürgen Bast, ‘On the Grammar of EU Law: Legal Instruments’ [2003] Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 9/03 24–26. 
72 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the 
European Union ECLI:EU:C:2002:197 para 90; Phillip Allott, ‘The Democratic Basis of the European 
Communities’ (1974) 11 Common Market Law Review 298, 301–302. 
73 Koen Lenaerts and Marlies Desomer, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? 
Simplification of Legal Instruments and Procedures’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 744, 746. 
74 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community’ (1991) 28 
Common Market Law Review 11, 13; Schütze, ‘The Morphology of Legislative Power’ (n 70) 92. 
75 Schütze, ‘The Morphology of Legislative Power’ (n 70) 98. 
43 
 
legislative nature, is applicable not to a limited number of persons, named or identifiable, 
but to categories of persons viewed in the abstract and in their entirety.”76  
5.) The Early Role of the Court of Justice  
With the institutional framework and system of law-making established, the remainder of 
Chapter 2 considers the initial powers of the Court of Justice to review the legality of 
measures of Community law. Under the EEC Treaty, the principal task of the Court was to 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty, the law was observed.77 As 
part of this overall mandate, the Court was required, inter alia, to review the legality of legal 
acts adopted by the other Community institutions. Four grounds of review were established 
for this purpose. They were: lack of competence; infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement; infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application and 
misuse of powers.78 
Rather than settling disputes over the allocation of legislative power or alleged 
infringements of fundamental rights, the Court’s early case law concerned technical 
challenges to administrative-type regulations in the economic sphere. It was therefore 
widely viewed “as a new type of supranational administrative adjudicator.”79 
The Community system of judicial review was intentionally founded upon the principles of 
French administrative law as utilised by the French Conseil d'État.80 According to the 
established position in France at the time of the ECSC and EEC Treaties, judicial review of 
administrative decision-making could take place according to four grounds of review. Known 
collectively as Le recours pour excès de pouvoir, these grounds were: lack of competence; 
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violation of a procedural requirement, violation of law and détournement de pouvoir 
(misuse of discretion).81 
It will immediately be recognised that these are the same grounds of review that were 
initially enshrined in the Community legal order.82 Indeed, officials involved in the drafting 
and ratification of the ECSC Treaty explicitly noted the linkage between the Conseil d'État, 
the principles of French administrative law and the workings of the Court of Justice.83  
As traditionally understood, judicial review of administrative action in France was aimed 
solely at ascertaining the legality of a contested measure according to rules of law, leaving 
the administration’s scope of discretion virtually untouched.84 In the same spirit, Article 33 
ECSC provided that the court: 
“[M]ay not review the conclusions of the High Authority, drawn from economic facts 
and circumstances, which formed the basis of such decisions or recommendations, 
except where the High Authority is alleged to have abused its powers or to have 
clearly misinterpreted the provisions of the Treaty or of a rule of law relating to its 
application.”85   
As was stated in the Luxembourg Parliament around the time of the entry into force of the 
ECSC Treaty, the Court of Justice “is organised upon the model of the French contentieux 
administrative which in principle only controls the legality and not the advisability of a 
measure.”86 A similar view was expressed by Valentine, a leading authority on the ECSC and 
EEC, who noted that: 
“[T]he control of the Court…has been limited. It may not look at the merits of a 
decision, but it can consider only whether the enacting body in passing the measure 
in question was acting ultra vires, or without regard to required procedural matters, 
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or in violation of the Treaty, or whether it has committed a détournement de 
pouvoir.”87 
These four grounds of judicial review remained unchanged with the coming into force of the 
EEC Treaty; meaning that the role of the Court of Justice continued to be compared with 
national administrative courts.88 Unlike Article 33 ECSC, however, the analogous provision in 
the Treaty of Rome (Article 173 EEC) did not contain the same prohibition on reviewing the 
conclusions of the High Authority drawn from economic facts and circumstances.89  
A further reform brought about by Article 173 EEC was the ability of the Court to review the 
legality of legal acts adopted by both the Commission and Council, rather than of the High 
Authority alone under the ECSC. The division of law-making powers between the 
Commission and Council in the Treaty of Rome meant that both those institutions would 
henceforth be able to challenge the legality of Community measures before the Court. This 
was further complemented by Member States being able to directly challenge the legality of 
Community legal acts on the same four grounds contained in Article 173 EEC.90 
The Treaty of Rome also transformed the preliminary ruling procedure by providing in 
Article 177 EEC that, upon the request of a national court of a Member State, the Court of 
Justice would provide rulings on: (a) the interpretation of the EEC Treaty; and (b) the validity 
and interpretation of acts of the other institutions of the Community.91 This differed 
considerably from the ECSC Treaty, which provided that national courts could only send 
requests for preliminary rulings to the Court where the validity of Community acts were at 
issue.92 The aim of giving the Court of Justice the power to issue binding rulings on the 
interpretation and validity of Community law was to ensure the uniform interpretation and 
application of Community law throughout the Member States.93 Prior to Article 177 EEC, 
there was no provision in the ECSC Treaty explicitly stating that the Court of Justice was the 
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sole institution competent to provide such interpretations, thus meaning that national 
judiciaries could theoretically do so themselves.94  
6.) The Beginnings of Constitutional Review in the EEC? 
When taken together, the changes made to the Community legal order by the Treaty of 
Rome had a considerable impact upon the role of the Court of Justice. Whilst it retained its 
function as an administrative court akin to the Conseil d'État in the majority of cases, 
aspects of the Court’s mandate under the EEC Treaty came to resemble that of a 
constitutional or supreme court.95  
a.) Elements of Structural Constitutional Review 
The reformed preliminary reference procedure – which was directly inspired by the Italian 
constitutional system – was said to have created a system with the “contours of a federal 
Supreme Court system of judicial review” that would “depend completely on the co-
operation of national courts in order to function.”96  
By allowing the Member States, Commission and Council to bring direct actions before the 
Court of Justice, Article 173 EEC laid the foundations for disputes of a “structural” nature. To 
recall from above, within the nation state context, constitutional review of legislation was 
initially designed to settle issues concerning governmental structure.97 In both the United  
States and Continental European tradition, constitutional review concerned questions over 
which branch of government was competent to act (horizontal competence disputes) or 
which level of government could act (vertical competence disputes).98 With both types of 
cases now possible in the Community legal order, the Treaty of Rome appeared to place the 
Court in a position comparable to national constitutional courts in certain types of cases.99  
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Despite such a possibility, however, Community legislation (acts of general application) was 
rarely challenged on competence grounds by the Member States or other Community 
institutions during the early decades of the EEC. As shall be examined in detail in Chapter 3, 
this lack of veritable structural constitutional review is explained in part by the fact that the 
Council typically adopted Commission proposals by unanimity, thus reducing the likelihood 
of subsequent challenges before the Court. Moreover, the way in which competences were 
distributed within the EEC legal order served to reduce the number of challenges to EU legal 
acts on structural grounds. Unlike many national constitutional legal orders, the Treaty of 
Rome did not contain a list of enumerated Community competences; nor did it make any 
mention of the powers reserved to the Member States.100 Instead, the competences of the 
Community institutions were derived from specific legal bases dispersed throughout the 
Treaty, which laid down the objectives to be achieved and the law-making procedure to be 
followed in a given policy field. As a former Vice President of the Court once remarked: 
“[T]he Treaties do not contain a list of…powers and do not share them out at all 
precisely between the Community and the Member States, as is the case in federal 
constitutions. On the contrary, powers are specifically conferred on the Community 
according to sector, to a degree which varies depending on the case and with 
caution as to their extent and the compass of the matters covered.”101 
b.) The Lack of Fundamental Rights Review 
Whereas certain aspects of the EEC Treaty rendered parts of the Court’s role loosely 
analogous to national courts entrusted with structural constitutional review, the same could 
not be said for fundamental rights.102 Unlike many legal orders that explicitly (or implicitly) 
provide for reviewing legislation against constitutionally protected fundamental rights 
standards, the EEC Treaty was silent on this issue. There was no “explicit bill of rights as a 
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Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
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higher law against which the administrative and legislative activities of the Community’s 
political organs [could] be checked.”103 
The authors of the Treaty of Rome did not consider such a document to be necessary given 
that the EEC’s core objective was to establish a common market and progressively 
approximate the economic policies of Member States.104 The Community institutions were 
simply not considered as being active in areas of law and policymaking that would give rise 
to serious fundamental rights concerns.105 Indeed, it was simply “inconceivable” that the 
national Parliaments of the founding Member States would have ratified a Treaty that “was 
capable of violating fundamental tenets of their own constitutions…”106  
This decision not to provide for fundamental rights review of Community legal acts also fits 
within the wider strategy of the drafters of the Treaties to restrict the powers of the Court. 
Fearing that a powerful court could interfere with the aims of furthering European 
integration by engaging in robust judicial review of Community measures, the Court’s 
jurisdiction had to be tightly circumscribed and restricted to questions of legality.107 The 
nature of the Community law-making process also spoke in favour of limiting the Courts’ 
powers of review. With all major Commission proposals requiring the agreement of national 
government Ministers in the Council, fundamental rights review carried the danger of 
overturning the hard-won consensus in the Community law-making process.108 
Such sentiments were not lost on members of the Court. Under the ECSC framework, the 
opportunity to review the legality of a Community measure that allegedly infringed 
fundamental rights protected under the German Constitution was rejected. In Stork, the 
Court held that the Community institutions were only mandated to observe and apply 
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Community law and were not competent to apply the national laws of the Member 
States.109 Consequently, the High Authority lacked the power to examine a complaint 
alleging that when it adopted a decision against certain companies for engaging in anti-
competitive practices, it infringed principles of the German Constitution.110 
The reluctance amongst members of the Court to interfere with the outcome of the political 
process in the Council was also evident during the early years of the EEC. In denying 
standing to natural and legal persons seeking to challenge the legality of a Council act of 
general application, Advocate General Lagrange noted “the extremely grave consequences 
that would follow from even a partial annulment of the regulations”, since “these texts have 
been arrived at only after considerable difficulty, and sometimes after a compromise 
reached in the Council...”111 For Alter, the remarks of the Advocate General were indicative 
of a more widespread concern amongst European officials during the early years of the EEC 
that judicial review of measures passed by the European institutions would lead to “political 
paralysis.”112 These concerns influenced the Court a year later in its now infamous 
Plaumann judgment that severely restricted the ability for individuals to challenge acts of 
general application directly before the Court.113  
7.) The Scope and Intensity of Review 
Thus far, the analysis of the ECSC and EEC legal orders has concerned the structure of the 
Court’s powers of judicial review and the nature of legal acts adopted by the Community 
institutions. In addition to these factors, however, it is also necessary to consider how the 
Court went about its task of reviewing the legality of measures of Community law. As we 
shall see in the chapters which follow, the methodology and intensity with which the 
contemporary CJEU conducts constitutional review of EU legislation sits in marked contrast 
with previous epochs in the history of the European integration project. 
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In this regard, every legal order in which judicial review exists involves courts in exercising 
some degree of control over the factual and discretionary determinations made by law-
makers.114 This tends to be accompanied by debates both within academia and amongst 
members of the judiciary as to the appropriate intensity of judicial review of questions of 
fact and discretion.115 On the one hand, many take the view that robust judicial scrutiny of 
such issues is inappropriate since it results in a judicial encroachment upon the merits of 
policy decisions taken by primary decision-makers. On the other, it is contended that if 
review of fact and discretion is too restrictive, any meaningful degree of judicial supervision 
of the primary law-maker ceases to exist.116 
As was noted above, the default rule under the ECSC was that the Court was prohibited 
from reviewing the conclusions of the High Authority drawn from economic facts and 
circumstances that formed the basis of its decisions.117 The Court’s powers of review were 
confined to reviewing the legality of legal acts, with considerations of discretionary policy or 
expediency being largely beyond the powers of judicial review.118 Following the removal of 
this prohibition in Article 173 EEC, however, the question arose as to how the Court would 
approach questions of fact and discretion in the future? The text of the Treaty of Rome was 
of little help here. Beyond setting out the four grounds of review, Article 173 EEC did not 
give any guidance on how intensively the Court should review Community legal acts. Nor did 
it indicate the extent to which the Court should respect the discretionary policy choices and 
factual determinations made by the Commission and Council.119 
The approach taken in the early years of the EEC is well illustrated by the Balkan-Import 
Export case, where the Court confirmed that where “the evaluation of a complex economic 
situation is involved” the Community law-maker enjoys “a wide measure of discretion.”120 
As a consequence, when reviewing the legality of the exercise of such discretion, “the Court 
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must confine itself to examining whether it contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse 
of power or whether the authority did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion.”121 
Like many national courts, the default position of the CJEU was that it should not substitute 
its judgement for that of the Community law-maker on questions of fact and discretion. 
Reasons pertaining to the separation of powers, institutional capacity and expertise have all 
been generally accepted as justifying the CJEU’s position on these issues.122  
Notably, in reviewing whether such a manifest error or clear excess in the bounds of 
discretion had been committed, the Court consistently adopted a light-touch or “low-
intensity” approach. As Craig notes, the Court was “very reluctant” to annul Community 
legal acts on these grounds during the early decades of the EEC:  
“The ECJ gave scant attention to the Commission's reasoning when reviewing the 
contested decision and the Court was normally content with one or two brief 
paragraphs before finding that there was no manifest error. Low intensity review for 
manifest error prevailed.”123 
This light-touch approach to reviewing the discretionary policy choices of the Commission 
and Council must be viewed in light of the subject matter of review proceedings before the 
Court at the time. Overwhelmingly, challenges to Community legal acts during the ECSC and 
early EEC eras were of what one might call a technical, administrative law nature. For 
example, the Court was required to assess whether the Commission had committed an error 
in its assessment of the prevailing economic situation when reorganising the market for 
sugar.124 Similarly, the Court had to review whether the Council had unlawfully 
discriminated between different types of starch manufacturers when administering a 
system of refunds in the cereals and rice sectors.125 As Kelemen puts it, the subject matter 
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of early disputes before the Court concerned “issues of relatively low political salience” with 
the Court developing its jurisprudence “behind a veil of technocratic obscurantism.”126  
8.) Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the role of the Court of Justice under the 
ECSC and EEC Treaties was far removed from national courts engaged in constitutional 
review of legislation. Fearful of an assertive judiciary that could frustrate the aims of 
European integration, a deliberate attempt was made to curtail the judicial review powers 
of the Court. Rather than being tasked with upholding a series of constitutionally 
entrenched rights and principles against the output of the Community’s law-making 
institutions, the Court’s powers were modelled upon those of the French administrative 
courts.127 The original Member States therefore “instigated on the Community level the sort 
of judicial review with which they were familiar at home: a narrowly circumscribed judicial 
review of administrative acts.”128  
In addition to this understanding of the system of judicial review, the concept of legislation 
was not comparable to primary legislation enacted through national parliamentary 
procedures. Instead, a material or functional understanding of the concept of legislation 
prevailed, with measures of general application being considered as Community legislation 
(irrespective of the form of legal act or the institution(s) responsible for its enactment). 
Overall, the typical view of the Community legal system - and the role of the Court therein - 
during the early decades of European integration is well summarised by A.M Donner, the 
second President of the Court. In his view, the EEC Treaty could not be compared to a 
genuine constitution in the sense typically deployed in the nation state contest. From this 
starting point, it was contended that: 
“Exactly because those treaties are not to be assimilated with a constitution, the 
dangers of a meddling in politics by ‘nine old men’, that exist where a constitution is 
concerned, which with a few brushes and some succinct formulas indicates the 
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powers of constitutional institutions, are greatly diminished as regards the 
interpretation of the treaties. They only transfer certain powers and responsibilities 
for the attaining of certain well defined objectives. We should be reticent in compare 
the position of the Community and of its Court with the well-known examples of 
constitutional review and in drawing all sorts of conclusions from such 
comparisons.”129 
Against this background, Chapter 3 examines how a constitutional dimension came to be 
added to the Community system of judicial review and how a constitutional frame of 
analysis came to dominate thinking about the CJEU’s role. 
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Chapter 2 demonstrated how the original system of judicial review established by the ECSC 
and EEC Treaties bore little resemblance to the practices of national courts engaged in 
constitutional review of legislation. Lacking a list of enumerated powers, an explicit doctrine 
of conferred competences and a written bill of fundamental human rights, the jurisdiction of 
the CJEU was initially founded upon the principles of French administrative law. Within this 
administrative law framework, substantive judicial review of questions of fact and discretion 
were deliberately restricted by the drafters of the Treaties. 
Furthermore, the Community law-making process and resultant legal acts were conceptually 
distinct from parliamentary or procedural conceptions of primary legislation found in many 
nation states. With no clear distinction between the legislature and executive within the EEC 
institutional framework, a functional definition of both the separation of powers and the 
concept of legislation prevailed. Community legislation was conceptualised as all legal acts 
of general application, irrespective of the institution responsible for their enactment or the 
procedure that was followed when doing so. 
Against this background, Chapter 3 examines how a series of changes to the legal and 
political order of the EEC led to the Court assuming greater “constitutional” responsibilities. 
It is contended that the Court’s establishment of fundamental rights as general principles of 
Community law rendered aspects of its role analogous to national courts engaged in 
constitutional review of legislation. Prior to the entry into force of the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1987, however, the same could not be said for structural constitutional review. The 
dynamics of the Community law-making process meant that it was largely for the Council, 
not the CJEU, to determine where the outer bounds of Community competences lay.1 
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In addition to analysing these changes to the legal and political order of the EEC, Chapter 3 
also examines the intensity with which the Court conducted fundamental rights and 
competence review prior to the entry into force of the SEA. In so doing, it is claimed that the 
period from the inception of the Treaty of Rome to the late 1980s was one of “low-intensity 
constitutionalism.”  
Consisting of several different elements, the “low-intensity” of this constitutionalism was 
characterised, most importantly, by the Court continuing to adopt a very light touch, tersely 
reasoned approach to review. In both competence (structural constitutional review) and 
fundamental rights cases, the Court did not engage in any meaningful degree of scrutiny of 
contested measures of Community law; often concluding within a few short paragraphs that 
such measures were valid.  
This state of affairs may be contrasted with the contemporary EU legal order and the Court’s 
role therein. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU is now responsible 
for conducting constitutional review of primary EU legislation on a series of federalism and 
fundamental rights grounds. Moreover, the methodology and intensity deployed by the 
Court when doing so reveals a finely calibrated, variable intensity approach to scrutinising 
the constitutionality of EU legislation.  
2.) The Constitutionalisation of the Treaty of Rome 
The Court’s assumption of greater “constitutional” responsibilities may be traced back to 
the so-called “foundational period” in the history of European integration.2 As was discussed 
in Chapter 1, this foundational period was marked by a series of landmark CJEU judgments 
which “constitutionalized” the EEC Treaty. Of particular significance here were the 
judgments of Van Gend en Loos - which established that individuals could rely upon 
provisions of Community law directly before national courts (direct effect)3; and Costa – 
which held that national courts should dis-apply national law that conflicted with provisions 
of Community law (supremacy).4 
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According to a very familiar narrative in EU legal studies, these seminal judgments of the 
CJEU transformed the Community from an international organization into “a truly novel 
legal order…containing the essence of a federal system.”5 By establishing a direct link with 
the individual citizen and mandating that Community law take primacy over conflicting 
provisions of national law, the EEC Treaties went “much further than normal treaties 
establishing international organizations” and now performed “the same functions as the 
Constitution of a federal State.”6  
As has been well documented, the establishment of the doctrines of direct effect and 
supremacy were not unanimously accepted without question across all the Member States 
of the Community. For some legal scholars at the time (particularly in Germany), the 
requirement that national courts dis-apply provisions of national law and give full effect to 
Community law in the event of a clash of norms presented a problem: What should a 
national court do in a situation where a provision of Community law seemed to conflict with 
a fundamental right protected by the national constitution? If the doctrine of supremacy 
was to be interpreted as an absolute rule, national courts would have to give effect to 
Community law and thus dis-apply fundamental rights as protected in their national 
constitutions.7  
For many, this outcome was unsatisfactory given that measures of Community law were not 
subject to any degree of fundamental rights scrutiny by the Court of Justice. In light of this 
gap, the preferred solution of some was for national courts to reject the supremacy doctrine 
in such circumstances and give effect to fundamental rights as protected in national 
constitutions.8  
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Had such a solution been put into practice, this would have resulted in different courts in 
different Member States subjecting measures of Community law to different national 
constitutional standards.9 Consequently, a Community Regulation or Directive may have 
been constitutional in some Member States, yet unconstitutional and thus unenforceable in 
others. Given that the EEC aimed at establishing a common market with common rules, this 
would have been highly damaging to the “substantive unity and efficacy of Community law, 
lead[ing] inevitably to the destruction of the Common Market and the jeopardizing of the 
cohesion of the Community.”10 
3.) The Establishment of Fundamental Rights as General Principles of Law 
Faced with such pressures, the solution was obvious: the CJEU had to guarantee that 
measures of Community law would henceforth be subject to fundamental rights review on a 
Community wide level. Had it not done so, there was no question that national courts 
(particularly in Germany and Italy) would have dis-applied Community law and given effect 
to national fundamental rights standards.11 
a) The Origins of Fundamental Rights 
In searching for a legal foundation upon which to build a framework of fundamental rights 
protection in the EEC legal order, however, the Court’s powers of review remained 
restricted to the four grounds enshrined in Article 173 EEC. Of these four, lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement and misuse of powers 
were relatively discrete grounds of review.  Their potential for developing a comprehensive 
system of general principles of judicial review of the sort found in many national legal 
systems was rather limited.12 In contrast, the infringement of the Treaties or any rule of law 
relating to their application ground was more promising given its somewhat open ended 
formulation. Indeed, it would provide a gateway through which a series of general principles 
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of law would enter the EEC legal order and flesh out the system of judicial review on the 
European level.13  
These general principles of law served “mainly as objective standards for administrative 
action” and were inspired by the traditions embedded within the systems of administrative 
law in the Member States.14 Examples included: the general principle of legality of 
administrative action15; the principle of non-retroactivity of law16; the rights of defence17 
and other due process of law requirements, including the right to be heard18; the principle 
of equal treatment19; legal certainty20 and the protection of legitimate expectations.21 In the 
vast majority of cases, these general principles were applied in what might be termed 
“classic” administrative law contexts, such as Commission competition law proceedings 
against corporations or in Community staff disputes.22 
In addition to these general principles, however, the Court also famously established that 
fundamental human rights formed part of Community law and that these would henceforth 
be protected by the CJEU.23 Following a brief nod in this direction in Stauder, the Court 
comprehensively set out its position in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.24 In that case, 
the applicants had contended that a Community export licensing system - which could result 
in the forfeiture of deposits - constituted a disproportionate violation of their right to 
freedom of action, of disposition and of economic liberty as protected under the German 
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constitution. In responding to a reference from a German administrative court, the CJEU 
held that national courts could not review the legality of measures of Community law 
against national constitutional standards, since recourse to such standards “would have an 
adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law.”25 “The law stemming from 
the Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because of its very nature be overridden 
by rules of national law, however framed, without being deprived of its character as 
Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called in 
question.”26  
This did not mean, however, that measures of Community law would not be subject to any 
form of fundamental rights review whatsoever. Instead, the Court held that it would 
determine “whether or not any analogous guarantee inherent in Community law has been 
disregarded.”27 Such guarantees were inherent in the EEC legal order because “respect for 
fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the 
Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the 
structure and objectives of the Community.”28 Consequently, the Court of Justice, basing 
itself upon the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, would review 
measures of Community law against a series of fundamental rights which existed in the 
Community legal order as general principles of law.29  
b.) The Beginnings of “Constitutional” Review of Community Legal Acts  
It is widely accepted in the literature that the primary motivation behind the establishment 
of fundamental rights review by the CJEU was to ward off challenges from national 
constitutional courts to the supremacy, unity and effectiveness of the Community legal 
order.30 It has also been convincingly argued that the advent of fundamental rights was 
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necessary in order to imbue the EEC with greater degrees of accountability and legitimacy.31 
According to this view, there was a clear incentive for the Court to increase the protection 
of the rights of individuals since the Community lacked a veritable parliamentary chamber, 
had no Bill of Rights and adopted laws in accordance with procedures dominated by the 
Commission and Council.32 
For the purposes of the present enquiry, the significance of Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft and its lineage is that it added a novel, “constitutional” dimension to 
the system of judicial review of Community legal acts.33 As has already been emphasised in 
Chapters 1 and 2, when viewed in comparative perspective, courts engaged in constitutional 
review of legislation generally engage in two rather different types of tasks. One is to act as 
umpire or referee in boundary disputes between parts or levels of government (structural 
constitutional review). The other is to protect fundamental rights from being infringed by 
those exercising public power.34  
 
In both types of cases, constitutional review involves the judiciary in upholding the 
hierarchically superior norms of the constitution against all legal acts enacted by the 
political branches of government.35 Formally speaking, therefore, one could categorise the 
Court declaring a Commission Regulation of general application void for an infringement of 
an essential procedural requirement as formally analogous to constitutional review. After 
all, the Court would in such circumstances be upholding the hierarchically superior norm in 
Article 173 EEC against a conflicting measure of Community legislation (understood in a 
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functional sense). Annulling a Council Directive for violating one of the abovementioned, 
judicially created general principles of administrative law could also be viewed in this way.  
When considered from a more substantive perspective, however, the original EEC Treaty 
simply lacked many of the doctrines and principles associated with constitutional review of 
legislation as defined above. Indeed, the legal order established by the Treaty of Rome was 
initially devoid of many of the central tenets of constitutionalism itself. In this regard, 
constitutionalism may be generally defined as a normative theory of limited government 
that is concerned with legal and political norms which place limits upon public power.36 
“Broadly speaking, these norms seek to impose limits upon the exercise of public power and 
the procedures through which such power is exercised.37 “Its key principles are 
independence of the judiciary, separation of governmental powers, respect for individual 
rights, and the promotion of the judiciary’s role as guardians of constitutional norms.”38  
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the Treaty of Rome established a unique system of 
competences that bore no resemblance to the constitutional division of powers in federal or 
other non-unitary states. There was no specific list of Community competences or explicit 
doctrine of conferred powers. Nor was there a written Bill of Fundamental Rights 
empowering the Court to engage in a practice analogous to constitutionally-entrenched 
rights review. Furthermore, the drafters of the Treaties deliberately restricted the judicial 
review powers of the Court so as to prevent robust scrutiny of the factual determinations 
and discretionary policy choices of the Commission and Council. When judicial review of 
such issues was undertaken, the Court’s early jurisprudence demonstrated an incredibly 
deferential approach, limiting itself to considering whether a manifest error of assessment 
had been committed.  
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By establishing that fundamental rights would hereafter be utilised by the Court to review 
the legality of Community legal acts, however, the role of the Court increasingly came to 
resemble the “constitutional court of a supranational order determined to preserve the 
integrity, unity, and uniformity of the system it had evolved.”39 By positioning itself as the 
ultimate guardian of fundamental rights in the Community legal order, the CJEU indicated to 
national constitutional and supreme courts that it was now responsible in the EEC for the 
same sort of fundamental rights adjudication that they undertook in their own domestic 
legal systems.40  
As the judgments in Stauder, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and subsequent cases make 
clear, the scope and content of fundamental rights within the EEC legal order would 
ultimately be determined by the CJEU. Whilst the Court would take inspiration from the 
common constitutional traditions of the Member States and international human rights 
treaties, fundamental rights within the EEC legal order would have an EEC-specific meaning 
as determined by the Court.41 These developments provided “as clear an indication as any 
of the audacious self-perception of the European Court. The measure of creative 
interpretation of the Treaty was so great as to be consonant with a self-image of a 
constitutional court in a ‘constitutional’ polity.”42 
4.) The Political Response during the Foundational Period 
Before moving to examine how the CJEU went about conducting fundamental rights review 
of Community legal acts in the years prior to the SEA, however, it is first necessary to 
consider some of the key changes to the Community law-making process during the 
foundational period. As shall be argued in the second half of this study, recent trends in the 
CJEU’s contemporary federalism and fundamental rights jurisprudence must also be viewed 
in light of a series of changes to the EU legislative process in recent years. It is only by 
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analysing the Court’s approach to constitutional review in light of the wider constitutional 
and political context in which it operates that one can truly appreciate its changing role over 
time. 
As Weiler argues in his highly influential “Transformation of Europe”, the abovementioned 
“constitutionalisation” of the EEC Treaty prompted an (indirect) political response from the 
governments of the Member States.43 Whilst typical international Treaties tend to create 
obligations solely between states, the EEC doctrines of direct effect and supremacy had 
resulted in individuals obtaining binding and enforceable rights within national legal 
orders.44 From the perspective of the Member States, this meant that “Community 
obligations, Community law, and Community policies were “for real.”45  
Recognising this new reality, the Member States sought to assert greater control over the 
law-making process on the Community level. The dynamics at play here were famously 
stated by Weiler in the following terms: 
“[T]he ‘harder’ the law in terms of its binding effect both on and within states, the 
less willing states are to give up their prerogative to control the emergence of such 
law or the law's ‘opposability’ to them. When the international law is ‘real’, when it 
is ‘hard’ in the sense of being binding not only on but also in states, and when there 
are effective legal remedies to enforce it, decisionmaking suddenly becomes 
important, indeed crucial.”46 
Under the original terms of the EEC Treaty, however, the Community law-making process 
consisted of strong supranational elements that prevented individual Member States from 
exerting decisive influence over the adoption of legal acts in every instance.47 The 
Commission enjoyed an almost exclusive right to propose or initiate Community legislation, 
allowing it to act somewhat autonomously of the Member States in the pursuit of the 
Community’s general interests.48 When it came to enacting Commission proposals into law, 
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the EEC Treaty provided that the Council of Ministers would gradually adopt a system of 
majority voting in ever greater policy fields following a transitional period.49 Accordingly, 
Member States faced the prospect of legally binding Community legal acts entering their 
domestic legal orders without having full control over the Community law-making process. 
Remarkably, the Member States opted to depart from these rules in the Treaty and assert 
far greater control over all aspects of the Community law-making process.50 At the policy 
formulation stage, the Member States obtained greater influence at the expense of the 
Commission with the advent of the European Council - an informal institution consisting of 
the heads of states and government of the Member States which provided impetus to the 
policy agenda of the EEC.51 Regarding the proposal of new legislation, the Commission 
increasingly conducted a preliminary, unofficial round of negotiations with a sub-body of the 
Council known as the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States to the European Union (COREPER).52 
In addition to gaining greater influence over policy formulation, the Member States also 
tightened their grip on the enactment of Commission proposals into law by the Council of 
Ministers. By far the most striking example of this phenomenon was the resolution of the 
French “empty chair crisis” by the “Luxembourg Compromise” in the mid-1960s.53 With the 
abovementioned transition to majority voting in the Council pending at the start of 1966, 
the French delegation opted to boycott the Council.54 They argued that they would not 
retake their seat unless a compromise was reached that balanced the imminent shift to 
majority voting and France’s national interests.55 Following negotiations in Luxembourg, a 
compromise was reached which provided, in essence, that the Member States would act by 
 
49 Article 8 EEC Treaty. 
50 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?’ (1982) 21 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 39, 46–47. 
51 Today the European Council is formally recognised as an EU institution in Article 15 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU). 
52 Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 2) 2424. The role of COREPER is now set down in Article 240(1) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
53 William Nicoll, ‘The Luxembourg Compromise’ (1984) 23 Journal of Common Market Studies 35. 
54 Article 8 EEC. 
55 Schütze (n 39) 20–22. 
65 
 
unanimity rather than majority voting whenever “very important interests” of one or more 
Member States were at stake.56 
Despite much ambiguity as to the formal status and substantive content of the Luxembourg 
Compromise, unanimity amongst the Member States in the Council nevertheless became 
the default rule for enacting proposals into law.57 From the mid-1960s until the entry into 
force of the Single European Act in 1987, the practice of the Council was to strive for 
consensus in virtually all areas of law-making.58 As a result, “unanimity became the rule for 
most Council decisions, including decisions on minor matters not involving national 
interests.”59 
For Weiler, the seizure of ever greater control of the Community law-making process by the 
Member States could be explained (either directly or indirectly) as a response to the 
judicially created doctrines of direct effect and supremacy: 
“The insistence of the Member States in controlling every phase in the process of 
Community decision-making must have been influenced, consciously or 
unconsciously, by the knowledge that in many spheres decisions are “for real”; that 
they will have the force of law, will override national law and will be enforceable by 
virtue of direct effect in the courts.”60 
When taken together, the dominance of the Council in the law-making process, coupled 
with the constitutionalisation of the Treaties, resulted in a form of equilibrium being 
established in the EEC: 
“On the one hand stood a strong constitutional integrative process that, in radical 
mutation of the Treaty, linked the legal order of the Community with that of the 
Member States in a federal-like relationship. This was balanced by a relentless and 
equally strong process, also deviating radically from the Treaty, that transferred political 
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and decisionmaking power into a confederal procedure controlled by the Member 
States acting jointly and severally.”61 
Simply stated, therefore, the Member States tolerated the transformation of the 
Community legal order via the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy etc. because each 
retained a veto over the adoption of new Community legal acts in important policy fields. 
Had this de facto veto power not existed, Weiler posits that the Member States would not 
have accepted what the CJEU was doing.62 
But how, if at all, did these legal and political developments impact upon the Court’s task of 
reviewing the legality of Community legal acts during this period? Did the Court immediately 
move to subject Community legal acts to rigorous scrutiny for their compliance with 
fundamental rights norms? How did the CJEU’s fundamental rights jurisprudence differ from 
its established position of reviewing questions of fact and discretion on a manifest error of 
assessment standard of review? As was discussed in Chapter 1, much of the literature 
analysing the role played by the Court over the course of the European integration project 
tends to overlook this aspect of the CJEU’s jurisprudence.63  
5.) Low-Intensity Constitutionalism 
A notable exception in this regard is the work of former Advocate General (AG) Maduro, 
which argues that the shift towards unanimity voting in the Council had a profound impact 
upon the Court’s approach to fundamental rights review. Of particular relevance for present 
purposes is Maduro’s analysis of how the establishment of fundamental rights as general 
principles of law “add[ed] the dimension of constitutionalism” to Weiler’s abovementioned 
theory of equilibrium.64 In his view, the claim of Community law to “normative authority” 
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which resulted from the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy “required the adoption of 
constitutional doctrines to not only legitimate but also control that authority.”65 
In applying these constitutional controls, however, it is asserted that “fundamental rights 
protection…was not directed primordially at controlling intergovernmental decision making 
since this was perceived to benefit from the traditional indirect democratic and 
constitutional legitimacy provided by the states.”66 Instead, fundamental rights were only 
really “designed to control a gouvernement des fonctionnaires” - understood as the 
technical, executive-type measures typically passed by the Commission.67 They were 
predominantly concerned with placing limits on “the Community’s nascent bureaucracy and 
autonomous centres of power, which could no longer be controlled by the constitutional 
orders and democratic constituencies of its Member States.”68  
In contrast, acts of general application adopted unanimously by the Member States in the 
Council were deemed to possess a greater degree of indirect democratic legitimacy than 
measures adopted by this “independent bureaucracy” of the Commission.69 In the former 
AG’s view: 
“Where states fully controlled the process of decision making no real question of 
legitimacy was raised. This was bound to determine the nature of constitutional 
review in the new European Community. For example, under European 
constitutionalism, no one thought it a priority to provide for the review of a 
unanimous decision of member states in the Council.”70 
Maduro utilises the term “low intensity constitutionalism” to capture what he perceives to 
be the essence of this dynamic between the CJEU and the Council from the Luxembourg 
Compromise to the coming into force of the SEA in 1987.71 The “low intensity of this 
European constitutionalism” was reflected in “the absence of a two-track democracy” on 
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constitutional processes.”72 Both the processes for amending the Treaties and for passing 
acts of general application required unanimity amongst the Member States.73 As a 
consequence, European integration was “dominated by an intergovernmental legitimacy 
based on providing democracy to Europe through the states.”74 
In the former AG’s view, this led to the CJEU subjecting acts of general application enacted 
unanimously by the Council (Community legislation in a functional sense) to less rigorous 
judicial scrutiny than legal acts adopted by the technocratic Commission.75 “A higher 
deference was to be accorded to the intergovernmental process, which was legitimated by 
consensus amongst states.”76  
As shall be demonstrated below, there is little support in the case law for Maduro’s claim 
that measures adopted unanimously by the Council were afforded a greater degree of 
judicial deference than other Community measures prior to the SEA. The Court made no 
discernable distinction between acts of general application adopted by the Council and 
other types of Community legal act when reviewing their legality against fundamental rights 
standards. Nor was there an explicit recognition in the reasoning of the Court that legal acts 
adopted unanimously by the Council were imbued with a greater degree of democratic 
legitimacy than other measures of Community law.  
The jurisprudence of the Court thus reflected the fact that there was no clear-cut distinction 
between legislative and executive institutions or law-making procedures in the EEC. As was 
noted in Chapter 2, the EEC institutional framework deliberately eschewed providing a 
parliamentary body with veritable legislative powers, with the consequence that a 
functional or material concept of legislation prevailed. 
Despite these doctrinal shortcomings, however, it is submitted that Maduro’s 
characterization of the period prior to the SEA as one of “low-intensity constitutionalism” is 
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valuable for both descriptive and analytical purposes. As generally defined above, 
constitutionalism may be understood as a normative theory concerned with placing legal 
and political limits upon public power.77 Viewed in these terms, the notion of 
constitutionalism being of a “low-intensity” captures the essence of both the EEC legal order 
and the emergent practice of “constitutional” review during this period.  
As noted above, when compared to many national legal orders, there were few 
constitutionally-entrenched limits upon the law-making powers of the Commission and 
Council in the EEC Treaty. Moreover, as the remainder of Chapter 3 demonstrates, the 
Court’s competence and fundamental rights jurisprudence was characterized by light-touch 
or low-intensity review. The era of low intensity constitutionalism was one in which the 
Court subjected the discretionary policy choices of the Community institutions to minimal 
degrees of scrutiny. Scant attention was given to the reasoning of the Commission and 
Council for their policy choices, with the consequence that not much was typically required 
by way of justification in order for them to defend the legality of their actions before the 
CJEU. 
6.) The Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence of the Court 
This is well-demonstrated by the early fundamental rights cases that operated on the basis 
of an open-ended and ambiguous catalogue of general principles of law. Prior to the SEA, 
the majority of fundamental rights recognised by the CJEU were of an economic nature, 
such as the right to property or the freedom to pursue a trade or profession.78  
a.) The Non-Absolute Nature of Fundamental Rights in the EEC 
As is common in many legal systems, these economically oriented fundamental rights were 
not construed as absolute constraints upon the Community’s law-making institutions. They 
could be legally restricted in certain circumstances in order to pursue policy objectives that 
were of general interest to the wider Community as a whole.79 Recognition of the existence 
of a particular fundamental right by the Court thus marked only the beginning of the 
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enquiry; since such recognition, in itself, says nothing about the level of protection to be 
afforded to that right or its legal value compared to other conflicting rights and interests.80 
What mattered in such instances was the balance struck between protecting the right in 
question and pursuing legitimate policy objectives in the Community interest.81  
When it came to reviewing the output of the Community’s law-making institutions, the early 
jurisprudence of the Court established a pattern that it would subsequently follow in the 
vast majority of fundamental rights cases.82 First, the Court identified whether a prima facie 
interference with a fundamental right had occurred. For example, did a Commission 
Decision regulating certain terms and conditions for the sale of coal infringe the right to 
property and the freedom to conduct a business of small coal wholesalers?83 In some cases, 
the Court would simply find that the contested measure had no impact upon a particular 
fundamental right, with the result that no infringement capable of effecting its validity had 
occurred.84 In the majority of cases, however, a prima facie encroachment upon a right was 
established, with the CJEU then moving to a second step in its analysis. Here, the issue to be 
decided was whether such an encroachment could nevertheless be justified in the pursuit of 
general policy objectives of the Community?85  
b.) The Principle of Proportionality  
Within this framework of rights adjudication, the principle of proportionality came to 
assume vital importance at the second step of the enquiry. The principle has been referred 
to as “an overarching principle of constitutional adjudication, the preferred procedure for 
managing disputes involving an alleged conflict between two rights claims, or between a 
rights provision and a legitimate state or public interest.”86 Much like fundamental rights 
themselves, proportionality was not originally part of the Court’s powers of judicial review 
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under Article 173 EEC and entered the EEC legal order as a judicially created general 
principle of law.87  
The principle of proportionality has since been utilised by the Court in two distinct types of 
judicial review cases that are relevant to the present enquiry. The first involves determining 
whether restrictions placed upon fundamental rights may nevertheless be legally justified in 
the pursuit of the policy objectives in the Community’s general interests. The second occurs 
outwith the fundamental rights context and entails reviewing whether the discretionary 
policy choices of the Community legislature are disproportionate to the aims they seek to 
pursue.88  
According to established case law of the Court, proportionality requires that restrictions 
upon rights or other protected interests are “appropriate and necessary in order to achieve 
the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice 
between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the 
disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.”89 
The principle may therefore be broken down into three stages of judicial enquiry. The first 
stage (known as the suitability test) involves an examination of whether the measure 
chosen is suitable or appropriate in order to achieve the aim proposed. The second stage 
(the necessity test) requires an assessment of whether the chosen measure is necessary to 
achieve the proposed goal - meaning that the least restrictive measure for achieving the 
stated aim be chosen. In certain circumstances, a third stage in the proportionality test is 
added (known as proportionality stricto sensu) which involves consideration of whether a 
measure, although suitable and necessary, nevertheless imposes an excessive burden on 
the individual and is thus disproportionate.90 
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It is clear from what has just been said that the principle of proportionality allows the CJEU 
to scrutinise the substantive legality or merits of measures enacted by the Commission and 
Council. “Conventional proportionality review…implies that the court conducts merits 
control. This means it will, where appropriate, potentially overrule the proportionality 
analysis conducted by the legislator or administrator.”91 It is for this reason that the 
principle has been perceived as “the most far reaching ground of review, the most potent 
weapon in the arsenal of the public law judge.”92 
Proportionality review thus runs the risk of the CJEU substituting its judgement for that of 
the Commission or Council within the context of their discretionary policy choices. If applied 
literally, it would be for the Court to determine whether a contested measure was suitable, 
necessary or imposed a disproportionate burden upon the individual in every case, and to 
substitute its judgment accordingly. The result would be that those institutions entrusted 
with enacting policy choices into law would not benefit from any margin of discretion at all. 
As Fritzsche points out: 
“[T]he legality of an act of another institution would in all cases be defined as the 
coincidence of the same analysis and evaluation by both the acting institution and 
the…court. Any deviation would amount to the illegality of the prior act. No matter 
how open-ended or ambiguous the formulation of the applicable law, the court’s 
decision would ultimately supersede the acting institutions’ findings…”93 
c.) Disproportionate and Intolerable Interferences Impinging the Substance of Rights 
The Court did not adopt such an intrusive approach to proportionality review during the era 
of low-intensity constitutionalism. As was noted above, within the context of alleged 
infringements of fundamental rights, the established position was that legal acts of the 
Community could restrict rights of an economic nature in the pursuit of general policy 
objectives of the EEC.94 Such restrictions were only legal, however, where they “in fact 
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correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and…do not 
constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the very 
substance of the rights guaranteed.”95  
This standard of review was utilized consistently by the Court when conducting fundamental 
rights review during the early decades of the EEC.96 As Craig notes, the latter part of the 
formulation - that restrictions should not impair the very substance of a right - is somewhat 
ambiguous.97 Deriving from German law, it encapsulates the notion that a restriction should 
not be held to be lawful if it undermines the essence of the guaranteed right. However, the 
phrase can also carry a different connotation; namely, that a restriction will be deemed to 
be lawful where it does not infringe the essence of the right.98 
When reviewing the jurisprudence, it is clear that the latter connotation prevailed.99 For 
example, in Hauer, the applicants contended that a Council Regulation prohibiting the 
planting of new vines for three years in an attempt to control wine surpluses infringed their 
fundamental right to property. In conducting such an examination, the Court held that it 
was necessary to: 
“[E]xamine whether the restrictions produced by the provisions in dispute in fact 
correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community or whether, 
with regard to the aim pursued, they constitute a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference with the rights of the owner, impinging upon the very substance of the 
right to property.”100 
In conducting such an examination, the Court placed much emphasis upon the Regulation’s 
pursuit of aims in the general Community interest including structural improvements in the 
wine sector. With the pursuit of general Community aims established, the Court swiftly 
concluded that the prohibition on planting vineyards did not constitute a disproportionate 
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interference infringing the substance of the right to property.101 The Court thus set a “very 
high threshold” in the early fundamental rights cases: “only disproportionate and 
intolerable restrictions that affected the very essence of the right could be found 
incompatible with [Community] law.”102  
Notably, the Court could have adopted a more stringent standard of review in these cases. 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the EEC Treaty provided little guidance on the scope of 
discretion to be afforded to the Community’s law-making institutions in a given instance. 
Nor did it provide any indication as to how intensively the four grounds of review enshrined 
in Article 173 EEC should be applied when scrutinising questions of fact and discretion.103 
Absent any guidance in the foundational Treaties, it was for the Court to both establish 
fundamental rights as general principles of law and to render them operational in individual 
cases.104  
For example, in Rau, a German court stated in a preliminary reference to the CJEU that 
“rules which interfere with the fundamental right to exercise a trade or profession are 
justified only if they are dictated by objectives in the general interest which are of such 
overriding importance that they deserve to take precedence over that fundamental right.”105 
Similarly, in Handelsgesellschaft, Advocate General Dutheillet da Lamothe stated that in all 
fundamental rights cases:  
“[T]he internal legality of the disputed measures are linked to one and the same 
problem, namely whether or not these measures comply with a principle of 
‘proportionality’, under which citizens may only have imposed on them, for the 
purposes of the public interest, obligations which are strictly necessary for those 
purposes attained.”106 
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The Court opted not to follow the views of the German courts or the AG, instead adopting 
the less intrusive “disproportionate and intolerable interference infringing the substance of 
the right” test. With this standard of review established, the Court would then move to 
consider whether such a high threshold had been met in the dispute at hand. Here, the 
established judicial practice was to first set out why the contested legal act corresponded to 
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community. Then, without much by way of 
scrutiny, the Court would hold that, in pursuing such objectives, there had been no 
disproportionate and intolerable interference affecting the very substance of the right in 
question.107  
Unlike the two or three stage proportionality enquiry set out above, therefore, the 
fundamental rights jurisprudence of the CJEU during the era of low-intensity 
constitutionalism was somewhat unstructured. The Court focused largely on the suitability 
of the contested Community measure for achieving an objective in the Community’s general 
interest - invariably finding that it did. Then, the CJEU would typically ignore the necessity 
stage of the enquiry before swiftly concluding that no disproportionate infringement of the 
substance of a right had occurred.108 
Notably, this methodology applied equally to acts of general application enacted 
unanimously by the Council109 and to other forms of Community legal acts such as 
implementing Regulations adopted by the Commission.110 In contrast to Maduro’s claims 
above, therefore, the case law does not reveal greater levels of deference being shown to 
measures adopted unanimously by the Council during the era of low-intensity 
constitutionalism. 
A clear illustration of the Court’s approach during this period is provided in ABDHU, where 
the validity of a Council Directive laying down a system for the collection and disposal of 
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waste oils was challenged via the preliminary reference procedure.111 The Directive 
provided that Member States could entrust one or more undertakings with the 
responsibility for collecting and disposing of waste oils within a designated zone, having first 
granted such undertakings a permit to do so. 
In deciding whether the system of permits was compatible with, inter alia, “the freedom of 
trade as a fundamental right”, the Court first confirmed that such a right constituted a 
general principle of Community law, compliance with which it would ensure.112 It then 
noted that the Commission and Council had conceded that the system would have a 
restrictive effect on the right to freedom of trade. This could nevertheless be justified in 
their view since it pursued an aim of general interest in the Community; namely, avoiding 
harm to the environment.113 
In line with established case law, the Court agreed that the right to freedom of trade was 
not absolute. It was subject to certain limits justified by objectives in the Community general 
interest, provided that the rights in question were not substantively impaired.114 With this 
typical balancing framework established, the CJEU immediately reached the conclusion that 
there was “no reason to conclude that the Directive has exceeded those limits.”115 This 
finding was explained in a single paragraph of the Court’s judgment, where it stated that 
provisions of the Directive established that it pursued the aim of environmental protection - 
one of the Community’s “essential objectives.”116 Rather than examining whether the 
Directive constituted a disproportionate interference with the substance of the right, 
therefore, the Court simply held that since the measure in question pursued an aim of 
general Community interest, no infringement of fundamental rights had occurred. 
Consequently, it was difficult to detect any degree of meaningful judicial scrutiny of whether 
there had been a disproportionate restriction impinging upon the substance of the right.117 
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d.) Light-Touch Review 
Based on this jurisprudence, the foundational period of low-intensity constitutionalism was 
characterised by a light touch or low-intensity approach to fundamental rights review. Two 
factors contributed to this outcome. The first was the adoption of a very demanding test for 
establishing a fundamental rights violation; namely, a disproportionate interference 
impinging upon the substance of the right. “Such a high bar suggested that the task of 
obtaining the annulment of a general measure…would prove to be a formidably difficult 
one.”118 The second was the Court’s practice of engaging in a limited degree of scrutiny of 
whether, on balance, a Community measure pursuing aims in the general Community 
interest had indeed disproportionately infringed upon the substance of the right in 
question.119  
The methodology and intensity of review adopted by the Court during this period has been 
subject to considerable criticism in the literature. Several scholars have argued that the 
Court was excessively deferential to the policy choices of the Commission and the Council, 
with the result that it had failed to engage in any meaningful degree of fundamental rights 
scrutiny.120 In addition to concerns about the standard of review deployed, the Court’s terse 
reasoning when concluding that no infringement had occurred was also cited by some as 
being problematic. As De Witte puts it, the judges of the Court should have taken “extra 
care in developing more detailed and persuasive arguments about why they reject pleas of 
human rights breaches in a particular case.”121  
Whilst the fundamental rights of individuals were capable, in principle, of invalidating 
Community legal acts, the general consensus was that the Court’s approach to review tilted 
the balance heavily in favour of the Community legislature’s pursuit of (economic) policies in 
the general interest.122 For all its noble rhetoric about protecting fundamental rights, the 
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core aims and objectives of establishing a pan-European Common Market as stated in 
Articles 2 and 3 EEC continued to tower over all other objectives.123  
The suggestion here is not that the outcome in particular cases would have been different 
had the Court engaged in more searching scrutiny of the substance of Community legal acts 
and the justification(s) proffered in support of their legality. Indeed, none of the cases 
discussed above represented egregious violations of fundamental rights which the Court 
had somehow failed to remedy. Instead, the crucial point for the purposes of the present 
study is that the era of low intensity constitutionalism was one in which the output of the 
Community legislative process was subject to minimal degrees of judicial scrutiny. In 
addition to providing minimal reasoning for its judgments, the CJEU also paid little attention 
to the legislative process that led to the adoption of a contested legal act. Nor did it spend 
much time scrutinising the reasons put forward by the Community institutions in support of 
contested legal acts. Consequently, the EEC legislature was typically placed under a very 
limited burden to justify the legality of its policy choices before the Court. 
7.) Proportionality as General Ground of Review 
This limited burden of justification was also clearly demonstrated in the Court’s early 
approach to the principle of proportionality in cases outwith the fundamental rights 
context. Typically, such cases involved claims that policy choices taken by the Commission or 
Council in fields of economic regulation were disproportionate - either because the costs 
were excessive in relation to the benefits, or that a measure was not suitable to achieve its 
stated objective.124  
Whilst these cases had little to do with fundamental rights or the division of competences 
between the Community and its Member States, we shall see in Chapter 5 that 
proportionality was enshrined as a constitutional principle of the EU legal order by the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1993.125 From that point onwards, the principle would play a vital 
role in challenges made to EU legislation on the grounds that such legislation infringed the 
EU’s federal balance of competences (i.e. structural constitutional review). Moreover, when 
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it came to utilizing proportionality in such competence disputes, the CJEU drew heavily 
upon its jurisprudence as established during the era of low-intensity constitutionalism. The 
scope of discretion to be afforded to the Community law-maker, the standard of 
proportionality review to be deployed by the Court and the intensity of judicial scrutiny of 
the merits as developed by the Court prior to the SEA all became standard points of 
reference in the years which followed. For these reasons, the proportionality jurisprudence 
of the Court during the era of low-intensity constitutionalism is considered below.  
To recall from Chapter 2, the Court had consistently adopted a very restrictive approach to 
reviewing questions of fact and discretion during the early decades of the European 
integration project. According to settled case law, the Court would only intervene where the 
law-maker had committed a manifest error of assessment, where there was a misuse of 
power or when the law-maker had clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion. This 
deferential approach was justified on the grounds that the Commission and Council were 
either: (i) required to undertake complex assessments in areas of economic regulation; or 
(ii) were entrusted with political responsibilities under the EEC Treaty in a given policy 
field.126 
A similarly light-touch approach was adopted in the early proportionality challenges to 
Community legal acts. In some cases, the Court provided a very basic definition of the 
principle, holding that proportionality required nothing more than “the imposition of a 
burden to be proportionate to the objective to be attained.”127 In others, a more structured 
definition akin to the three-step approach referenced above was used, according to which 
Community legal acts had to be: (i) suitable for attaining a legitimate aim; (ii) necessary in 
the sense that they should be the least restrictive option amongst viable alternatives; and 
(iii) not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.128  
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Irrespective of the structure used, the Commission and Council were invariably afforded a 
wide margin of discretion whenever the proportionality of their actions was in issue.129 The 
Court consistently adopted a limited standard of proportionality review, holding that “the 
legality of a measure…can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having 
regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue.”130  
The reasons for such a deferential standard of proportionality review during the era of low-
intensity constitutionalism were straightforward. Given that the majority of disputes arose 
in areas of technical market regulation such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the 
Court was reluctant to interfere with discretionary policy choices entrusted to the 
Commission and Council under the EEC Treaty.131 Respect for the separation of powers thus 
loomed large, with the Court of Justice adhering to the mantra that it should not overturn 
such choices simply because they believe things should have been done differently.132  
Despite these caveats, the reasoning of the Court during the era of low-intensity 
constitutionalism is to be noted for once again requiring very little by way of justification 
from the law-maker in defence of its policy choices. 
For example, in FEDESA, the applicants contended that a Directive prohibiting the use in 
livestock farming of certain substances having a hormonal action infringed the principle of 
proportionality. In their view, the prohibition in question was inappropriate in order to 
attain the declared objectives, since it was impossible to apply in practice. Furthermore, the 
prohibition was not necessary since consumer anxieties about such hormones could be 
allayed simply by the dissemination of information and advice, rather than the more 
restrictive option of an outright ban. Finally, the prohibition entailed excessive 
disadvantages in the form of financial losses for the traders concerns that were not 
outweighed by the alleged benefits accruing to the general interest.133 
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In response, the Court held that the principle of proportionality required judicial 
examination of the suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu of the contested 
measure.134 
Regarding the first of these steps, the measure was found not to be manifestly 
inappropriate for achieving its stated aim.  An alternative system of partial authorisations 
for hormones would be costly and its effectiveness had not been guaranteed by the 
claimants. Having found that the Council had committed no manifest error regarding the 
suitability of the measure, the Court then immediately concluded that the measure also 
complied with the necessity step of the analysis, without examining whether any less 
restrictive alternatives existed. In the Court’s view, the Council was “entitled to take the 
view that, regard being had to the requirements of health protection, the removal of 
barriers to trade and distortions of competition could not be achieved by means of less 
onerous measures such as the dissemination of information to consumers and the labelling 
of meat.”135 Finally, when examining proportionality in the strict sense, the Court stated 
without any degree of scrutiny or explanation whatsoever that “the importance of the 
objectives pursued is such as to justify even substantial negative financial consequences for 
certain traders. Consequently, the principle of proportionality has not been infringed.”136 
This “low-intensity”137 or “watered down”138 approach to proportionality review was 
commonplace during the era of low-intensity constitutionalism. The Court typically did not 
engage in close scrutiny of whether less restrictive alternatives to the contested measure of 
Community law existed, or whether, on balance, the disadvantages outweighed the 
advantages of pursuing a particular policy aim. Nor did the CJEU place any notable emphasis 
upon the reasoning of the Community institutions or the law-making process through which 
its policy choices were arrived at. Instead, the conclusion that a contested Community 
measure was not manifestly disproportionate was reached within a few short paragraphs of 
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the judgment.139 This “cursory examination” not only revealed an “intensely deferential” 
approach to reviewing acts of general application, but also indicated that annulments of 
Community legal acts would be extremely rare.140  
8.) Structural Constitutional Review 
Up to this point, Maduro’s conceptualisation of the pre-SEA period as an era of low-intensity 
constitutionalism has been utilized as a means of encapsulating the essence of the Court’s 
approach to constitutional review on fundamental rights and proportionality grounds.  
In addition to these tasks, however, the Court of Justice was also required to settle disputes 
over the law-making competences of the Community institutions during the era of low-
intensity constitutionalism. As has already been stated, within the national context, the 
entire premise of constitutional review of legislation as initially designed was to settle issues 
concerning governmental structure. In both the United  States and Continental European 
tradition, constitutional review concerned questions over which branch of government was 
competent to act in a given situation, or whether the centre or periphery were capable of 
taking action in legal systems which divided power along federal or other lines.141  
a.) The Unique System of Competence Allocation in the EEC Treaty 
Unlike many of these national constitutional orders, the competences of the Community 
were not clearly defined in a list of enumerated powers. Nor was there an explicit principle 
of conferral limiting the competences of the Community, or a doctrine of powers reserved 
to the Member States. Instead, the general aims of the Community were set down in 
Articles 2 and 3 EEC. This was supplemented by various legal bases throughout the EEC 
Treaty which stipulated the purpose of Community action in a particular policy field and the 
law-making process to be followed therein.142 
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In stark contrast with the fundamental rights jurisprudence discussed above, the practice of 
unanimity voting in the Council had a profound impact on the question of competence in 
Community law prior to the SEA. With the Luxembourg Compromise in full flow, 
Commission proposals in virtually all policy fields required the unanimous agreement of the 
Member States in the Council before they could be enacted into law. This meant that the 
choice of legal basis was of little practical importance during the era of low-intensity 
constitutionalism, since the procedure under each basis involved the same institutions and, 
in practice, the same law-making procedure and voting rules.143  
This also meant that the Council was primarily responsible for determining where the outer 
bounds of the Community’s law-making powers lay when acting upon a particular legal 
basis. Whenever Commission proposals appeared to go too far (or were simply politically 
unpalatable) Member States could individually prevent them from being enacted into law. 
Historically, therefore, “the representation of each Member State on the Council of 
Ministers has been the primary institutional guarantee of Member State autonomy in the 
[EEC] structure.” 144  
Unanimity also served to insulate the majority of acts of general application adopted by the 
Council from challenge before the Court during this period.145 Intuitively this makes sense: it 
would be somewhat odd for a Member State government to vote in favour of a measure in 
the Council only to then contest its legality on competence grounds at a later moment in 
time.146 Furthermore, the European Parliament possessed limited law-making powers and 
initially lacked the capacity to challenge such legal acts directly before the Court.147 Finally, 
natural and legal persons faced near insurmountable standing requirements when seeking 
to challenge acts of general application, thus further restricting the prospect of legal 
basis/competence challenges coming before the CJEU.148 
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This is not to say that the unanimous consent of the Council rendered the resulting 
Community legal act immune from legal challenge entirely. The Court remained, as always, 
empowered to review all measures of Community law for compliance with the grounds of 
review enshrined in Article 173 EEC (plus general principles of law.) Moreover, as the Court 
held in Italy v Council, the fact that a Member State voted to adopt a measure in the Council 
did not preclude it, legally speaking, from subsequently contesting its legality.149  
Nonetheless, the institutional framework described above, coupled with the dynamics of 
the law-making process, meant that the Court was rarely called upon to settle disputes over 
the competences of the Community during the era of low-intensity constitutionalism.150 As 
AG Maduro noted in Vodafone: “It can comfortably be said that, for a long period of time, 
this Court was not called on to exercise a predominant role in the control of the 
Community’s competences precisely because there were already strong limits to those 
competences enshrined in their decision-making processes.”151 
b.) Article 235 EEC: The Necessary and Proper Clause of the Community 
One important area in which the question of competence did arise (albeit extremely rarely) 
during the era of low-intensity constitutionalism was the use of Article 235 EEC as a legal 
basis for Community action. According to that provision: 
“If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly [European 
Parliament], take the appropriate measures.”152 
Unlike the majority of legal bases in the Treaty, Article 235 EEC did not confine the law-
making powers of the Community to a specific policy field. Instead, it was “functional” in 
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nature, meaning that it could be utilised in different fields to achieve certain objectives.153 
The provision thus provided a useful ad hoc law-making procedure in policy fields where the 
Treaty had not conferred the necessary powers, such as environmental and regional 
policy.154  
Based on its wording, Article 235 EEC seemed to require four conditions to be satisfied 
before it could serve as a legal basis:  (i) the measure must be “necessary”; (ii) in the course 
of the operation of the common market; (iii) to attain one of the objectives of the 
Community; and (iv) where the Treaty had not provided the necessary powers.155 
The leading case on the legality of Community measures enacted under Article 235 EEC 
during the era of low-intensity constitutionalism is Massey Ferguson.156 In that case, a 
Council Regulation on the valuation of goods for customs purposes was challenged on the 
grounds that Article 235 was not the correct legal basis for the measure. 
The Court began by noting that the establishment of a customs union between the Member 
States was one of the objectives of the Community under Articles 3 (a) and (b) of the EEC 
Treaty. Moreover, the functioning of a customs union necessarily required a uniform 
determination of the valuation for customs purposes of goods from third countries. This 
would ensure that the level of protection achieved by the Common Customs Tariff was the 
same throughout the entire Community.157  
With this aim in mind, the CJEU first found, without explanation, that the power to adopt 
Directives under the alternative legal basis of Article 100 EEC did not “provide a really 
adequate solution.”158 From this, it stated that the issue to be resolved was whether the 
Community’s powers for implementing the Customs Union and the Common Commercial 
Policy under the EEC Treaty provided adequate legal bases for Community action (i.e. 
Articles 9, 27, 28, 111 and 113 EEC).159 According to the Court, although these provisions 
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could be interpreted widely and thus render recourse of Article 235 EEC not “necessary”, 
there was, nonetheless, “no reason why the Council could not legitimately consider that 
recourse to the procedure of Article 235 was justified in the interest of legal certainty.”160 
Consequently, the Court found that Article 235 EEC was a valid legal basis for the contested 
measure. 
c.) Low-Intensity Review in Competence Disputes 
The judgment in Massey Ferguson provides further evidence of the Court engaging in 
incredibly light-touch review of Community legal acts during the era of low-intensity 
constitutionalism. Had the Court wished, it could have found that ample specific legal bases 
existed under the Treaty and that, consequently, recourse to Article 235 was 
unnecessary.161 Instead, it opted to conclude, without explanation, that Article 235 EEC was 
the correct legal basis for reasons of “legal certainty.” As Schütze notes, “the early 
jurisprudence soon showed that even if the ‘necessity’ criterion was justiciable, the actual 
standard of review was to be extremely light. The requirement that action be adopted ‘in 
the course of the common market’ would equally pose no serious conceptual limit.”162 
With the necessity and common market criteria failing to place any meaningful limits on the 
use of Article 235 EEC, the outer boundaries of the provision would principally depend on 
how the concept of “Community objectives” was interpreted.163 In time, the Council would 
come to take an ever-expanding view of the objectives of the Community for the purposes 
of Article 235 EEC, frequently citing the “global objectives of the Community” as set out in 
Article 2 EEC in addition to the tasks enshrined in Article 3 EEC.164 From 1973 to the Single 
European Act (SEA) of 1987, Article 235 EEC was utilised to enact measures of Community 
law in a wide variety of fields including environmental policy, the free movement of 
workers, the freedom to exercise a trade or profession, energy policy, scientific research, 
 
160 ibid para 4. 
161  Franziska Tschofen, ‘Article 235 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community: Potential 
Conflicts Between the Dynamics of Lawmaking in the Community and National Constitutional Principles’ (1991) 
12 Michigan Journal of International Law 471, 485. 
162 Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 135. 
163 ibid. 
164 ibid 137; Tizzano (n 155) 53.  
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social policy and regional policy.165 The result was that the “conceptual limits to the 
Community’s competence became hard to identify.”166 “For a long time it was simply taken 
for granted that the Community could act. The existence of a Community competence was 
not really disputed.”167  
Notably, during the period between the judgment in Massey Ferguson and the entry into 
force of the SEA, there were no challenges to Community legislation claiming that it was 
incorrectly enacted on the basis of Article 235 EEC. The requirements of unanimity in the 
Council put political bargaining between the executives of the Member States in the driving 
seat when it came to determining the outer limits of Community competence. “Since 
Member States had the ability to control the usage of Article 235, disagreements, often 
acrimonious…were resolved within the Council and not brought before the Court.”168 
Consequently, the Council’s use of Article 235 EEC as a legal basis for measures in a number 
of different policy fields faced no resistance from the Court of Justice.169 “Competence had 
become a political rather than a legal/constitutional matter.”170 Indeed, it has been 
suggested that the Court’s light-touch approach in Massey Ferguson encouraged the 
Community institutions to make “liberal use” of Article 235 EEC and to not seriously 
consider whether alternative legal bases existed.171  
9.) Conclusions  
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the early jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice when engaging in constitutional review of Community legislation. Despite being 
originally based upon the principles of French administrative law, it was contended that the 
advent of fundamental rights review served to add a constitutional dimension to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. 
 
165According to Tschofen, between 1962 and 1972, 13 directives, regulations or decisions were based on article 
235, see Tschofen (n 161) 474; For a comprehensive overview of the prolific use of that legal basis after 1972 
see Tizzano (n 155). 
166 Schütze (n 162) 137. 
167 Loïc Azoulai, ‘Introduction’ in Loïc Azoulai (ed), The Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 7. 
168 Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 2) 2446 fn 120. 
169 Konstadinides (n 146) 23. 
170 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’ (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 1, 
7. 
171 Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 2) 2446 at fn 120.  
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In examining how the Court conducted constitutional review in these types of cases, it was 
argued that the pre-SEA era was one of “low-intensity constitutionalism.” Unlike many 
national legal orders, there was no comprehensive, constitutionally enshrined bill of 
fundamental rights with which to review the legality of Community legal acts. Instead, 
fundamental rights in the EEC legal order existed as an open-ended and ambiguous set of 
judicially created general principles of law. These rights were mostly economic in nature, 
such as the right to property or the freedom to pursue a trade or profession - which 
claimants used to challenge the legality of discretionary policy choices in areas of technical 
complexity such as the CAP. As a result, the Commission and Council could legally restrict 
the enjoyment of these rights when pursuing general policy objectives of the Community.  
Whilst there was nothing controversial about this state of affairs per se, the Court adopted 
an incredibly light touch approach to reviewing whether the pursuit of such aims had 
disproportionately infringed the substance of fundamental rights. In a number of cases, the 
Court engaged in a very brief analysis of the proportionality of contested legal acts, 
concluding within a few short paragraphs that no infringement of a right had occurred. A 
similarly low-intensity form of review was also prevalent in proportionality cases occurring 
outwith the context of fundamental rights.  
In addition to fundamental rights and proportionality, the present chapter has also 
demonstrated how profound changes to the law-making process during the era of low-
intensity constitutionalism impacted upon the role of the Court. Because of the widespread 
practice of unanimity voting in the Council, the political process on the European level was 
largely responsible for ascertaining where the boundaries of EEC competences lay. In the 
rare instances where competence disputes did arise before the Court, the jurisprudence 
once again evinced a light touch and tersely reasoned approach to reviewing the legality of 
contested Community legal acts. Most notably, the Court failed to subject the expansive use 
of Article 235 EEC to any meaningful degree of scrutiny prior to the entry into force of the 
SEA.  
Against this background, Chapters 4 and 5 turn to examine several significant reforms to the 
legal and political order of the Community/Union from the SEA onwards. As we will see, 
successive rounds of Treaty amendment fundamentally changed both the concept of 
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legislation in the EU and the constitutional review powers of the Court. In turn, these 
reforms led to aspects of the CJEU’s role under the Treaties being compared to national 
constitutional and supreme courts engaged in constitutional review of legislation. Despite 
these momentous changes to the legal and political system as a whole, however, the CJEU 
continued to subject the constitutionality of EU legislation to minimal degrees of judicial 







Safeguarding the Core of the Agenda of European Integration 
 
1.) Introduction 
The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 marked the first major set of reforms to the original 
EEC Treaty.1 It added several new legal bases to the Treaty of Rome, which empowered the 
Community institutions to adopt legal acts in wide-ranging policy fields including economic 
and social cohesion, research, technological development and environmental protection. 2 
For the most part, these novel legal bases provided the Community institutions with 
concrete law-making powers in specific policy fields, thus reducing the need for the Council 
to have recourse of the EEC’s “necessary and proper” clause in Article 235 EEC.3 
Of all the reforms introduced by the SEA, however, two would come to be widely recognised 
as amongst the most significant treaty reforms in the history of European integration.4 
The first was contained in Article 13 of the SEA, which added Article 8a to the EEC Treaty.5 
Article 8a EEC contained an explicit commitment to adopting measures with the aim of 
progressively establishing the internal market before a deadline of 31 December 1992.6 The 
internal market was defined as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital are ensured.”7 This commitment was 
enshrined in the Treaty following the Commission’s 1985 White Paper on completing the 
internal market, which recommended that close to 300 measures of Community law were 
necessary in order to ensure completion of a “fully unified internal market.”8  
 
1 Single European Act (SEA) (1987) OJ L 169, p. 1-28. 
2 For an overview see Kathryn Good, ‘Institutional Reform under the Single European Act’ (1988) 3 American 
University International Law Review 299. 
3 Kieran St Clair Bradley, ‘Powers and Procedures in the EU Constitution: Legal Bases and the Court’ in P Craig 
and G De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU law (2011) 88. 
4 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Text and Materials (Third edition, 
Cambridge University Press 2014) 22. 
5 Article 13 SEA. 
6 Article 8a EEC. 
7 Article 8a EEC. 
8 ‘Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (1985) COM 
(85) 310 Final’ para 1. 
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The second momentous reform concerned the establishment of the “cooperation 
procedure” as a novel means of adopting legislation in the Community.9 According to that 
procedure, the Commission remained responsible for initiating proposals for Community 
legislation. These proposals would then be enacted into law by a Qualified Majority Vote 
(QMV) in the Council and involved an increased amount of input from the European 
Parliament (EP).10  
The most important area of Community law-making to which this novel cooperation 
procedure applied was unquestionably the adoption of harmonisation measures in the 
internal market. According to Article 100a EEC (which was added to the Treaty of Rome by 
Article 18 of the SEA): 
“The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission 
in co-operation with the European Parliament and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.”11 
2.) The Single European Act 
These changes provide the background for continuing to analyse the Court’s changing 
approach to reviewing the legality of Community legal acts over time. By emphasising that 
the role of the CJEU must be viewed in light of the wider constitutional and political context 
in which it operates, it is contended that the SEA had significant implications for: (i) the 
concept of legislation in the Community; and (ii) the Court’s task of reviewing such 
legislation on federalism and fundamental rights grounds.  
a.) The Concept of Legislation after the Single European Act  
 
9 Despite only applying to 10 articles of the post-SEA EEC Treaty, the cooperation procedure nevertheless 
applied to several important policy fields, including the adoption of measures aimed at improving the health 
and safety of workers (Article 118a EEC) and the facilitation of free movement of workers, service providers 
and the self-employed (Articles 49, 54[2], 56[2] and 57 EEC respectively). See generally Richard Corbett, 
‘Testing the New Procedures: The European Parliament’s First Experiences with Its New “Single Act” Powers’ 
(1989) 27 Journal of Common Market Studies 359, 361. 
10 Article 149 EEC. 
11 Article 100a EEC. 
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Regarding the concept of legislation, the Single European Act was the first in a series of 
Treaty reforms that fundamentally altered: (i) the procedures and institutions involved in 
the adoption of Community legislation; (ii) the sources of democratic legitimacy 
underpinning Community legislation; and (ii) the status of Community legislation within the 
overall hierarchy of EU legal acts.  
By shifting from a system of unanimity voting to QMV in the Council, the “traditional 
indirect democratic and constitutional legitimacy” that was previously provided to 
Community acts of general application by the Member States had been disrupted.12 Unlike 
the pre-SEA era discussed in Chapter 3, Community legislation could now be enacted 
without the unanimous support of each Member State in the Council.  
As a (partial) counterbalance to this shift in the underlying source of democratic legitimacy 
for Community legislation, the abovementioned cooperation procedure provided for much 
greater input by the EP into the legislative process.13 Whereas under the Treaty of Rome the 
Parliament had very limited powers of consultation, the novel cooperation procedure 
provided the Community’s only directly elected institution with (limited) legislative powers. 
Notably, the Parliament could approve, amend or reject the position established by the 
Council prior to the final adoption of a Commission proposal into law.14  
This development fundamentally changed the previous Community law-making practice – 
encapsulated by the aphorism “the Commission proposes, the Council disposes” – and 
“began the transformation of the legislative process, giving the EP significant input into the 
legislative process for the first time.”15 The EP went from having a “weak and essentially 
unconstructive power of delay to a stronger and potentially constructive role in the drafting 
of legislation.”16 
 
12 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the 
Authority of Constitutionalism’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 332, 335; Dieter Grimm, 
The Constitution of European Democracy (Oxford University Press 2017) 66–67. 
13 Good (n 2) 300–301 A further reason for increasing the powers of the European Parliament was that the 
Community law-making process had been dominated since the Treaty of Rome by national executives with no 
effective parliamentary oversight. Following direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, increased 
involvement in the Community legislative process was seen as one way of remedying this problem. 
14 Article 149 EEC. 
15 Paul Craig and Grainne De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press 2015) 126; See 
also Anthony Arnull, ‘The Single European Act’ (1986) 11 European Law Review 358, 361. 
16 Martin Westlake, The Commission and the Parliament: Partners and Rivals in the European Policy-Making 
Process (Butterworths 1994) 39. 
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The empowerment of the Parliament at the SEA constituted the first major step in the 
gradual emergence of a procedural, parliamentary conception of legislation in the 
contemporary EU legal order.17 To recall, the original law-making powers of the Commission 
and Council under the Treaty of Rome were not conceived of as being analogous to primary 
or parliamentary legislation as adopted in national systems. The drafters deliberately did not 
establish a parliamentary body that possessed veritable legislative powers, opting instead to 
create an “Assembly” with mere advisory powers. Nor did they designate one specific law-
making procedure or enshrine one type of Community legal act as being “legislative” in 
nature.  Instead, a material or functional definition of legislation prevailed, understood as 
acts of general application, irrespective of the procedure or institution(s) involved in their 
enactment.18 
In contrast, a procedural or parliamentary conception of legislation is intimately linked to 
the question of who is responsible for the legislative function, with legislation being defined 
as every legal act adopted according to a parliamentary legislative procedure.19 By involving 
the Council, representing the Member States, and the European Parliament, representing 
the European citizens, the beginnings of a specifically designated, bicameral legislative 
procedure on the European level could be detected.20  
When viewed against this definition, however, the concept of legislation in the post-SEA 
Community continued to be understood in functional terms as all acts of general 
application. Despite enhancing the EP’s input into the law-making process, the cooperation 
procedure nevertheless provided that the views of the Parliament could ultimately be 
overridden by the wishes of the Council.21 Furthermore, legal acts adopted in accordance 
with the cooperation procedure were not accorded a superior rank within the Community’s 
hierarchy of norms. Instead, all legally binding acts (Regulations, Directives and Decisions) 
 
17 Robert Schütze, ‘The Morphology of Legislative Power in the European Community: Legal Instruments and 
the Federal Division of Powers’ (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law 91, 92–93 at fn 9. 
18 See Chapter 2, Section 4 
19 Alexander Türk, The Concept of Legislation in European Community Law: A Comparative Perspective (Kluwer 
Law International 2006) 238. 
20 Richard Corbett, Francis Geoffrey Jacobs and Darren Neville, The European Parliament (John Harper 
Publishing 2016) 310. 
21 Article 149(d)-(g) EEC. 
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were of an equal status, irrespective of the procedure or institution(s) involved in their 
enactment.  
This meant that the post-SEA system still fell short of “the essential democratic requirement 
that Community measures should become law only with the explicit approval not only of the 
Council representing the national governments but also of the Parliament representing the 
electorate as a whole.”22 Community legislation continued to be understood in functional 
terms as all acts of general application, thus rendering it distinct from primary legislation 
typically adopted by parliamentary bodies in national systems.  
b.) The Changing Nature of Litigation 
Despite retaining a functional conception of legislation, the SEA reforms nevertheless 
altered the dynamics of the Community legislative process in such a way as to change the 
nature of litigation before the CJEU.  
The decline in the practice of unanimity voting, coupled with the empowerment of the EP 
under the cooperation procedure, led to a marked increase in challenges to the legality of 
Community legal acts on competence/ legal basis grounds.23 The addition of the 
cooperation procedure meant that there were now different law-making procedures 
ascribing different institutional inputs and voting rules when it came to enacting legislation. 
In turn, this led to “a new type of legal dispute” in which the different institutions 
confronted each other before the CJEU.24 According to Lenaerts, the resultant increase in 
challenges to Community legislation on legal basis grounds meant that the Court was 
increasingly being called upon to “umpire the federal system” in the post-SEA Community.25  
3.) The Impact of Article 100a EEC: A Brief History of Negative and Positive Integration 
 
22 Corbett (n 9) 371 (footnotes omitted); See also Roland Bieber, ‘Legislative Procedure for the Establishment 
of the Single Market’ (1988) 25 Common Market Law Review 711, 712.  
23 Holly Cullen and Andrew Charlesworth, ‘Diplomacy by Other Means: The Use of Legal Basis Litigation as a 
Political Strategy by the European Parliament and Member States’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 
1243; Despite some initial uncertainties as to the continued viability of the informal Luxembourg Compromise, 
QMV in the Council became the norm when it came to enacting harmonisation measures in the post-SEA era, 
see Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 4) 22. 
24 Leonor Moral Soriano, ‘Vertical Juridical Disputes over Legal Bases’ (2007) 30 West European Politics 321, 
324. 
25 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Some Thoughts about the Interaction between Judges and Politicians’ [1992] University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 93, 122. 
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The addition of Article 100a EEC to the Community legal order has been hailed as “the single 
most important provision of the SEA.”26 As was noted above, this provision allowed for the 
Community legislature to adopt Community harmonisation measures which had as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.27 Following the entry into 
force of the SEA, Article 100a EEC soon became the principal legal basis upon which vast 
swathes of Community legislation aimed at completing the internal market was enacted.28 
According to Barnard, the introduction of Article 100a EEC and subsequent proliferation of 
legislative activity “emphasised that the single market was essentially a lawmaking 
project.”29 Indeed, the establishment and functioning of the internal market has provided 
“the source of an unequalled range and quantity of legislation and case-law.”30  
To fully grasp the impact that Article 100a EEC had upon the Community legal order (and 
the Court’s role therein), however, it is first necessary to recall that the EEC’s core task 
under the Treaty of Rome was to establish a common market and progressively 
approximate the economic policies of the Member States.31  
a) Negative Integration 
The functioning of this common market required barriers to trade between the Member 
States to be abolished. For example, tariffs that increased the cost of imports or quotas 
limiting the number of exports between Member States had to be precluded. The practice 
of abolishing such barriers - whether through provisions of the EEC Treaty itself,32 or via 
measures adopted by the Commission and Council33 - is known as “negative integration.”34  
 
26 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ [1991] Yale Law Journal 2403, 2458. 
27 Article 100a EEC.  
28 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 4) 23. 
29 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Fifth edition, Oxford University Press 
2016) 11. 
30 Gareth Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (2015) 21 European 
Law Journal 2, 7–8; By the end of 1990, all 300 or so measures deemed necessary to complete the internal 
market by the end of 1992 had been proposed by the Commission. By the time of the deadline itself, close to 
95% of the measures had been enacted and 77% had entered into force in the Member States, see Chalmers, 
Davies and Monti (n 4) (footnotes omitted). 
31 Article 2 EEC.  
32 E.g. Article 13 EEC mandated that customs duties on imports in force between the Member States be 
progressively abolished. 
33 E.g. Article 54(3) EEC provided that the Council should progressively abolish national rules and practices 
which formed obstacles to the freedom of establishment. 
34 Paul Craig, ‘Development of the EU’ in Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European Union Law 
(Oxford University Press 2017) 19. 
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During the early years of the European integration project, the Community had achieved 
considerable success when it came to negative integration. Customs duties as applied 
between the Member States had been progressively abolished and a common customs tariff 
vis-à-vis 3rd states had been established.35 In addition, around 50 measures were enacted 
pursuant to general programmes aimed at the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services.36 
b.) Positive Integration and the Problems of Harmonisation 
Beyond negative integration, the completion of a common European market also required 
certain issues to be regulated on the European as opposed to the national level. This is 
because each Member State had specific rules on, say, banking, which pursued important 
objectives like the prevention of fraud or the protection of deposits. This diversity of 
national rules hindered the creation of a common market, since companies (in this case 
banks) had to comply with different laws in different member states, thus significantly 
increasing the cost of doing business.  
The solution envisaged by the EEC Treaty was to create one set of Community wide rules in 
a particular area, thus removing obstacles to free movement and reducing compliance costs 
on business. This is known as “positive integration” or “harmonisation.”37  
Prior to the SEA, the principal legal basis for enacting harmonisation measures was Article 
100 EEC. Much like the Community’s “necessary and proper” clause contained in Article 235 
EEC, Article 100 EEC did not confine the Community legislature to a specific policy field (e.g. 
common agricultural policy, consumer protection etc.) Instead, it provided the legislature 
with a seemingly “open-ended” power to enact harmonisation measures across different 
policy fields aimed at the establishment and functioning of the common market.38  
 
35 ‘Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (1985) COM 
(85) 310 Final’ (n 8) para 5. 
36 Paul Craig, ‘Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance’ in P Craig and G De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU 
Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 51. 
37 Craig (n 34) 19. 
38 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ (1990) 38 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 205, 214; According to Bradley, Article 100 EEC was employed as a legal basis from the mid-
1960s onwards in order to enact harmonisation measures in areas such as food safety, pharmaceutical 
products and environmental protection Bradley (n 3) 94. 
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However, the adoption of harmonisation measures under Article 100 EEC required 
unanimity in the Council and involved minimal input from the European Parliament. As we 
saw in Chapter 3, consistent recourse to unanimity voting meant that national governments 
were effectively in control of delimiting the scope of EEC legislative power, including Article 
100 EEC. The domination of the legislative process by the Council also served to limit the 
number of challenges to the legality of acts adopted on the basis of Article 100 EEC by other 
Community institutions and/or the Member States. As Weatherill puts it, “constitutionally 
dubious adventurism was typically shielded from constitutional review by the assembly of 
political consensus.”39 
Gradually, this requirement of unanimity made it increasingly difficult to enact 
harmonisation legislation - not least because the Community had expanded in size following 
the accession of new Member States.40 Moreover, during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
attempts at achieving comprehensive harmonisation by agreeing upon detailed, Community 
wide standards for goods, services, establishment etc. had resulted in limited legislative 
output.41 Few national laws were harmonised and many significant impediments to free 
movement remained, as Member States refused to make the necessary compromises.42 
Most notably, goods and services lawfully produced and marketed in their Member State of 
origin were frequently subject to different rules in other Member States, thus impeding 
their free movement within the Community.43 
4.) From Constitutionalisation to Safeguarding the Core of Integration: The Changing Role 
of the CJEU 
Against this background, Chapter 4 considers the changing role of the Court of Justice within 
the legal and political order of the EEC around the time of the Single European Act in 1987. 
According to a number of influential judges and EU legal scholars, the continued problem of 
legislative inertia in the Community resulted in the Court adapting its role in order to 
 
39 Stephen Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court’s Case Law Has Become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827, 830. 
40 Craig (n 36) 51. 
41 Robert Schütze, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press 2018) 571–574. 
42 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Some Thoughts about the Interaction between Judges and Politicians’ (1992) University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 93, 110. 
43 ibid 107. 
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respond to the pressing institutional and legal needs of the day.44 Having first 
“constitutionalised” the EEC Treaty via the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, 
fundamental rights etc. during the foundational period, the Court then moved in this second 
epoch to “safeguard the core of European integration set out in the Treaty.”45  
Unwilling to accept the status quo and frustrated by the lack of progress by the Community 
legislature on the issue of harmonisation, the Court moved in the years leading up to the 
SEA to drive the European integration project forward itself.46 This was done by “providing 
solutions to problems that were expected to be tackled by the EU political institutions but 
were not in practice as the latter could not reach the then necessary consensus.”47  
a.) Overcoming Political Deadlock 
The most significant solution proposed by the CJEU during this period came in Cassis de 
Dijon, where the principle of mutual recognition was established as a cornerstone of the 
internal market.48 According to this judicially-created principle, absent harmonisation, goods 
lawfully produced in one Member State should be free to enter any other Member State 
without further restriction.49 For example, wine produced legally in France would 
henceforth be able to be sold in Germany without having to first comply with the German 
rules on wine production. Under the principle of mutual recognition, Germany would 
recognise the French rules as equivalent to its own and thus allow the unimpeded access 
and sale of French wine on the German market.50  
The establishment of the principle of mutual recognition in the internal market sphere is 
widely cited as an example of the Court adopting a creative, teleological approach to Treaty 
 
44 See Chapter 1, Section 3. 
45 Koen Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks: A Study on Judicial Legitimacy’ (2013) 36 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1302, 1308; Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Political and Legal Culture of European Integration: An Exploratory 
Essay’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 678, 688. 
46 Schütze, European Union Law (n 41) 575; Thomas Horsley, ‘Reflections on the Role of the Court of Justice as 
the "Motor” of European Integration: Legal Limits to Judicial Lawmaking’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law 
Review 931, 944; Stephen Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (Clarendon Press 1995) 273. 
47 Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks’ (n 45) 1308; George A Bermann, ‘Subsidiarity and Proportionality’ in 
Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises 
(Hart Publishing 2002) 7. 
48 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesrnonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42. 
49 ibid para 14. 
50 Barnard (n 29) 93. 
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interpretation in order to overcome political deadlock in the Community.51 Rather than wait 
for common rules to be adopted through legislation on the European level, a different, 
judicially created strategy was pursued: Member States would now, in principle, be required 
to recognise the rules of other Member States as being equivalent to their own. 
b.) Furthering Integration by Removing National Barriers to Trade 
That being said, it is important to note that the principle of mutual recognition did not 
preclude Member States from applying their own rules or standards to imported products 
per se. According to the CJEU, in the absence of harmonisation legislation, Member States 
could continue to apply national rules to imported goods. However, such rules must be 
necessary in order to satisfy “mandatory requirements” in the public interest, such as 
consumer protection, fairness in commercial transactions, public health and environmental 
protection.52 Furthermore, such restrictions on trade in the pursuit of mandatory 
requirements must be proportionate to the aim pursued; meaning that, amongst equally 
effective measures, Member States should choose those which were least restrictive to free 
movement.53 Consequently, the default rule became one of mutual recognition and free 
movement, with national rules derogating from this rule being limited to mandatory 
requirements that were proportionate in nature.  
To greatly simplify a complex and much researched phenomenon, this novel framework of 
mutual recognition, mandatory requirements and proportionality review led to an increase 
in litigation before national courts.54 Economically active individuals and companies sought 
to challenge the legality of national regulatory policies, claiming that such policies 
constituted disproportionate restrictions upon the free movement principles of the internal 
market.55 Faced with these claims, national courts increasingly made references for 
preliminary rulings to the CJEU on the compatibility of national measures with these 
 
51 Craig and De Búrca (n 15) 63; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Pearson 
Education 2002) 294; Miguel Poiares Maduro, We The Court: The European Court of Justice and the European 
Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing 1998) 32; Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (n 46) 
273. 
52 Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (n 48) para 8. 
53 Case 261/81, Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v De Smedt PVBA ECLI:EU:C:1982:382. 
54 For an overview see Turkuler Isiksel, Europe’s Functional Constitution: A Theory of Constitutionalism Beyond 
the State (Oxford University Press 2016) 136–146. 
55 Karen J Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, ‘Judicial Politics in the European Community: European 
Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision’ (1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies 535, 555. 
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fundamental principles of Community law.56 In return, the Court regularly found that the 
justifications proffered by the Member States for derogating from the default rules of free 
movement in the internal market should be subject to rigorous proportionality review. In 
short, exceptions to the general principles of mutual recognition and free movement should 
be interpreted narrowly and subject to close judicial scrutiny.57  
The result of this dynamic interaction between litigants, national courts and the CJEU was 
that many of these national rules were ultimately found to constitute unjustified or 
disproportionate impediments to the fundamental freedoms of the internal market.58 With 
such rules being subsequently annulled or dis-applied, a powerful incentive for positive 
integration through Community harmonisation legislation was created, as the need for 
common rules in important areas of the internal market came to be recognised.59  
c.)  A Pro-Integrationist Court? 
Viewed in this way, the establishment of the principle of mutual recognition and its 
aftermath is frequently cited as evidence that the CJEU had assumed the role of an “engine” 
of European integration during this period.60 By allowing “interest-driven litigation to 
overcome the political deadlock that prevented the completion of the internal market” the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence facilitated “free movers” who sought to “tear down [national] barriers 
to trade that could have been eliminated by EU harmonization.”61 
This jurisprudence is also said to evince a general, “pro-integrationist” stance being taken by 
the Court.62 In particular, the manner in which the Court came to subject national regulatory 
barriers to trade to strict proportionality review has been said to highlight the Court’s strong 
bias in favour of furthering European integration.63 
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From a more critical perspective, the landmark judgments of the Court which: (i) 
constitutionalised the EEC Treaty during the foundational period; and (ii) subsequently 
sought to overcome legislative inertia and drive the European integration process forward, 
feature prominently in accounts that charge the Court with “judicial activism.”64  
On this view, the Court is alleged to have overstepped the acceptable limits of the judicial 
function, departing from orthodox canons of interpretation and impermissibly deviating 
from the text of the Treaty.65 By reading principles like direct effect and mutual recognition 
in to the Community legal order, the Court is accused of “unwavering and illegitimate 
promotion of the Union interest”66 and effectively engaging in “supranational judicial 
policymaking.”67 As Judge Rosas puts it, the Court has “often been criticized for judicial 
activism and, more precisely, for favoring, by applying teleological methods of 
interpretation, an integration agenda, and the broad objectives expressed in the Community 
Treaties at the expense of the explicit rules of those Treaties.”68  
In response, defenders of the Court insist that the Court was perfectly within its rights to 
establish such principles given the ambiguity of the text and the overarching objective of 
laying the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.69  
Although the origins of the judicial activism debate may be traced back several decades, the 
core claims made by both sides continue to influence much of the contemporary work on 
the role of the CJEU and its contribution to the development of the European integration 
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project.70 That being said, much of the literature dealing with the perceived judicial activism 
and pro-integrationist ethos of the CJEU tends to focus upon: (i) the Court’s methodology 
when interpreting provisions of the Treaty and/or provisions of Community legislation; 
and/or (ii) the ways in which the Court has subjected national impediments to free 
movement to robust judicial scrutiny.71  
In contrast, as was noted in Chapter 1, very little has been said on whether the Court’s 
jurisprudence pertaining to constitutional review of Community legislation is equally 
“activist” or “pro-integrationist” in nature and, crucially, whether this has changed over 
time. 72 Indeed, what has been lacking in much of the work on the Court to date is any 
comprehensive examination of how the CJEU has approached its task of reviewing the 
constitutionality of EU legislation, whether this has shifted over time and, ultimately, what 
this tells us about the (changing) role of the CJEU more generally.  
In seeking to address this gap, the remainder of Chapter 4 analyses how the CJEU reviewed 
the constitutionality of Community legislation in the period between the Single European 
Act 1987 and the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. As we shall see, the CJEU’s jurisprudence 
pertaining to questions of structural constitutional review (competence) and fundamental 
rights was consistent with the wider, pro-integrationist philosophy of the CJEU during this 
second epoch in its historical evolution.  
5.) Fundamental Rights Review after the Single European Act 
Turning first to fundamental rights, the previous chapter demonstrated how the CJEU 
consistently engaged in light-touch review of acts of general application prior to the SEA. It 
was contended that this jurisprudence was one of the defining characteristics of an era of 
“low-intensity constitutionalism” in the Community.  
Understood simply as normative theory that is concerned with placing legal and political 
limits upon public power, the notion of constitutionalism being of a “low-intensity” during 
this period stemmed from the fact that there were very few constitutionally-entrenched 
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limits upon the law-making powers of the Community legislature.73 Furthermore, 
fundamental rights claims involved the assertion of economically-oriented rights such as the 
right to property or freedom to conduct a business against Community legal acts that 
regulated technical aspects of the Common Market.  
Within this framework, the Court typically granted the Community institutions a wide 
margin of discretion and opted not to scrutinise the substance of Community legal acts to 
any meaningful extent. Limited attention was paid to the justifications proffered by the 
Commission and Council for their policy choices and judgments typically concluded within a 
few short paragraphs that no infringement of fundamental rights had occurred.  
Following the entry into force of the SEA, the Community legal order continued to lack a 
written bill of fundamental rights which the Community institutions were bound to respect. 
The only reference to fundamental rights in the amended EEC Treaty was in its preamble, 
which now provided that the Community was “determined to work together to promote 
democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognised in the constitutions and laws 
of the member states, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality and 
social justice.”74  
At the same time, the core aim and objective of the Community as laid down in Articles 2 
and 3 EEC remained that of furthering integration through the creation of a pan-European 
Internal Market. 
Consequently, fundamental rights review of Community legislation continued to be 
conducted on the basis of an open-ended and somewhat ambiguous catalogue of general 
principles of law within a legal framework that remained geared towards economic 
integration. 
a.) Fundamental Rights Review of Member State Action 
Somewhat remarkably, there were very few fundamental rights challenges to Community 
legislation in the years between the SEA entering into force in 1987 and the Treaty of 
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Maastricht in 1993.75 Instead, the landmark rights cases of this period concerned the extent 
to which the Member States were obliged to comply with Community-wide fundamental 
rights norms when they were implementing, or derogating from, Community law 
obligations.  
Owing their existence to the CJEU’s creative general principles of law jurisprudence, it was 
unclear whether fundamental rights in the Community legal order applied solely to the 
Community institutions or were also capable of curtailing the actions of the Member States. 
Through landmark judgments such as Wachauf and ERT in the early 1990s, the Court 
determined that the actions of Member States would indeed be henceforth be subject to 
Community-wide fundamental rights obligations in circumstances where they implemented 
or derogated from Community law obligations.76 
This development led Coppell and O’Neill to famously argue that the Court’s jurisprudence 
was strategically aimed at expanding the influence of Community law over the activities of 
the Member States.77 In their view, the Court’s “high rhetoric of human rights protection” 
was to be seen as “no more than a vehicle for the Court to extend the scope and impact of 
European law.”78 By insisting that an increasing number of Member State actions and 
derogations from Community law fell within the scope of Community law as interpreted by 
the CJEU, this strand in the jurisprudence served ultimately to further integrate the legal 
systems of the Member States with that of the Community.79 Moreover, given that 
fundamental rights review of Member State action was not explicitly provided for in the 
founding Treaty of the EEC, the judgments in Wachauf and ERT are often viewed as further 
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evidence of judicial activism and the pro-integrationist bias of the CJEU during this second 
epoch in its historical evolution.80 
b.) The Persistence of Low-Intensity Review  
This brings us to the CJEU’s record in subjecting Community legislation to fundamental 
rights review in the post-SEA era.  
The approach taken by the Court is well-illustrated by the Kühn case, where the applicants 
contested the legality of a Community Regulation in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
field which organised a system of levies to be payed by producers and purchasers of milk 
over a certain quantity in any given year.81 In their view, the rules governing exemptions 
from this obligation to pay such levies should be interpreted to include situations, such as 
their own, where milk companies had been leased to third parties. In rejecting applicant’s 
arguments, the Court found that the system of exemptions was exhaustive and did not 
cover the situation of the applicants, thus meaning that they could not benefit from an 
exemption to pay the levy.82  
According to the CJEU, this interpretation of Community legislation also did not infringe the 
applicant’s rights to property or their freedom to pursue an occupation. In keeping with 
established case law, it was held that such rights were not absolute and must be considered 
in light of their social function. Accordingly, restrictions on such rights were permissible 
provided they corresponded to objectives in the EEC’s general interest and did not 
constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate interference, impairing the 
very substance of the rights in question.83  
The CJEU first found that the Regulations formed part of a body of measures aimed at 
remedying surpluses in the Community milk market and thus corresponded to a general 
interest in the Community. Then, without any further degree of scrutiny of the Regulation, 
or any attempt to elaborate on its reasoning, the Court swiftly concluded in a single 
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paragraph that the Regulation did not affect the very substance of the right to property and 
of the freedom to pursue an occupation.84 
Much like before the SEA, therefore, fundamental rights cases involved claims by natural 
and legal persons that rights of an economic nature had been disproportionately restricted 
by Community legislation in areas of complex, technical regulation such as the CAP. In 
response, the same light-touch, tersely reasoned approach to reviewing Community 
legislation on fundamental rights and proportionality grounds was deployed by the CJEU.85 
Rather than engaging with the suitability, necessity and proportionality in the strict sense 
aspects of proportionality review in this context, the Court was content with accepting that 
contested Community legislation pursued legitimate community interests. Moreover, the 
light-touch approach to scrutinising the substance of contested legislation has been said to 
fit within the wider, pro-integrationist philosophy of the CJEU during this period.86 Whilst 
the brevity of many of the Court’s judgments makes it difficult to clearly ascertain the 
underlying policy choices of the CJEU, its apparent reluctance to closely scrutinise the 
legality of Community legislation may be said to stem from a desire not to frustrate the 
project of furthering European integration.87 
6.) The Question of Competence  
The same pro-integrationist ethos may also be detected in the way in which the CJEU went 
about reviewing Community legislation on competence/legal basis grounds in the years 
after the SEA. According to Granger, the jurisprudence in this area is perceived as being 
“biased”, since it “almost always gave priority to Treaty provisions which granted greater 
influence to supranational institutions and favoured supranational modes of decision-
making.”88 Moreover, when it came to policing the boundary between Community and 
Member State areas of competence, the Court typically favoured recourse to open-ended, 
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functional legal bases in the Treaty which allowed the EEC institutions to more easily expand 
the scope of Community activity.89 
In demonstrating how this played out in the case law, the remainder of this chapter first 
addresses the impact that the SEA reforms had upon the Court’s task of reviewing the 
legality of Community legislation. This is followed by an examination of the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence when reviewing Community legislation on competence/legal basis grounds.  
a.) The Shift to QMV: An End of an Era? 
To recall from the previous Chapter, the widespread use of unanimity voting in the Council 
before the SEA had effectively obviated the need for judicial review of Community 
legislation on competence grounds. With acts of general application being unanimously 
agreed to by the governments of the Member States, challenges to the legality of such acts 
before the CJEU were incredibly rare. The political process provided the principal check 
upon the existence of legislative powers on the Community level, which in turn led national 
ministers in the Council to often take a rather expansive view of the scope of the EEC’s 
competences.  
The legal and political order of the EEC during this period may therefore be contrasted with 
many national systems where issues of governmental structure and the division of powers 
between different levels of government forms “the most ‘explosive’ of federal 
battlegrounds.”90 Typically, within those legal orders that divide power between a central 
authority and constituent entities (often along federal lines), an expansive interpretation of 
the law-making powers of the central authority comes at the expense of the powers of the 
constituent states or regions.91  
During the early decades of the EEC, however, the near total control of the Member States 
over the law-making process resulted in the Community appearing “more as an instrument 
in the hands of the governments rather than as a usurping power.”92 “In federal states, the 
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classical dramas of federalism in the early formative periods presuppose two power centers: 
the central and the constituent parts. In the Community…the constituent units' power was 
the central power.”93 Consequently, the core question of delimiting competences between 
the centre and the periphery was far less important in the EEC than it was in many nation 
states.94  
This state of affairs was radically altered with the entry into force of the Single European 
Act. The significance of the change is apparent when one recalls that, at a foundational 
level, every legal act adopted by the Community institutions must be based upon a legal 
basis in the Treaty. These legal bases provide the scope of the Community’s competence to 
act within a particular policy area (e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy, Competition law, 
internal market etc.) and stipulate the law-making procedure to be followed therein.95 The 
choice of legal basis thus determines the scope of the Community’s powers per se; as well 
as the degree of influence enjoyed by the Community institutions and the Member States 
over the legislative output of the Community.  
Following the SEA reforms, this meant that whenever a legal basis to which the cooperation 
procedure applied was chosen, the Council operated by QMV and the Parliament enjoyed 
considerable input into the process. In contrast, whenever the cooperation procedure did 
not apply, most other legal bases in the Treaties continued to provide for unanimity voting 
in the Council and a reduced, consultative role for the EP.  
The adoption of legislation via the cooperation procedure therefore necessarily entailed the 
loss of individual national vetoes on the Community level. In drawing attention to the 
ramifications that this reform had upon the Member States, Weiler emphasised at the time 
that “unlike any earlier era in the Community, and unlike most of their other international 
and transnational experience, Member States are now in a situation of facing binding 
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Faced with the prospect of having to comply with Community legislation that they had 
opposed during the law-making process, the Member States came to recognise that defining 
the scope of the Community’s law-making competences was of far greater importance than 
during the pre-SEA era.97 As Weatherill points out, “[a] regime of QMV in Council, in place of 
unanimity, generates a sharper appreciation of the importance of defining the limits of 
[Community] competence from that which prevails in times when an anxious State knew the 
Council acted only if every State was in agreement.”98  
In addition to the Member States, the other Community institutions also came to realise 
that the choice of legal basis carried with it direct implications for the degree of input that 
they would each have over the formulation and adoption of Community legislation.  
b.) The Increasingly Constitutional Role and Rhetoric of the CJEU 
As stated above in the introduction, this increase in contestation over the legal basis and 
competence of Community legislation resulted in the Court being faced with new types of 
cases in which it was called upon to “umpire the federal system” in the Community. In much 
the same way as national constitutional and supreme courts are responsible for conducting 
structural constitutional review of legislation, the CJEU was now required to engage in “the 
interpretation and enforcement of the division of powers that is part of federal 
constitutions as well as the enforcement of those provisions establishing the basic 
institutions of government.”99  
Aspects of the Court’s task were now “essentially constitutional”, in the sense that the CJEU 
was required to adjudicate upon disputes between the Community institutions and the 
Member States within the context of reviewing the legality of Community legislation.100 This 
analogy with national systems of structural constitutional review is clearly implicit in 
Advocate General Van Gerwen’s observation in 1989 that “ensuring that the legal basis is 
the correct one is crucial to preserving the balance of powers laid down in the Treaties as 
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between the Community and the Member States and as between the Community 
institutions inter se.”101 
In addition to assuming these greater “constitutional” responsibilities, it has also been 
noted that the CJEU “started using more aggressively the rhetoric of a constitutional court” 
around the time of the SEA.102 For example, in the landmark 1986 judgment of Les Verts, the 
CJEU proclaimed for the first time that the Community legal order was “based on the rule of 
law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the 
question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty.”103  
This novel, constitutional rhetoric was soon complemented by the Court’s judgment in Foto 
Frost, which determined that national courts were precluded from ruling upon the validity 
of measures of Community law. In all such cases where issues of validity were raised before 
them, national courts were required to refer the matter to the Court of Justice via a 
reference for a preliminary ruling.104 The power to declare acts of Community law invalid 
was to be reserved solely to the Court of Justice. This resulted in a strictly centralised system 
of constitutional review in the Community legal order that drew comparisons with many 
constitutional orders (particularly in the continental European tradition).105 
By proclaiming that the Court was itself ultimately responsible for reviewing the legality of 
Community legislation against the Community’s “basic constitutional charter”, the reasoning 
in Les Vertes and Foto Frost permitted “recourse to a classic system of constitutional control 
in the Member States and the comparison of the Court to a constitutional court.”106 
Henceforth, every “exertion of authority” by the Community institutions would have to 
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“filter through the mesh of constitutional validity” provided by the Treaties and umpired by 
the CJEU.107 
But how, if at all, did the CJEU’s approach to reviewing the legality of Community legislation 
on competence grounds change following the entry into force of the SEA? In light of “the 
new relevancy of the question of competences in the post-SEA era” would the Court come 
to subject Community legislation to stricter competence control than during previous 
periods in the history of the Community?108 
7.) Establishing the Basic Principles of Structural Constitutional Review 
In discharging this novel “constitutional” responsibility of “umpiring the federal system”, the 
Court began by holding that the correct legal basis for Community legislation was not a 
matter to be determined solely by the political process. Prior to the SEA, the Council had 
contended that since it bore responsibility under the Treaties for amending Commission 
proposals, disputes over the correct legal basis were to be resolved through the political 
process and were not a matter for the Court.109  
a.) Objective Factors Amenable to Judicial Review 
In rejecting this viewpoint, the Court held that “the choice of the legal basis for a measure 
may not depend simply on an institution's conviction as to the objective pursued but must 
be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review.”110 In particular, the 
aim and content of the measure must be taken into consideration.111 
These principles were first articulated in deciding an action for annulment raised by the 
Commission against two Council Regulations that applied generalized tariff preferences to 
certain industrial and textile products originating in developing countries.112 In the 
Commission’s view, the Regulations should have been annulled for failing to state the 
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precise legal basis upon which they were enacted and for violating the Treaty by relying 
upon an incorrect legal basis.113 According to the Council, the contested Regulations had to 
be enacted on the basis of both Article 235 EEC (the Community’s ‘necessary and proper 
clause) and Article 113 EEC (empowering the Community to enact measures in the field of 
the Common Commercial Policy via QMV). This was because the Regulations pursued not 
only commercial policy objectives but also development policy aims beyond the scope of 
Article 113 EEC.  
In resolving the dispute, the Court noted that the choice of legal basis was not merely a 
question of formality, “since Articles 113 and 235 of the Treaty entail different rules 
regarding the manner in which the Council may arrive at its decision. The choice of the legal 
basis could thus affect the determination of the content of the contested regulations.”114 
Then, in articulating a principle that would be frequently repeated in the post-SEA era, the 
Court held that “[i]t follows from the very wording of Article 235 that its use as the legal 
basis for a measure is justified only where no other provision of the Treaty gives the 
Community institutions the necessary power to adopt the measure in question.”115 
b.) Restricting the Use of Article 235 EEC 
In marked contrast to the period depicted in Chapter 3, therefore, the Council would no 
longer have seemingly unrestricted recourse to the “necessary and proper clause” when 
enacting Community legislation in a wide variety of policy fields. Moreover, the 
abovementioned changes to the dynamics of the Community legislative process meant that 
acts of general application adopted unanimously by the Council would no longer be 
effectively immune from challenge by other institutions and/or the Member States. Indeed, 
in several instances where the Council opted for Article 235 EEC as a legal basis, the 
Commission and Parliament contested that choice of legal basis before the Court. In their 
view, specific legal bases that mandated Community action in a particular policy field and 
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which provided for the cooperation procedure should have been utilised (thus requiring 
QMV in the Council and an enhanced role for the EP).116  
Disputes of this nature required the CJEU to undertake two distinct yet interrelated tasks 
when reviewing the legality of Community legislation. The first was to examine the content 
of the contested Community legislation to determine its aims and objectives. The second 
was to provide an authoritative interpretation of the scope of those legal bases in the Treaty 
which empowered the Community to legislate in policy fields such as the CCP, 
environmental protection, vocational training etc. Whenever these specific legal bases were 
found to possess adequate scope for adopting Community legislation in a given field, the 
consequence was that the legislation had been incorrectly adopted on the basis of Article 
235 EEC. 117 
In a number of cases during this period, the Court sided with the claims of the Commission 
and/or Parliament that specific legal bases under the EEC Treaty were sufficient for adopting 
the contested legislation.118 As a result, the circumstances in which the Council could have 
recourse to Article 235 EEC to adopt legislation in key policy fields was considerably 
reduced.119  
8.) The Internal Market Unlimited? 
Having limited recourse to Article 235 EEC for the adoption of Community legislation in the 
post-SEA era, attention soon turned to the scope of the Community’s competence to enact 
harmonisation legislation under the newly inserted Article 100a EEC. As noted above, unlike 
many specific legal bases in the Treaty, Article 100a EEC possessed an open-ended, 
functional quality that was similar to Article 235 EEC. Both legal bases did not confine the 
scope of the Community legislature’s powers to a particular policy field.120  
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In contrast to Article 235 EEC, however, harmonisation legislation under Article 100a EEC 
could henceforth be adopted by QMV in the Council. Consequently, majority voting became 
a central feature of much of the Community’s legislative output, as the overarching 
objective of progressively establishing the internal market was pursued with renewed 
enthusiasm.121  
Given its central importance to the European integration project as a whole, the ways in 
which the Court has approached its task of reviewing the constitutionality of harmonisation 
legislation sits at the core of the present enquiry into the changing role of the CJEU. This is 
because “[n]o other provision of the Treaties provides a better yardstick of the way the EU 
lawmaking institutions understand the limits of their own powers, and the Court 
understands its role in reviewing the competence of the EU, than that provision.”122 
Moreover, as Advocate General Jacobs remarked almost ten years after the entry into force 
of the SEA, Article 100a EEC and its successors have led to “Community legislation touching 
the most diverse areas of national law, such as the protection of the environment, of public 
health, of the consumer, and…the protection of intellectual property.”123  
When viewed from the perspective of comparative federalism, the Community’s power to 
enact harmonisation legislation has long been compared to the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution, since both seek to empower their respective legislatures with 
broadly framed powers in order to abolish obstacles to interstate commerce.124 
“Quantitatively, that grant of power is of paramount importance, as most of US and EU 
legislation currently in force is grounded in that constitutional authority.”125 Article 100a EEC 
and its successors have formed a key “battlefield” for contests over whether the Community 
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or its Member States are competent to regulate a particular issue.126 In essence, when 
reviewing the constitutionality of harmonisation legislation, “the main issue the Court has to 
deal with is whether the [Community] is entitled to act and how much power is left to 
member states.”127  
a.) Titanium Dioxide 
The first major dispute over the scope of Article 100a EEC in the post-SEA era arose in 
Titanium Dioxide. The Commission challenged a Council Directive which pursued the twin 
goals of (i) harmonizing national programmes for the reduction of pollution from industrial 
establishments; and (ii) improving the conditions of competition in the titanium dioxide 
industry.128  
The Directive was enacted on the basis of Art.130s EEC, which empowered the Council to 
unanimously adopt measures in the field of environmental policy. In the Commission’s view, 
the Directive should have been adopted on the basis of Art.100a EEC, thus entailing 
recourse to the cooperation procedure of QMV in the Council and strong input from the 
Parliament.129  
In examining the aims and content of the Directive, the Court found that it was inextricably 
linked to both the protection of the environment and eliminating disparities in conditions of 
competition.130 According to settled case law, Community measures which pursued two 
different policy aims should be based upon both legal bases in the Treaty.131 However, the 
difference in law-making procedure in Art.100a (cooperation procedure) and Article 130s 
(unanimity in Council, consultation of the EP) meant that such an approach could not be 
taken, since this would “divest the cooperation procedure of its very substance.”132  
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Based on the fact that the SEA had inserted a specific legislative competence in the field of 
environmental protection into the Treaty, one might have expected the CJEU to find that 
the correct legal basis was Article 130s EEC rather than the general, open-ended 
harmonisation competence of Article 100a EEC.  
However, the CJEU rejected this outcome, annulling the contested legislation on the 
grounds that it had been incorrectly adopted under Article 130s EEC and that Article 100a 
EEC was the correct legal basis. In so doing, the Court placed much emphasis upon the 
purpose of Art.100a and the cooperation procedure when viewed within the broader 
context of the development of European integration. According to the CJEU, the 
cooperation procedure was intended to “increase the involvement of the European 
Parliament in the legislative process of the Community” with participation reflecting “a 
fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the exercise of power 
through the intermediary of a representative assembly.”133 
The judgment also provided important guidance on the scope of Article 100a EEC in 
the post-SEA era. According to the Court, a precondition for the existence of a pan-
European internal market is the existence of undistorted conditions of competition.134 
In order to give full effect to the fundamental economic freedoms of the internal 
market, therefore, “harmonizing measures are necessary to deal with disparities 
between the laws of the Member States in areas where such disparities are liable to 
create or maintain distorted conditions of competition.”135  
In the absence of harmonisation on the Community level, national measures which are 
necessary to address environmental concerns may not only create a burden upon the 
undertakings to which they apply, but also lead to competition being appreciably 
distorted.136 Consequently, “action intended to approximate national rules concerning 
production conditions in a given industrial sector with the aim of eliminating 
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distortions of competition in that sector is conducive to the attainment of the internal 
market and thus falls within the scope of Article 100a.”137 
This aspect of the Court’s judgment in Titanium Dioxide is widely recognised as 
entailing an incredibly broad understanding of the scope of the Community 
legislature’s internal market competence under Article 100a EEC.138 The reasoning of 
the Court not only confirmed that this legal basis could be utilised to eliminate 
distortions to competition, but “suggested that any disparities in national laws liable to 
create any distortion of competition could be harmonised.”139 Furthermore, by 
expressing a clear preference for the use of the cooperation procedure on the grounds 
that it sought to “accelerate the process of Community integration and to strengthen 
the democratic safeguards attached to the legislative process”140, the Court had 
further emphasised the diminution of unanimity voting that had dominated in the 
past. 
The pro-integrationist policy choices underlying the judgment are more clearly 
explained by Advocate General Tesauro in the case, who noted that a broad 
interpretation of Article 100a EEC was “fully consistent with the fundamental 
objectives of the reforms pursued by the Single Act.”141 In this regard, the most 
important innovation of the SEA was the cooperation procedure, which shifted to 
QMV in the Council and empowered the European Parliament. These reforms were 
intended “to accelerate the process of Community integration and to strengthen the 
democratic safeguards attached to the legislative process.”142 Article 100a EEC 
represented “the most significant case in which majority voting and the cooperation 
procedure are applicable” due to its “central importance to the attainment of the 
internal market.”143 The fundamental objectives underpinning the SEA were said to be 
“renewed integration through greater recourse to faster decision-making procedures 
 
137 ibid 23. 
138 Kenneth A Armstrong and Simon Bulmer, The Governance of the Single European Market (Manchester 
University Press 1998) 212; René Barents, ‘The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal 
Basis of Community Legislation’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 85, 87–88. 
139 Schütze, European Union Law (n 41) 557 (emphasis original). 
140 Case C-300/89, Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, ECLI:EU:C:1991:115 para 13. 





and the enhancement of democratic guarantees through more effective involvement 
of the Parliament in the legislative process.”144 
b.) Spain v Council  
Having confirmed the central importance of Article 100a EEC to the future development of 
the European integration project, the Court subsequently confirmed a broad interpretation 
of the scope of the Community’s harmonisation competence in Spain v Council.145 Spain 
challenged the legality of a Regulation which created a supplementary certificate for 
medicinal products that could be granted under the same conditions as national patents by 
the Member States. In their view, Article 100 or Article 235 EEC was the correct legal basis 
for the Regulation, since adopting Community legislation on these legal bases would 
“require the unanimity of all Member States and therefore...[would] not affect their 
sovereignty.”146  
The Court swiftly rejected this argument, emphasising that Article 235 EEC could only 
be utilised as a legal basis where no other provision of the Treaty provided the 
Community with the necessary powers to adopt the contested legislation. Moreover, 
no arguments had been put forward to support the claim that Article 100 EEC was the 
correct legal basis. The question to be resolved, therefore, was whether the novel 
Article 100a EEC constituted the correct legal basis for the Regulation.147 
Spain raised three separate issues which suggested that the Regulation went beyond 
the scope of the Community’s power to enact harmonisation measures on the basis of 
Article 100a EEC. First, Article 100a EEC could only be utilised to harmonise existing 
national rights and not to create new Community wide rights. Second, the Regulation 
did not pursue the objective enshrined in Article 8 EEC (to which Article 100a EEC 
referred) of establishing an internal market: the supplementary certificate extended 
the duration of national patents, thus extending the compartmentalisation of the 
internal market into distinct national markets. Third, at the time of the Regulation’s 
adoption, only two Member States had enacted national rules regarding a 
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supplementary certificate, thereby raising the question of whether the Community’s 
harmonisation power was triggered in such circumstances.148 
Regarding the first of these questions, the Court simply held without explanation that it was 
undisputed in this case that the contested regulation did not create a new right.149 In 
similarly terse fashion, the Court failed to directly address the second issue and did not 
discuss whether the Regulation did in fact hinder the free movement of pharmaceutical 
goods between states. Instead, the Court focused on the third issue raised by the applicants, 
holding that harmonizing measures were “necessary to deal with disparities between the 
laws of the Member States in so far as such disparities are liable to hinder the free 
movement of goods within the Community.”150 In this regard, the Regulation aimed to 
“prevent the heterogeneous development of national laws leading to further disparities 
which would be likely to create obstacles to the free movement of medicinal products 
within the Community and thus directly affect the establishment and the functioning of the 
internal market.”151  
Consequently, following Spain v Council, the Community appeared to be competent to 
adopt harmonisation measures under Article 100a EEC so as to prevent future obstacles to 
trade or a potential fragmentation of the internal market.152 As stated by Conway, since 
“almost any diversity of national laws could be understood as a potential future obstacle to 
free movement or undistorted competition, they could be brought within this 
framework.”153 Accordingly, the Court was believed to possess “a tendency to adopt a pro-
integration interpretation in questions of competence” in the years following the entry into 
force of the SEA.154 When it came to the delimitation of competences between the 
Community and the Member States, the CJEU’s wide interpretation of Article 100a EEC and 
its light-touch approach to review suggested a strong preference for favouring the former.  
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The purpose of Chapter 4 has been to demonstrate how the role of the CJEU changed 
around the time of the Single European Act in 1987. Having constitutionalised the Treaty of 
Rome during the foundational period, the Court then moved in this second epoch to 
“safeguard the core of European integration set out in the Treaty.”155 Faced with legislative 
inertia in the Community, the Court adapted its role in order to meet the pressing needs of 
the EEC at this time. 
By establishing the principle of mutual recognition in the internal market, the CJEU 
demonstrated a willingness to provide judicial solutions to problems that were supposed to 
be addressed by the political process. Subsequently, through a combination of creative, 
teleological Treaty interpretation and strict scrutiny of national impediments to free 
movement, the CJEU played a leading role as an “engine” of European integration during 
this second epoch in its history.156 
In addition to breaking the political deadlock on the Community level, the Court’s 
jurisprudence also proved to be something of a catalyst for Treaty reform. Following the 
Commission’s influential White Paper on completing the Internal Market (which was itself 
inspired, in part, by the jurisprudence of the CJEU) the Single European Act of 1987 brought 
about a series of fundamental changes to the legal and political order of the Community.  
Of paramount importance in this regard was the advent of the cooperation procedure and 
its application to the Community’s core competence for enacting harmonisation legislation 
in the internal market. By moving to a system of QMV in the Council and empowering the 
Parliament within the legislative process, the SEA marked the first in a series of reforms 
which would culminate in a procedural concept of legislation emerging in the post-Lisbon 
Treaty era. 
These changes to the dynamics of the legislative process also had a considerable impact 
upon the CJEU’s task of conducting constitutional review of Community legislation. The 
combination of QMV and enhanced European Parliamentary involvement gave rise to 
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increased litigation over the correct legal basis for Community legislation. Recognising that 
the choice of legal basis would determine the scope of the Community’s powers and the 
degree of influence that different actors would enjoy over the legislative process, both the 
Community institutions and the Member States sought to contest the constitutionality of 
Community legislation on competence grounds. The result was that the CJEU assumed 
greater responsibilities of a “constitutional” nature, as it was increasingly called upon to 
“umpire the federal system” within the post-SEA Community.157  
When it came to reviewing Community legislation on legal basis/competence grounds, 
however, Chapter 4 has argued that the same pro-integrationist ethos that was present in 
other areas of the Court’s jurisprudence was also evident in these cases of structural 
constitutional review.158 
Notably, the CJEU adopted an expansive interpretation of the scope of Article 100a EEC, 
with the abovementioned judgments of Titanium Dioxide and Spain v Council resulting in 
such a wide sweeping understanding of the Community’s harmonisation powers that they 
appeared “devoid of constitutional boundaries.”159  
This pro-integrationist approach to the question of competence was also reflected in the 
CJEU’s fundamental rights jurisprudence during this period. Much like the cases discussed in 
Chapter 3, the Court continued its established practice of rapidly concluding without much 
explanation that contested Community pursued legitimate aims and did not 
disproportionately impinge upon fundamental rights. It was therefore submitted that the 
case law evinces a reluctance on the part of the CJEU to frustrate the advancement of 
European integration by strictly scrutinising the constitutionality of Community legislation. 
It was not long, however, before this light-touch, pro-integrationist approach to 
constitutional review came to be viewed as part of a wider problem in the Community. The 
SEA reforms had made a momentous contribution to facilitating the enactment of 
Community legislation. With the legislative process on the Community level gathering 
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momentum, vast swathes of legal acts aimed at completing the internal market were 
enacted in an attempt to complete the internal market by the end of 1992.  
This proliferation of internal market legislation, coupled with the Court’s seemingly 
“unlimited”160 interpretation of the scope of Article 100a EEC, led to increased concerns 
about “competence creep” in the years following the entry into force of the SEA.161 In 
particular, concerns were raised over the extent to which Community law had come to 
encroach upon policy areas that were thought to have remained the responsibility of the 
Member States. Consequently, the “vexed question of the dividing line between Community 
competences and those of the Member States” gained widespread attention and came to 
be placed firmly at the top of the agenda for future Treaty reform.162  
With regards to the role that the CJEU could play in addressing this question, however, a 
problem presented itself: the system of judicial review remained rooted in the traditions of 
French administrative law, consisting of the four grounds of review enshrined in Article 173 
EEC (supplemented by a series of general principles of law). As Weiler and Jacqué argued in 
the early 1990s, whilst the lack of competence ground of review found in Article 173 EEC 
could theoretically be used in the future to address issues of competence creep, “since to 
date no Commission or Council measure has been struck down for pure and simple lack of 
competences our assessment is that this existing provision in itself will not satisfy the fears 
of the Member States.”163 
The problem in the post-SEA Community, therefore, remained one of “low-intensity 
constitutionalism.” When compared to many national legal orders, the Community 
continued to lack significant, constitutionally-entrenched limits upon the existence and 
exercise of legislative power. When coupled with the absence of a written bill of rights, the 
low-intensity of this constitutionalism also rendered the Court’s task of reviewing the 
legality of Community legislation distinct from many national constitutional and supreme 
courts.  Finally, the light-touch, tersely reasoned approach taken by the CJEU in federalism 
and fundamental rights cases to date served to further emphasise the “low-intensity” 
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nature of constitutionalism during this second epoch in the history of the European 




From Maastricht to Lisbon: Competence Creep and Constitutionalisation 
 
1.) Introduction 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 marked the next major phase in the evolution of the 
European integration project. The Treaty fundamentally reorganized the legal architecture of 
the Community by creating a European Union (EU) consisting of three separate pillars.1 
Subsequent rounds of Treaty amendment at Amsterdam and Nice would amend various 
aspects of the legal and political order of the EU whilst retaining this 3 pillar structure.2 
The first of these pillars consisted of the EEC Treaty, which was now renamed the European 
Community (EC) Treaty. Within this first pillar, a number of notable additions were made to 
the competences of the Community, including in the fields of: Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU); European citizenship; culture; public health; consumer protection; trans-
European networks and development cooperation.3  
The second pillar dealt with Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the third with 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). These two pillars concerned intergovernmental forms of 
cooperation in particularly sensitive areas of national policy. For the most part, the 
Community’s “supranational” institutions – the Commission and the Court – had a very 
limited role to play, with the Council and European Council asserting a firm grip over the 
decision-making processes in these fields.4 
For the purposes of the present enquiry, attention shall be focused on the first, EC pillar and 
the impact that the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice reforms had upon: (i) the system of 
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judicial review in the EC (ii) the legislative process and concept of legislation in the EC; and 
(iii) the changing role of the Court when reviewing the legality of Community legislation. 
2.) The Constitutionalisation of the System of Judicial Review 
When viewed in historical perspective, these successive rounds of Treaty amendment 
resulted in a profound shift in how one conceives of the concepts of constitutionalism, 
constitutionalisation and the nature of constitutional review of legislation in the EC. 
a.) Constitutionalism and Constitutionalisation 
As was noted in Chapter 3, constitutionalism may be generally defined as a normative theory 
that is concerned with legal and political instruments that limit power.5 Closely related to 
this basic conception of constitutionalism is the phenomenon of “constitutionalisation”, 
which Loughlin defines as “the process by which an increasing range of public life is being 
subjected to the discipline of the norms of liberal-legal constitutionalism.”6 By also defining 
constitutionalism as a set of legal and political limits upon power, Loughlin notes that, at its 
core, “constitutionalisation presupposes legalisation; as greater swathes of public life are 
brought within the ambit of constitutional norms, so too are they disciplined by formal legal 
procedures. Constitutionalisation is the process of extending the main tenets of liberal-legal 
constitutionalism to all forms of governmental action.”7  
In light of this basic definitional framework, the previous chapter noted that the pre-
Maastricht Community lacked many of the same constitutionally-entrenched legal and 
political limits that one typically finds in national constitutional systems. Unlike the US and 
many continental European constitutions, the EEC Treaty did not contain a clearly defined 
list of enumerated powers to be exercised by the Community institutions. Nor was there an 
explicit principle of attributed competences or a doctrine of powers that were reserved to 
the Member States.8 Furthermore, the Community legal order did not contain a written bill 
of legally binding fundamental rights commitments. For these reasons, Chapters 3 and 4 
argued that the EEC legal order was one of “low-intensity constitutionalism.”   
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b.) Limiting the Existence and Exercise of Legislative Power 
This state of affairs was radically altered by the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. 
According to Article F TEU, the EU would henceforth “respect fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms…and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, as general principles of Community law.”9 These commitments were 
then re-affirmed by the Amsterdam Treaty 1997 via Article 6 TEU, which also established for 
the first time that the EU was founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.10  
For Von Bogdandy, the decision at Amsterdam to explicitly found the EU upon these 
“constitutional principles” meant that the authors of the Treaty intended to create a 
“European political Union” that was “founded on the postulates of liberal-democratic 
constitutionalism.”11 Whereas the European Community’s core objective remained that of 
establishing an Internal Market and thus furthering integration through economic means, 
Article 6 TEU made clear that these aims and objectives were now situated within an EU 
construct that was founded upon a “core programme of liberal-democratic 
constitutionalism.”12  
In addition to founding the EU upon the constitutional principles of Article 6 TEU, the 
Member States also used the Maastricht Treaty to address growing concerns about the 
seemingly ever-expanding competences of the EC into sensitive areas of national 
policymaking. Of particular note in this regard was the addition of Article 3b to the EC 
Treaty.13 This provision provided that the Community institutions were now bound to 
respect the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality, which Dashwood 
describes as three “general organising principles of the [EC] constitutional order.”14  
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According to the principle of conferral, the Community “shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.”15 This 
inclusion of an explicit principle of conferral in the Treaties for the first time in the history of 
the European integration project had two principal consequences. First, it explicitly 
acknowledged, in plain terms, that the Community's legislative powers were limited. Second, 
the wording of Article 3b EC implicitly confirmed that the Community was not endowed with 
general law-making powers that could be utilised extensively in the pursuit of diverse policy 
choices.16  
In addition to the principle of conferral, the principle of subsidiarity was to act as a limit 
upon the exercise of Community legislative competence. It was defined by the Maastricht 
Treaty in the following terms: 
“In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community.”17 
Despite the somewhat awkward way in which the principle was drafted, subsidiarity 
generally operates “by setting a functional criteria to decide whether the [Community] – or 
rather the states – should act in a given field.”18 It therefore deals with a specific question in 
the vertical allocation of powers between the Community and the Member States.19  
Alongside the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, Article 3b EC also provided a Treaty-
based definition of the principle of proportionality for the first time, according to which 
“[a]ny action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty.”20 
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Whereas proportionality was first developed as a general principle of Community law during 
the early years of the EEC, the principle was traditionally utilised as a means of protecting 
the rights and interests of individuals and companies from excessive Community 
interference. Following its inclusion in Article 3b EC, however, prominent scholars argued 
that the proportionality principle had also taken on a different, competence-protecting 
function.21 According to this view, proportionality was now also concerned with “limiting the 
intensity of Union intervention in order to protect national regulatory autonomy.”22 It was 
“designed to safeguard primarily the interests of the Member States vis-à-vis the 
Community.”23  
c.) Safeguarding the Federal Order of Competences 
The addition of novel, constitutionally-entrenched limits to the powers of the Community 
institutions resulted in a significant “constitutionalization” of the system of judicial review. 
While constitutionalisation was traditionally associated with the Court’s transformation of 
the EEC legal order via the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy etc. during the foundational 
period, Article 3b EC represented constitutionalisation in the sense articulated above by 
Loughlin. In contrast to the low-intensity constitutionalism of the past, this next phase of 
constitutionalisation led to the EC legislature being subject to a greater number of 
constitutional norms aimed at “safeguarding the federal balance of competences” between 
the Community and its Member States.24 Accordingly, what was now at stake was “a 
dimension of constitutionalism that concentrate[d] on providing reliable limits to the 
competence of the Community to intrude on national autonomy.”25 
This focus on the balance of competences between the EC and its Member States formed 
part of a wider and rapidly increasing body of scholarship that analysed the post-Maastricht 
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EU in federal terms.26 Generally speaking, federalism's “basic tenet is that power will be 
divided between a central authority and the component entities of a nation-state or an 
international organization so as to make each of them responsible for the exercise of their 
own powers.”27 Presented in this way, the “federal idea” is broad enough to encompass a 
variety of different governmental structures that are not restricted to the nation state.28 
“[F]ederalism is treated as a modest concept derived from comparative analysis. The 
notion of federalism will not be restricted to refer only to fully fledged federal states. 
Instead federalism will be used to signal a range of political situations and institutions 
in which sovereignty is shared, covering a variety of federal states and federal unions 
or confederations.”29 
For present purposes, the addition of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality to the EC 
legal order meant that the CJEU was now entrusted with resolving “conflicts of competence 
between the EU and the Member States in a way reminiscent of the role of a constitutional 
court in a federal state…”30 Whether it be questions relating to the existence of a 
Community competence to act in a given policy field (conferral), or the legality of exercises 
of Community competences (subsidiarity and proportionality), “[a]ll refer to the problem of 
the coexistence of different political entities within a larger polity to which they are bound 
up and as such may readily be cast in ‘federalist’ terms.”31  
3.) The Federalisation of the Community Legislative Process 
a.) The Co-Decision Procedure  
In addition to rendering the CJEU responsible for safeguarding the federal order of 
competences, successive rounds of Treaty amendment from Maastricht onwards also led to 
 
26 Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the 
United States and the European Union (Oxford University Press 2001); Daniel Wincott, ‘Federalism and the 
European Union: The Scope and Limits of the Treaty of Maastricht’ (1996) 17 International Political Science 
Review 403; Thomas C Fischer, ‘“Federalism” in the European Community and the United States: A Rose by Any 
Other Name…’ (1993) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 389. 
27 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union’ (1998) 21 
Fordham International Law Journal 746, 748. 
28 ibid; See similarly Daniel J Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press 1987). 
29 Wincott (n 26) 404 (footnotes omitted). 
30 Kaarlo Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2015) 13. 
31 Loïc Azoulai, ‘Introduction’ in Loïc Azoulai (ed), The Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 1. 
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further “federalisation” in the legislative processes of the EC.32 As noted above, any system 
that divides power along federal lines is characterized by the existence of a central 
government or law-making authority that is responsible for the areas of competence 
entrusted to it. Whilst the constituent entities or states in federal systems may somehow 
impact upon the law-making processes of this central level, one typically finds that these 
processes enjoy a large degree of autonomy and independence.33  
Following the advent of the cooperation procedure in the Single European Act (SEA), the 
Maastricht Treaty continued the incremental process of strengthening the power of the 
Community institutions in relation to the Member States within the EC legislative process.34 
The most significant reform was the addition of a novel “co-decision” procedure to the EC 
Treaty and its application to enacting legal acts in a wide variety of policy fields.35 Under the 
rules of this procedure, the Commission remained responsible for drafting and submitting 
proposals for draft legal acts to the Council and the European Parliament. When it came to 
adopting such proposals, the Council continued to operate by QMV. Crucially, however, 
unlike the cooperation procedure discussed in Chapter 4, the European Parliament was 
given an effective veto over the adoption of Community legislation.36 
By operating on the basis of QMV in an expanded Council (now consisting of 12 Member 
States) and requiring the agreement of the European Parliament, the co-decision procedure 
“had a profound effect on the character of the Union and the balance of power between the 
institutions and Member States involved in the legislative process.”37 Whereas the legislative 
processes during the early decades of the EEC were dominated by national governments in 
the Council who each wielded an effective veto, the co-decision procedure had “federalized 
 
32 David H McKay, Federalism and European Union: A Political Economy Perspective (Oxford University Press 
1999) 18–22. 
33 Lenaerts, ‘Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union’ (n 27) 752–753. 
34 McKay (n 32) 18–19. 
35 The Co-Decision procedure applied to most of the competences previously covered by the cooperation 
procedure under the SEA, as well as to many new areas of competence introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 
such as education, consumer protection and culture, see Simon Hix and Bjørn Kåre Høyland, The Political 
System of the European Union (3rd ed, Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 53. 
36 Article 189b EC. 
37 Jørgen Bølstad and James P Cross, ‘Not All Treaties Are Created Equal: The Effects of Treaty Changes on 
Legislative Efficiency in the EU: EU Treaties and Legislative Efficiency’ (2016) 54 JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 793, 793. 
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even more strongly the procedures of political decisionmaking within the Community.”38 The 
co-decision procedure could credibly be considered in “federal” terms, since the law-making 
process had reached “a high degree of decisional autonomy from the Member States.”39 
The federal analogy was at its strongest when it came to the Community’s core competence 
to enact harmonisation legislation for the purposes of the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market.40 As was discussed in Chapter 4, legal scholars had often compared the 
scope of the Community’s competence under what was then Article 95 EC (ex 100a EEC) to 
the wide-ranging legislative powers of the US federal government under the US 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause.41 Following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, 
this comparison was also explicitly recognised from the bench of the CJEU itself, with 
Advocate General (AG) Geelhoed noting that “the Community's power is comparable to that 
enjoyed by the federal authorities in the United States in regard to inter-State trade.”42  
b.) The Concept of Legislation in the Post-Maastricht Community  
This “federalization” of EC law-making at Maastricht also served as a significant next step in 
the gradual shift towards of a procedural or parliamentary conception of legislation in the 
contemporary EU. 
By elevating the European Parliament to status of a veritable a co-legislative body alongside 
the Council whenever the co-decision procedure applied, these reforms were “widely 
heralded as a major advance for the European Parliament and the cause of parliamentary 
democracy at the European level.”43 Henceforth, Community acts of general application in 
important policy fields could not be enacted without agreement being reached between a 
qualified majority of national ministers in the Council and an absolute majority of directly 
elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). For some, this joint adoption of legal 
acts by the representatives of the Member State governments and European citizens 
 
38 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Some Thoughts about the Interaction between Judges and Politicians’ [1992] University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 93, 95. 
39 ibid 124. 
40 Fischer (n 26) 397–398. 
41 See Chapter 4, Section 8 
42 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed,  Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, The Queen, on the application 
of Alliance for Natural Health and others v Secretary of State for Health ECLI:EU:C:2005:199 para 108. 
43 Michael Shackleton, ‘The Politics of Codecision’ (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market Studies 325, 325. 
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respectively meant that the co-decision procedure was comparable to bicameral legislative 
processes in national systems.44 
That being said, the European Parliament remained unhappy with its position in the 
institutional framework of the Community.  In the years following the SEA, it demanded the 
creation of a superior layer of European parliamentary legislation that would sit above all 
other legal acts in the Community’s hierarchy of norms.45 In accordance with its 
conventional understanding in national legal orders, such a hierarchy would involve “a pre-
established ranking of different types of legal acts in accordance with the democratic 
legitimacy of their respective authors and adoption procedures.”46 In essence, what was 
called for was a fundamental reform to the institutional balance of power within the 
Community, with legal acts adopted jointly by the Council and Parliament enjoying a higher 
rank than mere “executive rule-making” by the Commission and the Council.”47  
Ultimately, however, a different approach was taken in the Maastricht Treaty, with the co-
decision procedure simply being added to the various different ways in which acts of general 
application could be enacted in the EC.48 Furthermore, legally binding acts which arose from 
these various law-making procedures continued to take the form of Regulations, Directives 
and Decisions – all of which had equal ranking in the hierarchy of Community norms. This 
much was made clear in Declaration No. 16 to the Final Act of the negotiating conference at 
Maastricht, which provided that a future conference would examine the possibility of 
reclassifying Community acts according to an “appropriate hierarchy.”49 
 
44 Christophe Crombez, ‘Codecision: Towards a Bicameral European Union’ (2000) 1 European Union Politics 
363; Fabbrini refers to an "emerging parliamentary democracy with two houses” Sergio Fabbrini, Democracy 
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Draft Constitutional Treaty’s Regime for Legislative and Executive Law-Making’ European Institute of Public 
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46 Koen Lenaerts and Marlies Desomer, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? 
Simplification of Legal Instruments and Procedures’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 744, 745. 
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48 See Article 189b EC (Maastricht Version). 




Despite these calls for “a greater dose of hierarchy”50 in the Community legislative process, 
however, subsequent rounds of Treaty amendment at Amsterdam in 1997 and Nice in 2001 
failed to make radical changes. Instead, the drafters of the Treaties continued down the 
same path of reforms that began with the SEA; reforming and extending the co-decision 
procedure to ever-greater fields of Community competence.51 
Consequently, there remained no single legislative procedure that produced Community 
legal acts of a hierarchically superior status between the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009.52 Instead, as Dashwood points out, Community legislation post-Maastricht 
was to be understood “broadly as covering procedures for the adoption of legally binding 
acts of all kinds under powers directly conferred by the Treaty itself, regardless of whether 
such acts would be treated, in national law, as having a legislative, regulatory or 
administrative character.”53   
4.) What Role for the CJEU in Federalism Disputes? 
When taken together, these reforms to the legal and political order of the EU speak to a 
fundamental and persistent tension at the heart of the European integration process.54  
On the one hand, successive rounds of Treaty amendment from Maastricht onwards added 
several new powers to the Community. Furthermore, the advent and expansion of the co-
decision procedure continued the SEA’s twin goals of enhancing the efficiency and 
democratic legitimacy of Community legislation. By expanding QMV in the Council and 
enhancing the role of the European Parliament in a number of policy fields, the powers of 
the European institutions evidently increased relative to that of the Member States.55  
 
50 Roland Bieber and Isabelle Salomé, ‘Hierarchy of Norms in European Law’ (1996) 33 Common Market Law 
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53 Alan Dashwood, ‘Community Legislative Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on European Union’ (2004) 19 
European Law Review 343, 343.  
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On the other, the decision of the Member States to insert Article 3b EC into the Treaties 
clearly illustrated widespread concerns about “competence creep” into sensitive areas of 
national policy and a desire redress the federal balance of competences in the Community.56  
a.) A More Appropriate Federal Analogy 
This tension between furthering the process of European integration whilst simultaneously 
safeguarding a meaningful balance of competences between the Community and its 
Member States also gave rise to much speculation about the future role of the CJEU.57  
As has been emphasised at several points throughout this study, the early years of the EEC 
saw the CJEU play a predominant role in laying the constitutional foundations of the 
Community legal order. Following this first, foundational period, the role of the Court 
changed as it sought to drive forward the integration process in the face of legislative inertia 
in the Community. During this second epoch, the CJEU assumed the role of an “engine” of 
European integration; making a seminal contribution to removing national barriers to free 
movement and reinvigorating the law-making process on the Community level.  
As chapters 3 and 4 have argued, this pro-integrationist ethos was also evident in the 
consistently light-touch, tersely reasoned way in which the Court approached its task of 
reviewing the legality of Community legal acts. Not only did the Court adopt an expansive 
interpretation of the scope of the Community’s core legislative competences, it also 
routinely engaged in low intensity review of Community legislation on fundamental rights 
grounds. Indeed, this failure to subject Community legislation to any meaningful degree of 
judicial scrutiny was cited as further evidence of the prevailing, “low-intensity” nature 
constitutionalism during this period.  
Following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, however, the “logical question” to be 
asked was whether the Court’s role would change yet again?58 As Jacobs put it at the time: 
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“As powers are increasingly transferred to the centre - and here, at last, the analogy 
with a federal system may begin to come into its own - will the emphasis of the 
[CJEU’s] role also shift? Will the [CJEU’s] function become that of protecting the 
rights of the Member States against alleged encroachments by the Community 
Institutions?”59 
 
Much would depend on how the Court approached its task of reviewing Community 
legislation for compliance with the principles enshrined in Article 3b EC. As Kumm asks 
“what is the appropriate institutional role of the Court of Justice in policing jurisdictional 
boundaries in the EU? To what extent is the application of the relevant standards a political 
question best left to the political process?”60 In a similar vein, Young perceptibly notes in his 
comparison of federalism in the US and the EU that even where it is established that courts 
should play a role in enforcing the federal balance of competences within a given legal order 
(by no means an uncontroversial proposition), we still face tough questions of institutional 
and doctrinal design. “How much should courts be involved and to what extent should they 
defer to political actors? What sort of doctrines should courts construct for protecting 
federalism?”61  
b.) Upholding Checks and Balances 
According to a number of influential accounts in the literature, the role of the CJEU did 
indeed change around the time of the Maastricht Treaty. Unlike the previous two epochs in 
the history of the European integration process, the Court came to be “less assertive as to 
the substantive development of EU law.”62 The gathering momentum of legislative processes 
in the EC, coupled with frequent rounds of Treaty amendment from Maastricht onwards, 
meant that the CJEU was no longer required to actively fill in the constitutional gaps in the 
Treaties.63 With political processes in the Community functioning more effectively, it is 
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claimed that the CJEU moved onto “a new paradigm” in the post-Maastricht era and 
assumed the role of “the constitutional court of a more mature legal order.”64  
Having assumed this role as a constitutional court for the EC, this third epoch was “merely 
one of judicial review of the legislative and administrative acts of the Community 
institutions”65 Rather than continuing to drive forward the European integration process, the 
Court now saw “its role primarily as one of upholding the ‘checks and balances’ built into the 
[Community] constitutional legal order of States and peoples, including the protection of 
fundamental rights.”66  
c.) Conducting Constitutional Review of Legislation 
The assertion that the CJEU came to perform a number of tasks that were analogous to 
national constitutional and supreme courts in the post-Maastricht era is widely supported in 
the literature.67 Indeed, the Court itself publicly stated in a 1995 report that it was now 
responsible for certain issues that were carried out by constitutional courts in the legal 
systems of the Member States. In particular, its “constitutional role” included ruling on “the 
respective powers of the Communities and of the Member States” and examining “whether 
fundamental rights and general principles of law have been observed by the institutions...”68 
Despite these widely shared views on the changing role of the Court, however, the question 
of how the CJEU actually went about conducting constitutional review of Community 
legislation during this period has not been fully explored. As chapter 1 demonstrated in 
detail, the extent to which shifts in the methodology and intensity of constitutional review 
may be detected over the years has not yet featured prominently in existing works on the 
Court.69  
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And yet, one of the core contentions of this thesis is that one cannot fully understand the 
changing role of the CJEU and its contribution to the European integration process without 
scrutinising how it has conducted constitutional review of legislation over time. When 
viewed in light of Kumm and Young’s remarks pertaining to the role of the CJEU in settling 
federalism disputes, it is clear that the intensity of constitutional review carries implications 
not only for the balance of power between Court and the EU legislature, but also between 
the EU and its Member States more generally.70 Simply stated, strict or intensive review of 
EU legislation has the potential to tilt the federal balance of power in favour of the Member 
States vis-à-vis the EU, and the CJEU vis-à-vis the EU legislature. In contrast, deferential or 
light-touch review of EU legislation indicates that the Court neither wishes to interfere in the 
discretionary policy choices of the EU legislature, nor impose strict limits upon the EU 
legislature’s powers in relation to the Member States.71 
 
With this in mind, the remainder of Chapter 5 analyses the Court’s record in reviewing the 
constitutionality of Community legislation on federalism and fundamental rights grounds in 
the period between the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Lisbon. In both sets of cases, 
the Court’s jurisprudence continued to be characterised by low-intensity review. Much like 
previous periods in the history of the European integration process, the Court’s approach to 
scrutinising Community acts of general application served to place the EC legislature under a 
very limited burden to justify the constitutionality of its policy choices. Far from responding 
to the “political impulses” that had “fuelled the demand” for Article 3b EC at Maastricht, the 
post-Maastricht jurisprudence of the Court generally failed to place meaningful limits upon 
the existence and exercise of Community legislative power.72  
5.) The Principle of Conferral as a Judicial Safeguard of Federalism 
The first issue to be considered when examining the Court’s federalism jurisprudence is the 
impact of the principle of conferral. As noted above, the addition of conferral via Article 3b 
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EC made it explicit, for the first time, that the Community was obliged to act within the limits 
of powers conferred upon it by the Treaties.73  
For all that is seemingly straightforward about this proposition, Chapters 3 and 4 highlighted 
the difficulties associated with locating the outer limits of some of the Community’s core 
legislative competences.  The problem was particularly acute with regards to the 
Community’s power to enact harmonization legislation under Article 95 EC (ex Article 100a 
EEC). Unlike many of the specific legal bases in the Treaties, the EC’s “commerce clause” 
power was framed in “purposive” terms - understood as the power to take measures to 
achieve a particular goal i.e. the establishment and functioning of an internal market.74 
Moreover, this competence was not limited to one specific policy field, but could be utilised 
to legislate across a wide variety of different areas for the purposes of the internal market. 
This open-ended, functional orientation of Article 95 EC was seized upon by the Community 
institutions, who adopted a broad interpretation of the scope of the internal market 
competence. Furthermore, the shift to QMV in the Council at the SEA had removed the 
possibility of individual Member States vetoing the adoption of harmonisation legislation 
and thereby “seriously reduced the effectiveness of the political safeguards of federalism 
within Europe.”75 Finally, this expansive interpretation of the Community’s competence to 
enact harmonisation legislation was reinforced by the CJEU, with its jurisprudence seeming 
to confirm that the mere “abstract risk” of the emergence to future obstacles to trade was 
sufficient for recourse to Article 95 EC.76 “The jurisprudence of the Court, up to the end of 
the twentieth century, unequivocally confirmed the widest possible reading of the European 
Commerce Clause.”77 
a.) Tobacco Advertising One 
 
 
73 For judicial recognition see Opinion 2/94 of the Court of Justice, Accession by the Community to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ECLI:EU:C:1996:140 para 23. 
74 Gareth Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (2015) 21 European Law 
Journal 2. 
75 Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 185. 
76 Case C-350/92, Spain v Council ECLI:EU:C:1995:237; Case C-300/89, Commission v Council 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:244. 
77 Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (n 75) 144. 
139 
 
Against this background, the Court’s seminal judgment in Tobacco Advertising One is to be 
noted as the first and only time that the CJEU has annulled harmonisation legislation for 
infringing the principle of conferral.78 
The case concerned a challenge by Germany to the constitutionality of a Directive that 
sought to ban practically all forms of tobacco advertising and sponsorship within the 
Community. In Germany’s view, Article 95 EC did not constitute a proper legal basis for the 
Directive, since it lacked the necessary link to the internal market and was, in essence, 
concerned with the protection of public health.79 This connection to public health measures 
served to render the Directive unconstitutional, since Article 152(4) EC explicitly stated that 
the Community institutions could adopt measures relating to health “excluding any 
harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States.”80 
b.) The Limits of Article 95 EC 
According to the Court, despite this explicit exclusion of harmonization in the field of public 
health, it did not necessarily follow that harmonization measures enacted upon other legal 
bases in the Treaty could not have any impact upon public health.81 When it came to Article 
95 EC, so long as the conditions for recourse to that provision were satisfied, the Community 
institutions could have recourse to that legal basis, notwithstanding the fact that public 
health protection was “a decisive factor” in the choices made when legislating in the internal 
market. Moreover, Article 95(3) EC expressly mandated that harmonisation legislation 
ensure that a high level of human health protection was achieved.82  
Whilst recognising that the creation of an internal market with unfettered free movement 
was a core aim of the European integration project, the CJEU noted that, in the post-
Maastricht Treaty era, interpreting Article 95 EC as vesting the Community legislature with a 
“general power to regulate the internal market” would be incompatible with the principle of 
conferral enshrined in Article 3b EC.83  
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79 ibid paras 9, 12-25. 
80 Article 152(4) EC. 
81 However, those other legal bases should not be utilised as a means of circumventing the exclusion contained 
in Article 152 EC Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising One (n 78) paras 78-79. 
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Rather than being devoid of any limits, harmonisation legislation “must genuinely have as its 
object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.”84 Moreover, a “mere finding of disparities between national rules” or an 
“abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of 
competition” could not justify recourse to Article 95 EC.85 
Consequently, harmonization legislation would henceforth be required to “actually 
contribute” to the elimination of obstacles to free movement, or to the elimination of 
distortions to competition, in the internal market.86 In refining its position from Spain v 
Council discussed in Chapter 4, the Court also held that whilst Article 95 EC could be utilised 
if the aim was to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from the 
diverse development of national laws, the emergence of such obstacles must be “likely” and 
the Community measure in question must be “designed to prevent them.”87 Finally, Article 
95 EC could only be used to legislate for the elimination of distortions to competition where 
such distortions were “appreciable.”88 Otherwise, without such an appreciability threshold, 
“the powers of the Community legislature would be practically unlimited” if national laws 
which produced “the smallest of distortions of competition” could be harmonised.89 
c.) Applying the Limits in Practice 
Having read these limits into Article 95 EC in light of the principle of conferral, the Court then 
moved to consider whether the contested legislation had complied with those limits in the 
case at hand.90 The implications that these judicially-created criteria had for the federal 
balance of competences between the EC and the Member States are summarised by 
Weatherill: 
“These words carry immense constitutional weight. Find that an effect on the market 
is direct, a distortion of competition appreciable or emergence of obstacles likely and 
the diversity between national laws is of sufficient magnitude to impact on the 
functioning of the internal market: the matter falls within the limits of [Article 
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95]…Take away that crucial quality of directness or appreciability or likelihood and 
the matter rests with the Member States, for it is legislative diversity of a type that 
does not harm the EU’s market‐making project.”91 
Against this background, the Court found that the Directive’s prohibition of tobacco 
advertising in “static” advertising media such as posters, parasols and ashtrays could not be 
based upon Article 95 EC. The Community legislature had failed to demonstrate how such a 
prohibition could be justified by the need to eliminate obstacles to free movement, and the 
ban did nothing to facilitate trade in those products which served as the media for such 
advertising.92 Moreover, the Directive did not contain a “free movement clause” which 
would have guaranteed that those products which complied with the Directive would be 
entitled to unimpeded circulation throughout the internal market. This meant that the 
Member States remained free to subject imports of such products to stricter national rules 
over and beyond the rules laid down by the Directive. Consequently, the EU legislature could 
not rely upon Article 95 EC to prohibit tobacco advertising in these types of media, since the 
Directive did not remove obstacles to free movement.93 
When it came to distortions to competition, the Court found that disparities in national laws 
regulating tobacco advertising - whilst economically advantageous to undertakings 
established in Member States with few restrictions - only had a remote and indirect effect 
on competition.94 The distortions were held not to be appreciable and could not justify the 
use of Article 95 EC as a legal basis for an outright prohibition of tobacco advertising.95 
Ultimately, therefore, the Directive was annulled in its entirety for going beyond the scope 
of the powers conferred upon the EU legislature under Article 95 EC.96 
d.) Evaluation 
When compared with the Court’s pre-Maastricht jurisprudence, Tobacco Advertising One 
suggested a new era of constitutional review in which Community legislation was subject to 
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“stricter” legal limits.97 The CJEU had confirmed that it was “both willing and able to assert 
itself as the highest court in a constitutional order adjudicating on competences.”98  
Notably, the Court’s findings were based explicitly upon considerations flowing from the 
newly inserted principle of conferral in Article 3b EC, rather than the original lack of 
competence ground of review contained in Article 173 EC.99 This suggested that the 
abovementioned constitutionalisation of the system of judicial review by the Maastricht 
Treaty had not only led to a shift in the grounds of constitutional review (from lack of 
competence to infringement of the principle of conferral) but also to the intensity of such 
review.100  
When viewed against the staunchly pro-integrationist jurisprudence of the pre-Maastricht 
era, the judgment also hinted at a possible shift in the role of the CJEU. Rather than 
facilitating the pursuit of further European integration though teleological interpretation and 
low-intensity review, the CJEU would now police the EC’s federal order of competences by 
subjecting harmonisation legislation to meaningful judicial scrutiny.    
That being said, it is important to note that the CJEU did not annul the Directive for 
impinging upon the reserved powers or sovereignty of the Member States to regulate public 
health. Nor was the prohibition in Article 152(4) EC on adopting harmonisation legislation in 
this policy field decisive in the Court’s reasoning. Consequently, the judgment in Tobacco 
Advertising One is not to be understood as the beginnings of a judicially enforceable 
doctrine of “dual federalism” in the post-Maastricht Community.101 There was no finding 
that the Community and Member States possessed “two mutually exclusive, reciprocally 
limiting fields of power” that “confront each other as equals across a precise constitutional 
line, defining their respective jurisdictions.”102 Instead, the judgment turned on the finding 
that the EC legislature had strayed beyond the scope of its competences by failing to justify 
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how an outright ban on tobacco advertising contributed to the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. Consequently, much would depend on how stringently 
the Court would apply the conditions of Article 95 EC when reviewing Community legislation 
in subsequent cases. 
6.) Subsequent Developments in the Case Law 
As has been documented elsewhere in meticulous detail, the CJEU largely failed to subject 
harmonisation legislation to any meaningful limits in the decades following Tobacco 
Advertising One.103 Indeed, there is a general consensus in the literature that since 2000 the 
Court has “largely reversed the competence restricting effects” of its judgment in that 
case.”104 
a.) Encroachments upon Sensitive Areas of National Policymaking 
In a number of cases, the Court emphasised that so long as the conditions for recourse to 
Article 95 EC had been satisfied, the Community legislature could not be prevented from 
using that legal basis simply because considerations of public health, industrial policy, 
scientific research etc. were decisive factors in the choices to be made.105 Consequently, 
sensitive areas of national policy that the Treaties seemed to either exclude from 
harmonisation and/or leave (predominantly) to the Member States to regulate were not 
immune from Community harmomisation legislation.106 This resulted in both the practices of 
the EC legislature and the Court’s subsequent case law being criticised as “too liberal and 
granting the EC an unlimited power to regulate subject matters still belonging to the 
Member States’ fields of competences.”107 
b.) The Existence and Likely Future Emergence of Disparities between National Laws 
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With so much resting on the judicially created conditions which operationalised the principle 
of conferral within the context of Article 95 EC, the most striking feature of the CJEU’s case 
law during this period was the extremely light-touch approach to review.  
For example, when it came to ascertaining whether divergent national laws which 
obstructed free movement either existed or were likely to emerge in the future, the Court 
often cited statements from the EC institutions and recitals to the contested legislation. In so 
doing, the CJEU accepted these statements and findings at face value without engaging in 
any degree of examination as to their accuracy.108 In particular, the Court required very little 
by way of justification from the EC legislature in order to prove that the emergence of future 
obstacles to trade was likely. In some cases, it went so far as to accept the seemingly 
unsubstantiated claim that “increased public awareness” about the health implications of 
tobacco would “likely” lead to diverse national regulation and future obstacles to trade.109 
As Ludwigs points out, the Court did not require the EC institutions to provide anything by 
way of justificatory evidence capable of supporting the claim that the emergence of 
disparate national laws was likely.110  
c.) Impact upon the Internal Market and Distortions to Competition 
A similarly light touch approach to review was evident when determining whether existing or 
potential future divergences in national laws would actually impede free movement and 
thus impact upon the functioning of the internal market. This is well demonstrated by the 
second tobacco advertising case (Tobacco Advertising Two).111 
Following the judgment in the first Tobacco Advertising case, the Community legislature 
enacted another Directive harmonising national laws relating to the advertising and 
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sponsorship of tobacco products.112 Unlike the previous legislation that was annulled by the 
CJEU, however, the new Directive did not contain an outright ban on the advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products. Instead, it laid down a series of prohibitions on tobacco 
advertising in the press, on the radio and in information society services; whilst also making 
exceptions for such advertising in periodicals, magazines etc. intended solely for those in the 
tobacco trade.113  
In reviewing whether the new prohibition on tobacco advertising in the press was validly 
adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC, the CJEU noted that disparate national laws 
prohibiting or restricting tobacco advertising would impede access to the market for foreign 
products more than they would for domestic products. Such laws also restricted the 
opportunities for publishers to offer advertising space in their publications to advertisers 
established in other Member States.114 Furthermore, the Court was convinced that, even if 
in reality certain publications were not sold in other Member States, divergences amongst 
national laws nevertheless created, or were likely to create, obstacles to trade in press 
products. Therefore, such obstacles to trade existed even for publications placed principally 
on a local, regional or national market and which are sold in other Member States only by 
way of exception or in small quantities.115  
This suggested that even minimal impacts upon trade (either now or in the future) were 
sufficient to render recourse to Article 95 EC constitutionally valid. With such a low standard 
being deployed for justifying the constitutionality of legislation, concern was raised that the 
CJEU was “coming frightfully close to being satisfied with a mere showing of disparities 
among national laws in contrast to Tobacco Advertising [One].”116  
The CJEU also found that differences in national laws meant there was an appreciable risk of 
distortions to competition. This was done by simply citing the relevant recitals to the 
contested Directive itself, which provided nothing more than a statement confirming that 
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national regulatory diversity gave rise to an appreciable risk of distortion to competition.117 
No separate, judicial scrutiny of the appreciability criterion was conducted as part of the 
constitutional review process. Instead, by uncritically relying upon statements made by the 
legislature whose actions were under review, the Court appeared content with simply 
ensuring that the constitutional boxes had been ticked.118  
d.) Contributing to the Establishment and Functioning of the Internal Market. 
Having found that the conditions for recourse to Article 95 EC had been satisfied, the Court 
then analysed whether the contested provisions of the Directive were actually designed to 
eliminate or prevent obstacles to free movement or remove distortions of competition.119 
Here, the EU legislature had evidently learned its lesson from Tobacco Advertising One: it 
had included a “free movement clause” prohibiting Member States from banning or 
restricting free trade in products which complied with the Directive in issue.120 It swiftly 
followed, therefore, that the contested legislation was in fact designed to improve 
conditions in the internal market.121  
Finally, the Court rejected Germany’s argument that the Directive could not be based upon 
Article 95 EC since the prohibitions contained therein applied only to advertising media of a 
local or national nature which lacked cross-border effects. In so doing, the Court adopted a 
remarkably wide interpretation of the Community legislature’s harmonisation competence, 
noting that:  
“Recourse to Article 95 EC as a legal basis does not presuppose the existence of an 
actual link with free movement between the Member States in every situation 
covered by the measure founded on that basis…[T]o justify recourse to Article 95 EC 
as the legal basis what matters is that the measure adopted on that basis must 
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actually be intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market.”122 
e.) Evaluation 
These developments in the CJEU’s case law since Tobacco Advertising One led to renewed 
claims that Article 95 EC was devoid of meaningful constitutional limits and effectively 
operated as a general power for the EC to regulate the internal market.123  
Rather than restricting EC legislative power, Weatherill has argued that the jurisprudence 
provided little more than a “drafting guide” to the Community institutions.124 Following the 
CJEU’s annulment of the first tobacco advertising directive, the EC legislature was careful to 
subsequently draft legislation in such a way as to make explicit reference to the 
“constitutionally approved vocabulary” articulated by the CJEU in Tobacco Advertising 
One.125 
For example, in Alliance for Natural Health, the Directive under review contained in its 
recitals a reference to the “direct” impact that national regulatory diversity had on the 
functioning of the internal market. Similarly, in Tobacco Advertising Two, the recitals to the 
new Directive asserted that there was an “appreciable” risk of distortion to competition and 
that increased future barriers to trade were “likely.”126 
This same vocabulary was then used by the Community institutions when defending the 
constitutionality of their legislation before the CJEU.127 For its part, the Court then accepted 
the declarations in recitals to contested legislation - as well as written and oral statements 
made by the EC institutions during review proceedings - with minimal scrutiny of their 
content or accuracy. In short, constitutional review of harmonisation legislation came to be 
characterised by low-intensity review, leading to the conclusion that the case law “[does] not 
disclose an effective basis for policing the limits of EU competence… The case law is a 
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drafting guide for the legislature: the Court is empowering, not restraining, the legislative 
institutions.”128 
Despite this forceful critique, Weatherill and others acknowledged that part of the problem 
stemmed from the wording of Articles 3b and 95 EC themselves, which were drafted in 
ambiguous terms and failed to provide any “hard legal criteria” for the purposes of 
constitutional review.”129 In particular, the overarching aim of legislating for the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market did not lend itself to clearly identifiable 
limits.130 
That said, there is little doubt that the Court could have adopted a more rigorous approach 
to reviewing the constitutionality of internal market legislation during this period. It certainly 
does not necessarily follow from the open-ended framing of legislative competence that the 
CJEU had no choice but to uncritically accept assertions and recitals purporting to 
demonstrate regulatory diversity, impacts upon trade, distortions to competition etc.  
As Craig has argued, the Court could and should have demanded more by way of 
justificatory evidence that the conditions for legislating under Article 95 EC were present.131 
In particular, Impact Assessments and other documents utilised in the preparatory phases of 
the legislative process could have provided useful tools for the Court when conducting 
constitutional review in this area. In Craig’s view, the Court “should be willing to consider the 
adequacy of the reasoning for [EC] legislative action” and “look behind the formal legislative 
preamble to the arguments that underpin it derived from the Impact Assessment.”132 In the 
event that the justificatory reasoning of the legislature was deficient, the CJEU should then 
annul the relevant legislation, thus “signal[ling] to the political institutions that the precepts 
in the Treaty are to be taken seriously.”133 
As we shall see in Chapter 7, shifts in this direction have indeed materialised in the post-
Lisbon Treaty era, with the Court coming to adopt an increasingly process-oriented approach 
to constitutional review in federalism cases. In stark contrast to any other period in its 
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history, the CJEU now places considerable emphasis upon the legislative process and 
evidence base upon which EU legislation was enacted when reviewing its constitutionality. 
For the time being, however, one can conclude that from the period between the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, the CJEU failed to subject EU legislation to any 
meaningful degree of scrutiny on competence grounds.  
7.) Subsidiarity as a Judicial and Political Safeguard of Federalism 
A similar pattern may be detected in cases where the CJEU reviewed the constitutionality of 
EC legislation on subsidiarity grounds. 
As was noted above, the principle of subsidiarity dictates that, outwith areas of exclusive 
Community competence, the Community legislature shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but 
can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at EU 
level.134  
Unlike the contemporary EU legal order, the addition of subsidiarity to the EC Treaty at 
Maastricht occurred at a time when the precise division between exclusive and shared 
Community competences was uncertain.135  
Generally speaking, an exclusive Community competence means that the mere existence of 
a legal basis to this effect in the Treaties prohibits the Member States from acting in the 
policy area concerned. From the moment such a competence is laid down in the Treaties 
(and for as long as it remains in force) the Member States cannot legislate on the subject 
matter concerned - subject to express authorisation from the competent Community 
institution.136  
In contrast, shared competences permit the Member States to adopt autonomous national 
legislation in the policy area concerned, provided that the Community level has not 
exercised its legislative competence. Once European legislation is adopted in an area of 
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shared competence, however, the Member States are prohibited from adopting additional 
laws regulating the same matter.137  
After some initial uncertainty, the CJEU confirmed that legislating for the purposes of the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market fell within the shared competences of 
the Community and the Member States.138 Consequently, whenever the Community 
legislature sought to adopt harmonisation legislation on the basis of Article 95 EC, it had to 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity.  
a.) The Community Legislature and Subsidiarity 
Within the context of the Community’s federal balance of competences, subsidiarity 
required the Community legislature to consider whether it should “refrain from acting, even 
when constitutionally permitted to do so, if their objectives could effectively be served by 
action taken at or below the Member State level.”139 It is for this reason that the principle 
has been referred to as a “constitutional safeguard of federalism that should limit the 
exercise of powers granted to the European Union”140 and a principle “employed to 
safeguard the autonomy of national regulatory powers.”141  
Based on the wording of Article 3b EC, the principle appeared to consist of two tests. The 
first, known as the national insufficiency test, provided that the Community could only act 
where the objectives of the proposed action could not be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States.142 The second test, known as the comparative efficiency test, stated that the 
EU should not act unless it could better achieve the objectives of the proposed action.143  
As Schütze notes, there is much ambiguity and perhaps tension between these two tests. 
When taken together, do they mean that the Community “would not be entitled to act 
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where it is – in relative terms – better able to tackle a social problem, but where the 
Member States could – in absolute terms – still achieve the desired result?”144  
In an attempt at resolving these uncertainties, the conclusions from the European Council 
meeting in Edinburgh in 1992 provided that: 
“For Community action to be justified, both aspects of the subsidiarity principle shall 
be met: the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
Member States’ action in the framework of their national constitutional system and 
can therefore be better achieved by action on the part of the Community.”145 
In making this subsidiarity calculation, the Edinburgh Guidelines also provided that the 
Community institutions should consider: (i) whether the issue under consideration has 
transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States; 
and/or (ii) if actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict 
with objectives of the Treaty or would otherwise significantly damage Member States' 
interests; and/or (iii) that action at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason 
of its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member States.146 
Furthermore, the guidelines stated that the “reasons for concluding that a Community 
objective cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can be better achieved 
by the community must be substantiated by qualitative or, wherever possible, quantitative 
indicators.”147 
These non-binding guidelines as to the substantive aspects of subsidiarity were subsequently 
“constitutionalised” and incorporated into the Community legal framework by Protocol 
No.30 annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997.148 Additionally, the Protocol 
“proceduralised” the principle of subsidiarity by setting down certain steps that the EC 
institutions should take to ensure that proposed Community action complied with the 
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principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.149 Proceduralisation in this context required 
the Commission to: consult widely before proposing legislation; publish consultation 
documents; justify the relevance of its proposals with regard to the principle of subsidiarity 
in explanatory memoranda and submit an annual report to the other Community 
institutions.150 Additionally, the European Parliament and Council were required to scrutinise 
Commission proposals and subsequent amendments for their compliance with the principles 
of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.151 
b.) Subsidiarity as a Ground of Structural Constitutional Review 
In the first instance, it is clear from these guidelines that the decision to exercise a shared 
competence and legislate at the European level - or to refrain from doing so and thus leave 
matters to the Member States - is political in nature.152  
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the general consensus was that the 
Community’s legislative institutions had failed to take the subsidiarity principle very 
seriously.153 Whenever the Commission and a qualified majority of states in the Council 
favoured legislation on the European level, subsidiarity ultimately posed no obstacle to such 
an outcome.154 Moreover, as Wyatt has demonstrated, the Community legislature typically 
provided very little by way of explanation as to why a particular legal act complied with the 
subsidiarity principle.155 This lack of detailed consideration and reasoning vis-à-vis 
subsidiarity compliance highlighted the problem of entrusting the Community institutions 
with being judges in their own cause.156 Despite the intentions of the drafters of the 
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Maastricht Treaty, subsidiarity had failed to allay fears about EC “competence creep” and 
excessive European intervention into areas of national policymaking.157 
i.) The Substantive Dimension 
 But it was not only the political process that failed to take subsidiarity seriously prior to the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The CJEU also failed to utilise the principle as a 
meaningful, judicially enforceable safeguard of the EC’s federal balance of competences 
during this period.158 Indeed, as a ground of structural constitutional review of Community 
legislation, the jurisprudence has variously been described as “very timid”159, of “little value 
as a standard of scrutiny”160 and even “to put it bluntly, an embarrassment.”161  
In a number of cases, the Court’s reasoning was both ambiguous and unhelpfully concise. 
The CJEU also consistently engaged in an incredibly deferential, low-intensity standard of 
review when scrutinising EC legislation for subsidiarity compliance.162 
The approach is well illustrated by the British American Tobacco (BAT) case, where a number 
of tobacco companies contested the validity of an EC Directive that harmonised national 
laws on the manufacture, presentation, and sale of tobacco products.163 In addition to 
challenging the Directive on conferral grounds, the claimant’s also contended that the 
subsidiarity principle had been infringed. In their view, prior to the adoption of the 
contested Directive, harmonisation legislation already existed which eliminated barriers to 
trade in tobacco products, thus removing the need for further action on the European level. 
Moreover, it was claimed that no evidence had been adduced by the EU legislature 
demonstrating that the Member States could not adopt the measures of public health 
protection they considered necessary.164 
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In response, the Court stated that in reviewing Community legislation for compliance with 
the subsidiarity principle, “it must first be considered whether the objective of the proposed 
action could be better achieved at Community level.”165 In determining this question, the 
Court drew upon its previous findings regarding the Directive’s compliance with the principle 
of conferral - noting that its objective was to eliminate barriers to trade caused by divergent 
national laws while ensuring a high level of health protection.166 This fact alone was enough, 
in the Court’s view, to conclude that such an objective could not be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States individually and, therefore, called for action at Community level.167 
Consequently, without any further degree of scrutiny or explanation, it was held that the 
Directive complied with the principle of subsidiarity.168  
This approach to the substantive aspects of subsidiarity review was consistently adopted by 
the Court in the years between Maastricht and Lisbon.169 In so doing, the CJEU focused 
exclusively on the national insufficiency test, thus “short-circuiting” the comparative 
efficiency test.170 The reasoning in these cases assumed that whenever the Community 
legislature wanted to harmonise national laws, that objective could never be attained by 
Member State action, thus necessarily requiring Community legislation.171 The national 
insufficiency test was thus answered with an erroneous tautology - since only the 
Community can harmonize national laws through legislation, the Community must be 
deemed to have complied with the subsidiarity test.172  
ii.) The Procedural Dimension 
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The Court was also unsuccessful in enforcing procedural aspects of the subsidiarity principle 
during this period.173 As was noted above, Protocol No.30 annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty 
placed a series of procedural obligations upon the Community institutions to consider 
whether proposed legislation complied with subsidiarity and to provide reasons for its 
conclusions on this matter.  
In some cases, Community legislation was challenged for failing to comply with these 
procedural aspects of the subsidiarity principle. Rather than claiming that the content of the 
Community legislation infringed the national insufficiency or comparative efficiency tests per 
se, the contention here was that the legislation in question lacked sufficient reasons 
explaining why it complied with the principle of subsidiarity.174  
For example, in the Deposit Guarantee case, Germany challenged the legality of a directive 
requiring all credit institutions to have guaranteed schemes for depositors in the event that 
the institution ran into financial difficulty.175 In their view, the Directive should have been 
annulled for failing to state the reasons on which it was based.176 In particular, the Directive 
did not explain how it was compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. Germany claimed 
that the Directive did not provide detailed reasons explaining why only the Community, and 
not the Member States, were empowered to act in the area in question. Moreover, the 
Directive did not “indicate in what respect its objectives could not have been sufficiently 
attained by action at Member State level or the grounds which militated in favour of 
Community action.”177 
In disposing of the case within a few short paragraphs, the CJEU cited three recitals to the 
Directive which, in its view, demonstrated that the Community legislator had concluded that 
the aim of the legislation could be best achieved at Community level.178 On this basis alone, 
it was held that the Community legislature had given adequate consideration to the principle 
of subsidiarity, despite the fact that the principle itself was not explicitly mentioned in the 
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text of the legislation. Instead, based on the overall context of the Directive as derived from 
its recitals, the Community legislature had (implicitly) explained why it considered that its 
action was in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity and, therefore, complied with the 
duty to state reasons. In the Court’s view, “[a]n express reference to that principle cannot be 
required.”179 
The approach taken in Deposit Guarantee was also repeated in subsequent case law, thus 
suggesting that the procedural requirements would be satisfied even when there was “no 
evidence to suppose that the institutions actually considered whether the measure satisfied 
the principle of subsidiarity.”180 By simply repeating the Community legislature’s brief 
assertions in the recitals to contested legislation that that legislation (explicitly or even 
implicitly) complied with subsidiarity, the Court did nothing to ensure that the reasons 
provided by the Community legislature were supported by qualitative or quantitative 
indicators (as required by the Amsterdam Protocol).181 
c.) Subsidiarity’s Failure 
Following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the Court not only failed to engage in 
any meaningful review of the substance of Community legislation on subsidiarity grounds, 
but also seemed unwilling to enforce even the most rudimentary, procedural aspects of the 
principle.182 As a result, the Community legislature was once again placed under a very 
limited burden to justify the constitutionality of its legislative output before the Court. 
Much like the problems identified above in relation to the principle of conferral within the 
context of Article 95 EC, the structure and wording of the subsidiarity principle 
unquestionably contributed to its under-enforcement by the EC institutions and the Court.183 
As framed in Article 3b EC, subsidiarity did not provide any meaningful, substantive and 
legally operable criteria that could be utilised when seeking to balance legislative action on 
the Community level versus the benefits of continued national regulatory autonomy over a 
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particular issue.184 Furthermore, some have argued that the very nature of the subsidiarity 
enquiry is unsuited to judicial review, since it involves quintessentially political questions 
about the appropriate level of governance, the right balance between federal uniformity and 
national diversity and the trade-offs between different (and often competing) policy 
choices.185  
That being said, the open-ended texture of the norms involved and the politically sensitive 
nature of the questions asked are not sufficient reasons, in themselves, to justify the Court’s 
approach to subsidiarity. After all, evaluating and reviewing the legality of laws which often 
contain delicately balanced tradeoffs between competing rights and interests is an integral 
part of the judicial function.186 Moreover, the Treaties quite clearly required that EC 
legislation comply with the constitutional principles enshrined in Article 3b EC without 
reservation. 
In this regard, there is little doubt that the Court could have done more in the post-
Maastricht era to subject Community legislation to more meaningful constitutional review 
on subsidiarity grounds.187 This is particularly so with regards to the procedural aspects of 
the principle. As De Búrca argued:  
“Even if it is accepted that the deeply political nature of the questions underlying 
subsidiarity make them inappropriate for the Court rather than the political 
institutions ultimately to decide, it must surely be the case that if subsidiarity is a 
justiciable principle of judicial review, the institutions must be obliged to provide 
something more substantial by way of justification than a simple assertion that they 
consider their legislation to be compatible with that principle”188 
8.) Two Conceptions of Proportionality 
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a.) Federal Proportionality 
In light of subsidiarity’s failure as a constitutional limit upon the exercise of EC legislative 
power, calls were raised for the principle to be reformulated or (re)interpreted so as to 
incorporate an element of “federal proportionality.”189 This echoes the abovementioned 
view that the addition of a Treaty-based definition of proportionality in Article 3b EC at 
Maastricht had added a competence protecting dimension to the proportionality principle. 
In essence, federal proportionality would involve taking the “shall act only if and in so far as” 
aspect of the principle of subsidiarity in Article 3b EC and interpreting it through the lens of 
proportionality stricto sensu.190 This would require the CJEU to “spell out the competence 
function of proportionality, and the role of national autonomy in the balance, and have a go 
at addressing competence concerns in this way.”191 In so doing, the CJEU would review the 
balance struck by the EC legislature between the added value to the Community of acting on 
the federal level, on the one hand, and any possible harm to national interests, on the 
other.192 The question for the Court under federal proportionality, therefore, would be 
whether the EC legislature had “unnecessarily restricted national autonomy?’, or was “the 
importance of the [Community] measure sufficient to justify its net effect on Member 
States?’”193  
Despite being advocated in the literature, the CJEU never explicitly endorsed a federal 
dimension to proportionality review in the period between the Treaties of Maastricht and 
Lisbon. Perhaps the closest the Court came to articulating the beginnings of a doctrine 
federal proportionality came in BAT, where the CJEU held that “the intensity of the action 
undertaken by the Community in this instance was also in keeping with the requirements of 
the principle of subsidiarity.”194 In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court simply cross-
referenced the relevant passage from the same judgment where it had found the contested 
EC legislation to be in compliance with the principle of proportionality as understood in its 
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liberal, rights-protecting sense.195 Consequently, no separate consideration of whether the 
contested legislation placed a disproportionate or excessive restriction upon national 
regulatory autonomy was considered.  
b.) Protecting Liberal Values: The Continuation of Low-Intensity Review 
This brings us to the Court’s jurisprudence concerning constitutional review of Community 
legislation for compliance with the traditional, liberal conception of the proportionality 
principle. To recall, Article 3b EC simply provided that “any action by the Community shall 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”196 
Despite this novel, constitutionally-entrenched definition of the principle, the CJEU 
continued to utilise the more comprehensive definition that it had itself articulated when 
developing proportionality as an unwritten general principle of Community law. According to 
settled case law, the principle of proportionality required EC legislation to be appropriate for 
attaining the objective pursued (suitable) and not go beyond what was necessary to achieve 
that objective (necessity).197 In some (but not all) instances, the CJEU also added that when 
there was a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the 
least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims 
pursued (stricto sensu).198  
In-keeping with its jurisprudence during the era of low-intensity constitutionalism (discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4), however, the Court typically found that the EC legislature was to be 
“allowed a broad discretion in areas in which its action involves political, economic and 
social choices and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments and 
evaluations.”199 This approach was also consistently taken with regards to the EC’s core 
competence to adopt harmonisation legislation under Article 95 EC.200  
 
195 ibid para 184; See also Case C-84/94, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council (n 162) 
paras 54-55. 
196 Article 3b EC. 
197 Case C-210/03, Swedish Match (n 108) para 47 and case law cited therein. 
198 Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00, The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and others ECLI:EU:C:2002:161 para 62 and case law cited therein. 
199 Case C-380/03, Tobacco Advertising Two (n 109) para 145 and case law cited therein. 
200 Case C-491/01, BAT (n 108) para 123 and case law cited therein. 
160 
 
In addition to the continued recognition of a wide scope of discretion, the CJEU also adopted 
a very deferential standard of review. Community legislation would only be annulled on 
proportionality grounds where it was “manifestly inappropriate having regard to the 
objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue.”201 There was, therefore, a 
judicial choice in favour of granting wide discretion to the legislature and subsequently 
engaging in low-intensity review. As one member of the Court put it when writing extra-
judicially, “there is a long line of cases where the Court has refused to scrutinise the 
proportionality of [EC] measures strictly. This judicial self-restraint has resulted in a rather 
strong presumption of the legality of [Community] law.”202  
As has already been pointed out in relation to the Court’s earlier case law, there are valid 
reasons behind the Court’s deferential approach to discretionary policy choices and complex 
evaluations. When viewed from the perspective of relative expertise and institutional 
capacity, it is clear that the CJEU is ill-equipped to subject the intricate, technical findings of 
the legislature to robust proportionality review.203 Furthermore, the separation of powers 
and superior democratic legitimacy of the EC’s main legislative institutions (Parliament and 
Council) dictate that the Court should be reluctant to overturn the policy choices of the 
legislature by engaging in robust, substantive review via the proportionality principle.204  
Nonetheless, the CJEU’s approach to proportionality review of EC legislation was conducted 
in such a low-intensity fashion at times that it was difficult to detect any degree of 
meaningful judicial scrutiny whatsoever. This was particularly true when it came to the 
necessity and/or proportionality stricto sensu aspects of the enquiry.205 The Court often 
seemed hesitant to engage in any detailed consideration of alternatives or less restrictive 
measures when conducting the necessity stage of the proportionality examination.206 
 
201 ibid. 
202 Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The Evolution of the Principle of Proportionality in EU Law—Towards 
an Anticipative Understanding?’ in Stefan Vogenauer and Stephen Weatherill (eds), General Principles of Law: 
European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2017) 168.; 
203 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 600. 
204 For an illuminating discussion see Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Case C-244/03,France v European 
Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2005:178 paras 90-93. 
205 Case C-233/94, Germany v Parliament and Council (n 174) paras 57-58. 
206 Case C-434/02, Arnold André GmbH & Co KG v Landrat des Kreises Herford, 14 December 2004, 
EU:C:2004:800 paras 54-55; Case C-491/01, BAT (n 108) para 130. 
161 
 
Similarly, in those instances where proportionality stricto sensu was mentioned as part of 
the test, an explicit balancing of costs and benefits was not then undertaken.207  
c.) Evaluation: Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
To reiterate, the contention here is not that there were instances of EC legislation flagrantly 
imposing disproportionate or excessive burdens upon individuals and that this was not dealt 
with by the CJEU. Rather, it is to demonstrate that, when viewed alongside the Court’s 
conferral and subsidiarity jurisprudence, the Court was evidently reluctant to exercise its 
powers of constitutional review in a manner that placed effective limits upon the existence 
and exercise of EC legislative power.208 
Despite hopes that the Court might help to redress the federal balance of competences after 
the Maastricht Treaty, the abovementioned constitutionalisation of the system of judicial 
review via Article 3b EC did not result in the Court adopting a more searching enquiry into 
the constitutionality of contested EC legislation. Whilst recognising that there are strong 
reasons against courts engaging in robust constitutional review of the merits of contested 
legislation, it is nevertheless clear that the Court could have required more by way of 
justification from the EC legislature during this period.  
9.) Fundamental Rights Review after Maastricht 
The final aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence pertaining to constitutional review of 
Community legislation concerns fundamental rights. 
As was noted above, the Maastricht and then Amsterdam Treaties provided that the EU was 
now founded upon the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Article 6 TEU also provided that the EU would 
protect fundamental rights as general principles of law, taking inspiration from the ECHR and 
the common constitutional traditions of the Member States.209 This was supplemented by 
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Article 46 TEU, which stated that the jurisdiction of the CJEU involved reviewing EC legal acts 
for compliance with fundamental rights deriving from these sources.210 
a.) Continuity with the Past? 
Far from empowering the CJEU with the power to review Community legislation against a 
constitutionally-entrenched, written bill of rights, however, these provisions merely 
provided textual recognition of the Court’s longstanding practices based upon general 
principles of law.211  
At first glance, the solemn declaration of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) by the 
EU institutions at the Nice European Summit of December 2000 appeared to have 
dramatically changed this state of affairs.212 The Charter contained a variety of fundamental 
human, civil, political, economic and social rights that went beyond both the ECHR and the 
existing case law of the CJEU.213 According to Article 51 CFR, its provisions were addressed to 
the institutions and bodies of the EU, thus suggesting that the law-making institutions of the 
EU would henceforth face the prospect of their legislative output being scrutinised by the 
CJEU for compliance with the CFR’s provisions.214 
Crucially, however, the CFR was not aimed at creating new, legally binding fundamental 
rights commitments which the CJEU would then guarantee through its powers of 
constitutional review. Instead, its overarching purpose was to catalogue existing 
fundamental rights and principles in a single document so as to make “their overriding 
importance and relevance more visible to the Union’s citizens.”215 Furthermore, the solemn 
declaration at Nice was political in nature, meaning that the CFR itself was not integrated 
into the EU Treaties and was not legally binding upon the EU legislature.216 By virtue of its 
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non-binding and declaratory nature, the CFR was not utilised as a stand-alone means of 
contesting the validity of EU legislation during this period.217 
The question to be resolved for the purposes of the present enquiry, however, was whether 
these changes to the underlying values and principles of the EU legal order had brought 
about any shift in the methodology and intensity of fundamental rights review as conducted 
by the CJEU? 
b.) Judicial Caution towards Substantive Policy 
It will be recalled from Chapters 3 and 4 that, prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the Court had 
consistently adopted a deferential approach to reviewing Community legislation that had 
allegedly restricted fundamental rights in a disproportionate manner. The threshold for 
establishing a violation was set high: contested legislation had to constitute a 
disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringed upon the very substance of 
the right in question.218 In addition, the Court did not to engage in any meaningful degree of 
scrutiny of the substance of contested legislation. Community legislation that restricted 
fundamental rights in some way was frequently found to be justified on the grounds that it 
pursued legitimate objectives in the Community’s general interest. 
 
When viewed against this background, very little changed in the nature of the Court’s task of 
conducting fundamental rights review in the post-Maastricht era. Much like the era of low-
intensity constitutionalism, the subject matter of legislation under review often involved 
complex technical aspects of economic regulation in areas related to the internal market. 
Furthermore, the fundamental rights asserted by those contesting EC legislation were 
typically of an economic nature, such as the right to property or freedom to pursue a trade 
or profession.219 As De Witte notes, this is readily explicable by the fact that fundamental 
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rights review continued to be conducted within the confines of an EC Treaty that remained 
heavily geared towards economic integration.220 
In addition to the subject matter and overall context of fundamental rights litigation, the 
CJEU’s approach to reviewing EC legislation on fundamental rights grounds also represented 
continuity with the past. The Court consistently based itself upon established, pre-
Maastricht case law which provided that such rights were not absolute and had to be viewed 
in light of their social function. Accordingly, the right to property and the freedom to 
conduct a business could be restricted by the Community legislature, provided that such 
restrictions corresponded with objectives in the Community’s general interest and did not 
constitute disproportionate and intolerable interferences which impaired the very substance 
of those rights.221   
In much the same way as it had done during the era of low-intensity constitutionalism, the 
Court placed considerable emphasis upon the contested Community legislation being 
appropriate for pursuing objectives in the EC’s general interest. Having established that the 
appropriateness aspect of the test had been satisfied, the Court then swiftly concluded that 
interferences with fundamental rights were justified.222 
There was evidently a reluctance to engage in any meaningful degree of scrutiny of whether 
any less restrictive measures were available (necessity) and/or whether the overall balance 
between rights and objectives was proportionate (proportionality stricto sensu).223 As 
Tridimas notes, the Court opted instead to rely upon some notion of reasonableness or 
arbitrary conduct. Rather than seriously engaging with some form of two or three step 
proportionality test, the CJEU was content with reviewing whether the EC legislature 
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committed some manifest error when deciding that its policy was appropriate to achieve 
objectives in the Community interest.224    
The fundamental rights jurisprudence of the CJEU in the period between the Maastricht and 
Lisbon Treaties therefore continued to be characterised by low-intensity review. The stance 
taken by the Court revealed an unwillingness to undertake an elaborate or comprehensive 
substantive assessment of [EC] legislation and failed to “provide for very structured or 
illuminating reasoning as to its approach…”225 
This line of case law led Von Bogdandy to comment that the CJEU had “little in common with 
the role forceful constitutional courts have had in…national political processes.”226 In his 
view, “in its role as a constitutional court”, the CJEU had been “very cautious with respect to 
substantive policy” and was “very cautious about substantively guiding the European 
legislative process.”227 
10.) Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine how successive rounds of Treaty 
amendment from Maastricht onwards significantly impacted upon: (i) the system of judicial 
review in the EC (ii) the legislative process and concept of legislation in the EC; and (iii) the 
changing role of the Court when reviewing the legality of Community legislation. 
When compared to earlier periods in the history of the Community, these reforms served to 
more closely approximate aspects of the CJEU’s tasks under the Treaties with those carried 
out by national constitutional and supreme courts. The addition of Article 3b EC had 
equipped the Court with a set of constitutionally-entrenched grounds of review that were 
intended to safeguard the federal balance of competences in the Community. Furthermore, 
the advent of the co-decision procedure had resulted in a substantial change to the EC 
legislative process by elevating the status of the European Parliament to that of a co-
legislature alongside the Council. These changes also rendered the concept of legislation in 
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the Community more closely (but not exactly) analogous to parliamentary understandings of 
legislation in the nation state. 
With regards to the changing role of the Court within the overall legal and political order of 
the Community, the Maastricht reforms are widely said to mark a pivotal moment in its 
evolution over time. Unlike the first two epochs in its history, the Court is said to have 
become less interested in driving forward the process of European integration by engaging 
in creative methods of interpretation. With the political process on the European level 
operating effectively, the Court now saw itself as the “constitutional court” of a “more 
mature legal order” whose primary responsibility was to uphold the “checks and balances 
built into the [Community] constitutional legal order of States and peoples, including the 
protection of fundamental rights.”228 
In subjecting these claims to closer scrutiny, Chapter 5 has argued that the Court largely 
failed to place meaningful limits upon the existence and exercise of EC legislative power in 
the post-Maastricht era. In subjecting EC legislation to constitutional review on both 
federalism and fundamental rights grounds, the Court’s jurisprudence continued to evince a 
light-touch, tersely reasoned approach. In a number of cases, the Court was evidently 
reluctant to closely examine the substance or merits of contested legislation. An equally 
deferential stance was taken when examining whether the legislature had complied with its 
procedural obligations under the Treaties. As a result, the Community legislature was placed 
under a very limited burden to justify the constitutionality of its actions in the years after the 
Maastricht Treaty.   
For some, this pervasive, low-intensity approach to constitutional review of Community 
legislation was yet further evidence of the Court’s continuing, pro-integrationist bias.229 The 
Court’s case law in this area was said to demonstrate its continuing preference for furthering 
integration through centralising and strengthening Community powers.230 This critique was 
most forceful when one compared the CJEU’s record in reviewing EC legislation against its 
record in scrutinising national impediments to the fundamental freedoms of the internal 
market. Much like its earlier jurisprudence on this score, the Court continued to apply a 
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more stringent form of necessity test to national measures, often closely examining whether 
less restrictive measures were available.231 In Harbo’s view, this meant that proportionality 
review was “not objective in the sense that it is value-neutral. On the contrary, the analysis 
is informed by a very strong substantial bias, namely that of promoting European 
integration.”232  
Some went even further and contended that the failure to engage in meaningful 
constitutional review of Community legislation demonstrated that the Court was failing to 
give effect to the law as set down in the Treaties. Whereas in the past the CJEU had been 
accused of judicial activism for departing from the text of the Treaties so as drive forward 
the integration process, a new form of activism accusation arose in the post-Maastricht era. 
According to Moens and Trone, the CJEU was now behaving in an “activist” and thus 
illegitimate fashion by “continuing to give effect to its preference for centralisation in the 
face of express Treaty provisions that have the contrary intention.”233 
With this in mind, the remaining chapters of this study move to consider the contemporary, 
post-Lisbon Treaty jurisprudence of the Court. It is argued that in both federalism and 
fundamental rights cases, a series of subtle yet significant shifts in the methodology and 
intensity of constitutional review may be detected. Unlike any other period in the history of 
the European integration project, recent judgments evince a finely calibrated, variable 
intensity approach to constitutional review of EU legislation. 
These developments in the methodology and intensity of constitutional review of EU 
legislation then form the basis for evaluating the contemporary role of the CJEU within the 
post-Lisbon Treaty European Union.234 It is contended that these changes require one to 
reconsider those longstanding views of the Court as a “pro-integrationist” institution that 
seeks to enlarge and empower the Union at every opportunity. For the same reasons, it is 
necessary to re-evaluate accusations that the Court continues to behave in a “policymaking” 
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or “activist” fashion by ignoring the clear wording of the Treaties in order to attain a (pro-
integrationist) policy outcome. 235   
Crucially, these recent shifts in the methodology and intensity of constitutional review 
correspond to changes in both the EU’ constitutional framework and the EU legislative 
process. As the system of constitutional review and the concept of legislation have been 
refined over time, so too has the Court’s jurisprudence. Far from operating in accordance 
with its own agenda or in a manner that is divorced from the constitutional framework of 
the EU Treaties, therefore, the post-Lisbon case law reveals a Court that is responsive to the 
wider legal and political context in which it now operates. As such, it is argued that the 
contemporary CJEU is one that takes its responsibilities as the “Constitutional court” of “a 
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edition, Oxford University Press 2014) 73–77. 




The Lisbon Treaty: Towards Veritable Constitutional Review of EU Legislation 
 
1.) Introduction 
Two core claims have been advanced during the present study into the changing role of the 
CJEU when reviewing the legality of measures of European Union (EU) law.  
The first is that a series of reforms to the legal and political order of the European 
Community (and then European Union) have gradually resulted in the CJEU assuming 
responsibility for conducting constitutional review of EU legislation. This may be 
summarised as changes to the concepts of constitutionalism (understood as political and 
legal limits upon power) and legislation respectively. 
With regards to the constitutional side of this equation, a combination of CJEU 
jurisprudence and successive rounds of Treaty amendment resulted in an increasing number 
of constitutionally entrenched limits being placed upon the European legislature. In turn, 
the proliferation of constitutional limits upon legislative power has led to aspects of the 
CJEU’s tasks resembling constitutional review of primary legislation as broadly understood 
in many national contexts. In particular, the CJEU has gradually assumed responsibility for 
reviewing EU legislation against: (i) a series of constitutionally-entrenched federalism 
principles; and (ii) fundamental rights standards. 
In addition to these developments in the system of constitutional review, there has also 
been a gradual refinement of how the concept of “legislation” is understood in the EU.  
Originally, a material or functional definition of legislation prevailed in the EEC. According to 
this understanding, all acts of general application constituted Community legislation; 
irrespective of the institution(s) or procedure(s) involved in their enactment. Following the 
first wave of reforms to the legislative process in the Single European Act (SEA), further 
rounds of Treaty amendment have sought to expand the use of Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) in the Council and empower the European Parliament. In so doing, a default 
legislative procedure that involves the joint adoption of EU legal acts by the Parliament and 
the Council gradually began to emerge.  
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At the same time, however, the concept of legislation in the Community remained markedly 
different from primary legislation enacted through parliamentary procedures in many 
nation states. Not only was there no single, parliamentary-type legislative process, there 
was also no hierarchy of legal norms in the pre-Lisbon EU.  
Alongside this gradual emergence of a veritable system of constitutional review of EU 
legislation, the second major claim of this thesis is that the methodology and intensity of 
constitutional review has also shifted over time. For much of the history of European 
integration, the Court engaged in light-touch, tersely reasoned review of Community 
legislation in both federalism and fundamental rights contexts. As was argued in Chapters 3 
and 4, part of the explanation for this lay in the fact that the Community legal order simply 
lacked many of the same constitutionally-entrenched legal and political limits upon power 
that one typically finds in national constitutional orders. This low-intensity approach to 
review was further explained by a reluctance on the part of the Court to frustrate the 
further advancement of European integration. Whilst considerations of institutional 
capacity, expertise and the separation of powers unquestionably played a role, it was 
argued that the CJEU’s low-intensity approach to review was also underpinned by its “pro-
integrationist” ethos during this period. 
Against this background, Chapter 6 provides an overview of the salient reforms to the EU’s 
legal and political order by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.1 By continuing to focus upon 
changes to constitutionalism and legislation over time, it demonstrates how the Lisbon 
reforms significantly altered: (i) the EU legislative process and the concept of EU legislation; 
and (ii) the system of constitutional review in the EU.  
When considered together, these reforms further approximated part of the CJEU’s 
responsibilities under the EU Treaties with the practice of constitutional review of primary 
legislation as carried out by many national courts. For the first time in its history, the CJEU 
was now responsible for reviewing primary EU legislative acts, adopted via formal legislative 
procedures, for a series of constitutionally-entrenched federalism and fundamental rights 
principles.  
 
1 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C 306, p. 1–271. 
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Furthermore, as Chapters 7 and 8 shall go on to demonstrate, these reforms have also laid 
the foundations for a series of subtle yet significant shifts in the methodology and intensity 
of constitutional review of EU legislation in recent years.  
2.) Towards a Procedural, Parliamentary Conception of EU Legislation 
For the purposes of the present enquiry, the first major reform to be considered is the 
Lisbon Treaty’s creation of a procedural or parliamentary definition of legislative power. 
Today, for the first time in the EU’s history, Article 289 TFEU formally defines primary EU 
legislation as EU legal acts adopted in accordance with designated legislative procedures.2 
Furthermore, legislative acts adopted in accordance with legislative procedures are 
distinguished from non-legislative acts, thus creating a novel, Treaty based hierarchy of legal 
acts.3  
Under what is now the default, “ordinary legislative procedure”, EU legislation consists of 
legal acts that are jointly adopted by the European Parliament and Council; typically 
following a proposal from the Commission.4 As the name implies, this ordinary legislative 
procedure is now the principal means of enacting legislation in the EU, thus meaning that 
vast swathes of legislation pertaining to the internal market and many other areas of EU 
competences are adopted via this procedure.  
a.) From a Material to a Procedural Definition of Legislative Power 
According to Schütze, Article 289 TFEU demonstrates that the EU now “follows a procedural 
definition of legislative power” with EU legislation being formally defined as “an act adopted 
by the bicameral Union legislator.”5 This procedural definition of legislative power was 
carried over from Article I-34 of the failed Constitutional Treaty of 2004, which intended to 
create the presumption that EU legislative acts “correspond[ed] to legislation in form as 
employed in the constitutional systems of its Member States.”6  
 
2 Article 289(3) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2016] OJ 
C 202; For discussion see Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 152. 
3 Article 290 and 291 TFEU. 
4 Articles 289 and 294 TFEU. 
5 Schütze, European Constitutional Law (n 2) 169. 
6 Alexander Türk, ‘The Concept of the “Legislative” Act in the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 6 German Law 
Journal 1555, 1558. 
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In addition to laying down a procedural definition of legislative power, the Lisbon Treaty 
also explicitly recognises the democratic foundations of legislative acts that are enacted 
jointly by the Council and the European Parliament. According to Article 10 TEU: 
“The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. 
Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member 
States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or 
Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically 
accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.”7 
 
This means that the “democratic legitimacy of the Union is founded on its states and 
peoples, and consequently an act of a legislative nature must always come from the bodies 
which represent those states and peoples, namely the Council and the Parliament.”8 For 
some, this foundational principle of representative democracy and its operation through the 
ordinary legislative procedure served to allay concerns about the EU’s persistent 
“democracy deficit.”9 Like many federal polities, the post-Lisbon EU was now founded upon 
a “dual legitimacy” stemming from the peoples and states of Europe. Moreover, this dual 
legitimacy was expressed through the “compound nature” of the EU’s legislative process, 
which now formally operated on the basis of the consent of the majority in both the Council 
and the European Parliament.10 
 
b.) Legislative Acts as Primary EU Legislation 
But can EU legislative acts that result from these legislative procedure(s) be accurately 
defined as being akin to parliamentary conceptions of primary legislation as typically 
understood in national legal systems?11 The issues at stake are succinctly stated by Bast, 
 
7 Article 10(1) and (2) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) [2016] OJ C 202. 
8 Final Report of Working Group IX on Simplification of 29 November 2002, CONV 424/02, 2. 
9 Robert Schütze, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 71–73; On the democracy deficit 
debate in general see Dieter Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy (Oxford University Press 2017) 
Chapter 4. 
10 Schütze, European Union Law (n 9) 71. This thesis does not seek to engage in these wider sociological or 
political aspects of the EU’s democratic deficit debate. Rather, its focus is on the narrower question of how 
CJEU interacts, through constitutional review, with this novel, procedural conception of EU legislative power 
and the legislative acts which result from such procedures. 
11 Herwig Hofmann, ‘Legislation, Delegation and Implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets 
Reality’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 482, 484. 
173 
 
who notes that “[i]n an emphatic understanding, the exercise of legislative power denotes 
more than simply producing rules and regulations of any kind or form. Legislation evokes a 
mode of law-making by elected representatives and hence a democratic form of coupling 
the spheres of law and politics.”12  
On the one hand, there continue to be some crucial differences between legislative acts in 
the post-Lisbon Treaty EU and national concepts of parliamentary legislation.13 First of all, 
the EU is neither sovereign nor a state.14 Thus, the concept of legislation in the EU legal 
order should not be considered as analogous to the national concept of parliamentary 
legislation.15 On this view, the EU remains a very advanced type of international 
organisation, and it is inappropriate to utilise terminology that is inextricably linked to the 
nation state - such as “legislation” - to analyse legal acts produced by such organisations.16 
Despite Articles 10(1) and 14(2) TEU providing that the directly elected European Parliament 
represents the citizens of the EU, the European Parliament cannot be considered as the 
central legislative body in a manner analogous to national systems, since “the European 
Parliament is not a representative body of a sovereign European people.”17 Finally, EU 
legislative acts can only be adopted following a proposal from the Commission (except 
where the Treaties state otherwise).18 This arrangement clearly distinguishes EU legislative 
acts from primary legislation in national contexts, since the right of legislative initiative 
typically rests with elected members of Parliament and/or the Government and not a non-
elected, technocratic institution.19 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the Lisbon Treaty reforms to the EU legislative 
procedure, coupled with the foundational principle of representative democracy, assumes 
that the concept of legislation – “which constitutes a key characteristic of constitutional 
 
12 Jürgen Bast, ‘New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law’ 
(2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 885, 891. 
13 For a wide-ranging analysis see Grimm (n 9) Chapter 4. 
14 Schütze, European Constitutional Law (n 2) 152–153. 
15 Barbara Mielnik, ‘Comment on Alexander Türk – The Concept of the “Legislative Act’ (2005) 6 German Law 
Journal 1571. 
16 ibid. 
17 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 para 280. 
18 Article 17(2) TEU. 
19 Damian Chalmers, ‘The Democratic Ambiguity of EU Law Making and Its Enemies’ in Damian Chalmers and 
Anthony Arnull (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 320. 
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states” - can be legitimately employed in the European Union.20 In developing this 
argument, Turk states that:  
“It might well be the case that the Union after Lisbon does not constitute a state and 
that the Union Treaties lack the characteristics of a Constitution comparable to that 
found in nation states. However, it does not follow that the term ‘legislation’ cannot 
validly be used in Union law provided it serves a purpose which is functionally 
equivalent to that employed in states.”21 
 
According to this view, the EU system is not premised upon the classical, state based 
understanding of the Parliament representing the nation, but rather a system of “functional 
representation” in which each EU institution represents specific interests in the legislative 
process.22 In addition to the European citizens and Member States being represented 
through the European Parliament and Council respectively, therefore, one can also add “the 
general interest of the Union” which is represented by the Commission.23 Despite the 
distinct characteristics of the EU’s institutional framework, it is nonetheless possible to 
discern similarities with national concepts of legislation when one considers that the 
process of legislating in many national contexts comprises a variety of “constitutionally 
relevant institutions in a deliberative process of lawmaking.”24  
Consequently, a conception of primary legislation that is functionally equivalent to national 
legislation exists in the EU legal order whenever the EU institutions participate fully in the 
legislative process and, in so doing, represent the specific interest assigned to them in 
accordance with the Treaties.25  
This is further supported by the fact that, in the post-Lisbon era, legislative acts are subject 
to a greater number of procedural requirements than other types of EU legal acts of a non-
legislative nature. This not only reinforces the formal hierarchy of norms in the 
 
20 Alexander H Türk, ‘Lawmaking After Lisbon’ in Biondi et al (ed), EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford University Press 
2012) 67. 
21 ibid 68. 
22 ibid 69; Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Text and Materials (Third 
edition, Cambridge University Press 2014) 153. 
23 Article 17(1) TEU. 




contemporary EU legal order, but also seeks to ensure a high degree of transparency and 
consultation in the EU legislative process.26 
For example, the Commission is obliged to consult widely before proposing legislative acts 
and, where appropriate, such consultations must take into account the regional and local 
dimension of the action envisaged.27 When it comes to considering draft legislative acts, 
Article 15(2) TEU provides that the European Parliament shall meet in public.28 Similarly, 
under Article 16(8) TEU, the Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a 
draft legislative act.29 To this end, each Council meeting shall be divided into two parts, 
dealing respectively with deliberations on Union legislative acts and non-legislative 
activities. When taken together, these procedural requirements combine to ensure that 
legislative acts in the post-Lisbon era are acts which are subject to enhanced public scrutiny. 
Unlike previous periods in the history of European integration, EU legislative acts are now 
enacted through a formally defined legislative procedure in which the interests of the 
Union, the Member States and European citizens are articulated and debated in a public, 
transparent forum. For the purposes of the present enquiry, therefore, we may define 
legislative acts adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure as 
representing a veritable conception of primary legislation in the contemporary EU.30 
3.) The Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Written Bill of Rights for the EU  
In addition to reforming the EU legislative process and the concept of EU legislation, the 
Lisbon Treaty also further strengthened the CJEU’s powers to conduct constitutional review 
of EU legislation on both federalism and fundamental rights grounds. 
With regards to fundamental rights, Article 6(1) TEU now provides that the EU “recognizes 
the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights…” and that 
the Charter (CFR) “shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”31  
 
26 Hofmann (n 11) 503. 
27 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Protocol (No 2) on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality [2008] OJ C 115, p. 206–209, Article 2. 
28 Article 15(2) TEU. 
29 Article 16(8) TEU. 
30 Türk (n 20) 69; For similar arguments see Gerard Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European 
Court of Justice (Cambridge University Press 2011) 178–182, 199–200. 
31 Article 6(1) TEU. 
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As was discussed in Chapter 5, the initial purpose behind codifying a series of fundamental 
rights and principles in the EU legal order was not to add anything new to the existing body 
of law in this area. The CFR’s preamble is explicit in stating that its provisions simply “re-
affirm” EU fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions and 
international obligations of the Member States, along with the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
and European Court of Human Rights.32  
a.) The Constitutional Entrenchment of Fundamental Rights Review 
By elevating the CFR to the same status as the TEU and TFEU in Article 6 TEU, however, the 
Lisbon Treaty provided the EU legal order with a constitutionally-entrenched, written Bill of 
Rights for the first time in its history. This entrenchment of a legally binding catalogue of 
fundamental rights commitments that the EU legislature was bound to respect, and the 
CJEU bound to uphold, placed the Charter at “the very centrepiece of the EU legal order.”33  
Furthermore, the subjugation of EU legislative power to the legal and political limits of the 
CFR represents a crucial next phase in the “constitutionalisation” of the system of judicial 
review.34 When viewed alongside the EU’s federalism principles enshrined in Article 5 TEU 
(ex Article 3b EC), the post-Lisbon Treaty CJEU is now responsible for conducting 
constitutional review of EU legislation on both federalism and fundamental rights grounds. 
Whereas the Court had previously been responsible for some variant of these two tasks, the 
significance of the Lisbon Treaty is that the grounds of review open to the CJEU for these 
purposes are now explicitly set down in the text of the Treaties themselves.  
Having begun its existence as a court of limited jurisdiction that was modelled upon the 
principles of French administrative law, the Lisbon treaty marked the end point in a gradual 
process of the CJEU assuming responsibility for engaging in a veritable practice of 
constitutional review of EU legislation. 
 
 
32 Consolidated Version of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ C 202 
Preamble; For discussion see Paul Craig and Grainne De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford 
University Press 2015) 396. 
33 Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz and Stephen Weatherill, ‘Introduction’ in Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz and Stephen 
Weatherill (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument : Five Years Old and Growing 
(Hart Publishing 2015) 2. 
34 See Chapter 5, Section 2 
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b.) The Future of Fundamental Rights Review 
For some, the decision to accord the CFR the same legal status as the EU Treaties would 
likely increase the profile of rights-based claims within the context of challenges to the 
legality of EU legal acts.35 Claimants would now be able to point to a clear set of rights that 
are legally binding upon the EU institutions.36 In turn, this would lead to the CJEU being 
“faced with a change in the profile of judicial review actions, with an increasing number of 
such claims having a strong rights-based component.”37 
Stone Sweet predicted in 2010 that as rights-oriented litigation increased in the EU legal 
order, the CJEU would also come to find fundamental rights issues being implicated in 
almost any case that arose before it.38 In his view, there was “every reason to expect that 
rights preoccupations will gradually infuse the exercise of all of the Court’s competences, 
much like it does that of other national constitutional courts in Europe.”39 Furthermore, the 
obligation that the EU accede to the ECHR40, along with increased references from national 
courts regarding the compatibility of EU legislation with fundamental rights norms, would 
put pressure on the CJEU and “force [it] to review the legality of EU acts much more 
robustly than it has to this point in time.”41 
The possibility that the CJEU would come to subject EU legislation to more rigorous or 
intensive fundamental rights review in the post-Lisbon era was further supported by the 
Charter’s limitation clause in Article 52(1) CFR. According to that provision: 
“Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
 
35 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 493. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid; See similarly Damian Chalmers, ‘Judicial Authority and the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 448, 463. 
38 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance’ (2010) 5 Living 
Reviews in European Governance 5, 37. 
39 ibid. 
40 Article 6(2) TEU inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon required the EU to accede to the ECHR. At the time of 
writing, this has not been achieved. The prospects of such accession being attained in the near future seem 
unlikely following the CJEU’s opinion that the draft agreement on EU accession to the ECHR was incompatible 
with various aspects of the EU legal order, see Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice, Accession of the European 
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
41 Sweet (n 38) 37. 
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Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”42 
 
In contrast to previous epochs in the history of the European integration project, the 
limitation clause in Article 52(1) CFR explicitly required the CJEU to consider whether the 
essence of rights had been respected. Moreover, the reference to the principle of 
proportionality, necessity and the need to genuinely meet EU objectives of EU general 
interest suggested a more robust form of fundamental rights review might take hold in the 
post-Lisbon era.43 As shall be demonstrated in Chapter 8, the elevation of the CFR to legally 
binding has indeed resulted in a notable shift in the methodology and intensity of 
constitutional review of EU legislation in recent years. 
4.) Reforming the Federal Order of Competences 
A further major reform to the EU legal order by the Treaty of Lisbon relates to the question 
of competence. In recognition that the insertion of a series of federalism principles via 
Article 3b EC in the Maastricht Treaty had largely failed to allay concerns about EU 
“competence creep”, the desire to establish a clearer division of competences between the 
EU and its Member States was placed firmly on the political agenda from the early 2000s 
onwards.44 
Declaration 23 of the Nice Treaty provided that future discussions over Treaty reform should 
consider “how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the 
European Union and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity.”45 Similar 
calls were made in the Laeken Declaration of 2001 on the future of the European Union, 
which sought “a better division and definition of competence in the European Union.”46  
 
42 Article 52(1) CFR. 
43 Dorota Leczykiewicz, ‘“Constitutional Justice” and Judicial Review of EU Legislative Acts’ in Dimitry 
Kochenov, G De Búrca and Andrew Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Hart Publishing 2015) 104–105. 
44 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’ (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 1. 
45 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
and certain related acts [2001] Declarations Adopted by the Conference - Declaration on the Future of the 
Union, OJ C 80. 
46 Laeken Declaration of 15 December 2001 on the Future of the European Union, SN 300/1/01 REV 1 3. 
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In the run up to the Lisbon Treaty, further consideration was given to the question of 
competence and the balance of powers between the EU and the Member States. A 
particular emphasis was placed upon those open-ended, purposive legal bases in the Treaty. 
The competence to enact harmonisation legislation for purposes of the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market attracted considerable attention.47 For Craig, these 
discussions amongst the leaders of the Member States reflected a “predominant 
concern…that Article 5 provided scant protection for State rights, and little safeguard 
against an ever-increasing shift of power from the states to the EU…”48  
a.) Limiting the Existence of EU Legislative Power: Conferral and the Catalogue of 
Competences 
Against this background, the Lisbon Treaty is to be noted for the emphasis that it placed 
upon the principle of conferral in the common provisions of the TEU and TFEU.  
Article 5(1) TEU now provides that the limits of Union competences are governed by the 
principle of conferral. This is followed by Article 5(2) TEU, which states that “Under the 
principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out 
therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States.”49 Furthermore, Article 4(1) TEU further stresses that, in accordance with 
Article 5 TEU, competences not conferred upon the EU in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States.50 
This reinforcement of the principle of conferral is supplemented by an attempt to 
distinguish between: (i) exclusive; (ii) shared and; (iii) supporting, coordinating or 
supplementary competences in Articles 2-6 TFEU. These three categories of competence 
seek to provide “expectations to citizens, as well as public officials, as to the fields in which 
the Union may legitimately act.”51 Despite not explicitly including a list of specific 
 
47 Michael Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law 
Review 617, 654. 
48 Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford University Press 2013) 156. 
49 Article 5(2) TEU. 
50 Article 4(1) TEU.  
51 Mark Dawson, ‘The Political Face of Judicial Activism: Europe’s Law-Politics Imbalance’, Judicial activism at 
the European Court of Justice 14. 
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competences reserved exclusively to the Member States (and thus beyond the legislative 
reach of the EU institutions), the Lisbon reforms nonetheless seek to limit the scope of EU 
legislature’s competences in certain ways. For example, the EU legislature is prohibited from 
enacting harmonisation legislation in areas of supporting, coordinating or supplementary 
competences per Article 2(5) TFEU.52 
In Azoulai’s view, this “overabundance” of provisions limiting the existence of EU 
competences in the Lisbon Treaty illustrates that the Member States “were clearly 
concerned with setting boundaries to the Union’s action.”53  
b.) Striking a Balance Between Competence Control and Flexibility 
 
One plausible interpretation of these reforms is that the drafters of the Treaties were 
seeking to establish a balance of competences in the EU legal order that operated along the 
lines of dual federalism as discussed in Chapter 5. According to this view, the overarching 
purpose behind the persistent references to the limits of EU competences was to carve out 
two, mutually exclusive and reciprocally limiting fields of EU and Member State powers.54  
If such an approach were to be followed, the result, for example, would be that 
harmonisation legislation enacted under Article 114 TFEU would henceforth be deemed to 
be unconstitutional whenever it impacted upon policy fields where harmonisation had been 
explicitly excluded by the EU Treaties (e.g. public health, education, tourism etc.55) This 
would involve a considerable shift away from the established, pre-Lisbon position which 
provided that, so long as the conditions for recourse to Article 114 TFEU were satisfied, EU 
legislation could not be impugned on the grounds that public health protection etc. were 
decisive factors in the choices taken by the EU legislature.56 
 
52 Read alongside Article 6 TFEU, the prohibition on harmonisation legislation applied to policy areas such as 
tourism, culture and the protection and improvement of human health see Robert Schütze, ‘Co-Operative 
Federalism Constitutionalized: The Emergence of Complementary Competences in the EC Legal Order’ (2006) 2 
European Law Review 167. 
53 Loïc Azoulai, ‘Introduction’ in Loïc Azoulai (ed), The Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 10–11. 
54 Ernest A Young, ‘Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from 
American Federalism’ (2002) 77 New York University Law Review 1612, 1464–1469. 
55 Articles 2(5) and 6 TFEU. 




That being said, it is generally accepted the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty did not intend to 
strictly separate EU and Member State competences in this way.57 Whilst recognising the 
need for better competence monitoring and control, it was also deemed necessary from the 
early 2000s onwards to retain a considerable degree of flexibility within the system. The 
pursuit of further European integration within the context of the broadly stated aims and 
objectives of the Treaties continued to speak against placing rigid limits upon the existence 
of EU competences.58 Indeed, attempts at strictly separating EU from Member State 
competences were viewed as posing significant costs in terms of inflexibility, with the 
prospect of diminishing the EU’s capacity to effectively act to address the manifold 
objectives entrusted to it under the Treaties.59 
This much is clear when one considers the EU’s competence to enact harmonisation 
legislation under Article 114 TFEU. Despite being specifically cited as a major source of 
“competence creep” in the 2001 Laeken Declaration, the Member States decided not to 
amend Article 114 TFEU.60 Somewhat remarkably, for all the discussion over the problems 
of open-ended, functional competences during the Treaty reform process, the EU 
legislature’s power to enact internal market harmonisation legislation “survived that reform 
process unscathed.”61 Indeed, the wording of this core legislative competence remained 
virtually identical to its predecessor provision of Article 95 EC.62 The Lisbon Treaty therefore 
did not provide the Court with new, legally operational criteria that could be utilised to 
further limit the existence of EU legislative powers in the internal market. The same open-
ended, purposive framing of Article 114 TFEU would continue alongside the same generally 
worded principle of conferral in Article 5 TEU. 
 
57 Stephen Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court’s Case Law Has Become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827, 850–851; For a 
discussion of the relevant provisions of the failed European Constitutional Treaty which then made it in to the 
Treaty of Lisbon see Franz C Mayer, ‘Competences—Reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU and 
the New European Constitution’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 493, 498–500. 
58 “How are we to ensure at the same time that the European dynamic does not come to a halt?” Laeken 
Declaration of 15 December 2001 on the Future of the European Union, SN 300/1/01 REV 1 4. 
59 Weatherill (n 57) 851. 
60 Dougan (n 47) 654. 
61 Bruno De Witte, ‘A Competence to Protect’ in Philip Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU 
Internal Market (Cambridge University Press 2012) 45. 
62 Kathleen Gutman, The Constitutional Foundations of European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 318. 
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Given the central importance of the EU’s competence to enact harmonisation legislation 
and its major contribution to concerns about competence creep over the years, the degree 
of continuity with the past is indicative here. By leaving things pretty much as they were, the 
Member States were not seeking to place excessive or overly restrictive limits upon the 
existence of EU legislative power. There was certainly no intention of redesigning this core 
legislative competence along the lines of dual federalism mentioned above. As Tridimas puts 
it, the Lisbon Treaty does not aim to: 
“[C]reate bright lines between EU and national competences, nor does it avoid 
intricate problems of interpretation. The division of powers between the EU and the 
Member States, as in any constitutional model, is inherently unstable. The pursuit of 
red lines that politicians crave so much and the search for impregnable bastions of 
national sovereignty remain elusive.”63 
At the same time, however, there can be little doubt that the Lisbon Treaty sought to 
address the persisting problem of competence creep and to prevent the expansion of EU 
legislative power into sensitive policy areas.64  
This further highlights the fundamental and persistent tension which sits at the heart of the 
European integration process. As noted in the previous chapter, successive rounds of Treaty 
amendment have continuously expanded the competences of the EU institutions into ever-
greater areas of policymaking. These same reforms have also sought to render law-making 
on the European level more efficient, by enhancing the role of the EU institutions and 
decreasing the influence that individual member states have within the EU legislative 
process.65 At the same time, however, the Member States have sought to place more 
meaningful legal and political limits upon the powers of the EU institutions. 
 
63 Takis Tridimas, ‘Competence after Lisbon: The Elusive Search for Bright Lines’ in Diamond Ashiagbor, Nicola 
Countouris and Ioannis Lianos (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge University 
Press 2012) 49. 
64 Sacha Garben and Inge Govaere, ‘The Division of Competences between the EU and the Member States: 
Reflections on the Past, the Present and the Future’ in Sacha Garben and Inge Govaere (eds), The Division of 
Competences between the EU and the Member States: Reflections on the Past, the Present and the Future (Hart 
Publishing 2017) 7. 
65 The expansion of QMV in the Council and the empowerment of the European Parliament are the classic 
examples here.  
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The key question to be resolved, therefore, was how to achieve the aim of placing more 
meaningful limits upon EU legislative power without excessively restricting its flexibility to 
meet the challenges of further integration?  
5.) The Further Proceduralisation of the EU Legislative Process  
 
Rather than seeking to place novel, robust limits upon the existence of core EU legislative 
competences, the answer provided by the Lisbon Treaty was to reinforce the means through 
which the exercise of EU legislative power could be effectively monitored and controlled.66 
In particular, the Lisbon Treaty aimed at strengthening the principles of subsidiarity (Article 
5(3) TEU) and proportionality (Article 5(4) TEU). This appeared to be a more promising way 
of ensuring an effective balance of competences while also preserving a sufficient degree of 
EU legislative discretion and flexibility.67   
In seeking to render these principles more effective as limits upon the exercise of EU 
competences, much faith was placed in an enhanced degree of “proceduralisation” in the 
EU legislative process.68  
As Chapter 5 has demonstrated, the Amsterdam Treaty had already attempted to inject a 
degree of proceduralisation into the EU legislative process by laying down a series of 
guidelines on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality.69 However, 
this largely failed to bring about a satisfactory system for ensuring that these principles 
were adequately considered and enforced. The EU’s legislative institutions appeared not to 
give much consideration to the principles during the law-making process, with final legal 
acts often containing terse explanations as to why subsidiarity and proportionality had been 
complied with.70  
 
66 On the distinction between the existence and exercise of EU competences see Paul Craig, ‘The ECJ and Ultra 
Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 395, 425–426. 
67 For an institutional endorsement of this balanced view see Convention on the Future of Europe Draft 
Constitution - Commission Statement, IP/03/836, Brussels (13 June 2003). 
68 Xavier Groussot and Sanja Bogojević, ‘Subsidiarity as a Procedural Safeguard of Federalism’ in Loïc Azoulai 
(ed), The Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2014). 
69 Protocol (No 30) annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
[1997] OJ C 340. 
70 Derrick Wyatt, ‘Could a “Yellow Card” for National Parliaments Strengthen Judicial as Well as Political 
Policing of Subsidiarity?’ (2006) 2 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy 1, 10. 
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Furthermore, the CJEU was widely criticized for failing to engage in any meaningful degree 
of scrutiny of whether EU legislation complied with the substantive or even procedural 
aspects of subsidiarity. It was therefore argued in the previous Chapter that, within the 
context of federalism disputes, the EU legislature was placed under a very limited burden to 
justify the constitutionality of its actions prior to the Lisbon Treaty. 
a.) Protocol No.2 
In light of these failings, the most important example of enhanced “proceduralisation” of EU 
law-making in the Lisbon Treaty is Protocol No. 2, which offers specific guidelines for 
rendering the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality operational in practice.71 When 
compared to its predecessor in the Treaty of Amsterdam, it has been noted that the new 
Protocol has been almost completely rewritten so that it now focuses almost entirely on 
procedural aspects.72  
Under Protocol No.2, the Commission is obliged to consult widely before proposing 
legislative acts and must forward draft legislative acts to national parliaments at the same 
time as it does to the Union legislator (i.e. Council and European Parliament.)73 These draft 
legislative acts must be justified with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and must contain a detailed statement making it possible to appraise 
compliance with those principles.74 Article 5 of the Protocol provides a series of guidelines 
for determining whether the requirements of subsidiarity have been met in a given 
instance. According to that provision, the statement justifying EU legislation’s compliance 
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should contain some assessment of 
the proposal's financial impact. Furthermore, the reasons for concluding that an EU 
objective can be better achieved at European level must be substantiated by qualitative 
and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators. Finally, all draft legislative acts must ensure 
that financial or administrative burdens falling upon the EU, national governments, regional 
 
71 Groussot and Bogojević (n 68) 237; Robert Schütze, ‘Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of 
Federalism’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 525, 531. 
72 Groussot and Bogojević (n 68) 237; Jean-Victor Louis, ‘The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish “No”.: National 
Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity – Legal Options and Practical Limits’ (2008) 4 European 
Constitutional Law Review 429, 433. 
73 Protocol No. 2 Articles 2 and 4. 
74 ibid Article 5. 
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and local authorities, economic operators and citizens be minimised and commensurate 
with the objective being pursued.75 
When it comes to monitoring and enforcement, national parliaments have been given a role 
in ensuring that draft legislative acts of the EU institutions comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity. Providing that certain voting thresholds are met by national parliamentary 
chambers across the Member States, the national parliaments may collectively issue non-
binding warnings that a particular proposal does not comply with subsidiarity.76 In response 
to such concerns being expressed, the Commission may decide to maintain, amend or 
withdraw its legislative proposal and it must provide reasons for its decision.77  
Crucially, the involvement of national parliaments in the initial stages of the legislative 
process applies only to draft legislative acts and not to other forms of EU legal acts. This 
serves to further distinguish, in legal terms, EU legislative acts from all other types of EU 
acts.78  Moreover, it has been claimed that the recruitment of national parliaments as 
monitors of subsidiarity compliance, coupled with the enhanced procedural obligations 
placed upon the EU institutions when drafting legislative acts, will serve to enhance 
parliamentary and thus public scrutiny of the EU’s legislative process.79 
Overall, the Lisbon Treaty reforms sought to place the EU legislature under an increased 
number of procedural obligations to consider the subsidiarity implications of proposed 
legislative activity.80 By instilling a duty to circulate draft legislative acts around national 
parliaments and the EU’s legislative institutions, an incentive to take subsidiarity more 
seriously than hitherto was created. In future, draft legislation would not only have to be 
sufficiently justified in terms of its compliance with subsidiarity, but these justifications 
would then be subject to scrutiny by a greater number of actors. 
 
75 ibid Article 5. 
76 See Article 12 TEU and Protocol No.2 Articles 6 and 7. 
77 Protocol No.2 Article 7. 
78 Herwig CH Hofmann, Gerard C Rowe and Alexander H Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European 
Union (Oxford University Press 2011) 127. 
79 Ian Cooper, ‘The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU’ (2006) 
44 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 281. 
80 Groussot and Bogojević (n 68). 
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In particular, the enhanced monitoring role of national parliaments had the potential to 
increase the quality of ex ante subsidiarity compliance by the EU legislature.81  
b.) The Rise of Better Regulation 
In addition to Treaty reform, a similar shift towards enhanced proceduralisation in the EU 
legislative process has also taken place through a series of non-binding, “Better Regulation” 
initiatives in recent years.82 Generally speaking, these initiatives aim to ensure that political 
decisions at the EU level are prepared in an open and transparent manner, informed by the 
best evidence available and supported by the comprehensive involvement of citizens and 
other key stakeholders.83 
The flagship initiative in this regard is the Impact Assessment (IA). According to the most 
recent IA guidelines published by the European Commission, the IA process involves the 
gathering and analysing of evidence in order to support policymaking.84 It “verifies the 
existence of a problem, identifies its underlying causes, assesses whether EU action is 
needed, and analyses the advantages and disadvantages of available solutions.”85 IAs are 
required for all Commission initiatives that are likely to have significant economic, 
environmental or social impacts.86 Consequently, they have become a key feature in the 
early stages of the EU policymaking process and are consistently used when preparing 
proposals for EU legislation in core areas of competence such as the internal market. 
From the perspective of the EU’s federal balance of competences, IAs require that policy 
proposals be scrutinised for compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  
 
81 Dougan (n 47) 659. 
82 Anne Meuwese and Patricia Popelier, ‘Legal Implications of Better Regulation: A Special Issue’ (2011) 17 
European Public Law 455. 
83 Commission Staff Working Document, “Better Regulation Guidelines”, SWD (2017) 350 (Brussels, 7 July 
2017) 4. 
84 Better Regulation Guidelines 2017; There were also previous versions of the guidelines. For the purposes of 
the present enquiry, the salient provisions in the latest IA guidelines remain virtually unchanged from previous 
versions. Reference is therefore made to the most recent version of the guidelines throughout, see 
Commission Staff Working Document, “Better Regulation Guidelines”, SWD (2015) 111 (Strasbourg, 19 May 
2015); European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2009) 92 (Brussels, 15 January 2009); 
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791/3 (Brussels, 15 June 2005).   




With regards to subsidiarity, the guidelines provide that consideration should be given to: 
“whether the problem addressed has transnational aspects which cannot be adequately 
addressed by action by the Member States and whether action at the EU level would 
produce greater benefits compared to action taken solely at the level of the Member States 
due to its scale or effectiveness.”87 
Furthermore, all policy proposals must be evaluated in light of the principle of 
proportionality, with particular attention being paid to less restrictive alternatives. 
Consideration must be given to: (i) whether different options would achieve the same 
objectives; (ii) the benefits versus the costs; (iii) the coherence of different options with the 
overarching objectives of the EU; (iv) whether the proposed option goes beyond what is 
necessary to achieve those objectives; and (v) if the option is limited to issues that the EU 
can better address and which the Member States cannot satisfactorily achieve on their 
own.88 
There must be a continual process of evaluation of these issues. The Commission is required 
to provide reasoning as to subsidiarity and proportionality compliance at the early stages of 
policy planning and throughout the preparatory phases of drawing up legislative 
proposals.89 Throughout this process, different stakeholders are able to comment on, inter 
alia, the subsidiarity and proportionality aspects of proposed EU legislative action. Only once 
all relevant information is collected and analysed will it then be possible to make a final 
determination as to the proposal’s compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.90 
Oversight of the IA process is conducted by a Regulatory Scrutiny Board (formerly Impact 
Assessment Board) which provides independent quality support and control for IAs 
prepared by the Commission.91 The Board carries out an objective quality assessment of 
draft IAs and issues an opinion on each draft that is submitted to it. For IAs, a positive 
opinion from the Board is required before the next phases in finalizing a legislative proposal 
 
87 ibid 19. 
88 ibid 28–29. 
89 ibid 17–27. 
90 ibid 19. 
91 Decision of the President of the European Commission on the Establishment of an Independent Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board, C (2015) 3263 final, (Strasbourg, 19 May 2015). 
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can continue. In situations where a negative opinion is provided, the draft report must be 
reviewed and resubmitted to the Board.92 The opinions on IAs are then made public once 
the Commission has formally adopted the relative legislative proposal.93 
Of particular note here is the role that the Board plays in scrutinizing the Commission’s 
reasoning with regards to a particular proposals’ compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. As the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality 
make clear, the Board has “frequently asked for stronger justification of the need for action 
at EU level.”94 In particular, it has highlighted “the need for more evidence of problems that 
require action at EU level”95; “concluded that the evidence base to demonstrate the need 
for and proportionality of an EU legislative initiative remained weak”96; asked “for a better 
justification of the proportionality of the initiative”97, and “sought to clarify the added value 
and necessity of action at EU level as opposed to Member State level.”98 
Once approved, the final Impact Assessment forms part of an Explanatory Memorandum 
which provides an overall explanation of the Commission's legislative proposal. This 
memorandum is required for all legislative proposals that are to be adopted by the 
European Parliament and Council and it is transmitted alongside the legislative proposal to 
the EU institutions.99 
Amongst other things, the Explanatory Memorandum explains the legal basis of the 
proposed legislation, along with the reasons why the proposal complies with the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. It also contains an overview of the results from 
stakeholder consultations and the findings of any Impact Assessment(s) that have been 
conducted. Reference is made to revisions of the Impact Assessment in light of opinion(s) 
from the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. An explanation is also provided as to which policy 
 
92 Better Regulation Toolbox, Tool #3, Role of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/better-regulation-toolbox-3_en_0.pdf (last accessed 
09.05.2019) 15–16. 
93 Decision Establishing Regulatory Scrutiny Board, C (2015) 3263 5. 
94 Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality (19th Report on Better Lawmaking covering 
the year 2011) COM/2012/0373 final Section 2.1. 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid. 
97 Report from the Commission Annual Report 2014 in Subsidiarity and Proportionality, COM/2015/0315 final 
Section 2.1. 
98 ibid. 
99 Better Regulation Guidelines 2017 38. 
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alternatives were examined, how they compare and why the final legislative proposal was 
chosen as the best means of proceeding.100 
c.) Evaluation 
When taken together, the obligations contained in Protocol No.2, coupled with the 
increased use of Impact Assessments, have led to a much greater degree of 
proceduralisation in the EU legislative process. By requiring the EU institutions to consider 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality at various stages in the law-making process 
- and to provide reasons for their conclusions - the reforms “go a long way towards fostering 
a justificatory practice and help limit the danger of arbitrary intergovernmental or 
supranational rule-making.”101 Moreover, the decision to involve national parliaments in 
subsidiarity monitoring speaks to an “enhanced general need for justification in legislative 
drafts as to how they may be considered respectful of the EU’s constitutional 
framework.”102   
When viewed from the perspective of the EU’s federal balance of competences, these 
reforms represent a significant strengthening of the political safeguards of federalism in the 
post-Lisbon EU.103 Moreover, the emphasis placed upon proceduralisation and the 
involvement of different national and European political actors indicates a strong 
preference for entrusting the federal balance of competences to the political process.104  
This much is clear when one considers the process that led to the drafting of the relevant 
sections of the rejected Constitutional Treaty that were largely retained by the Lisbon 
Treaty.105 According to the working group on subsidiarity, monitoring compliance with 
subsidiarity should be primarily preventative in nature and occur within the legislative 
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Press 2012) 139. 
102 Isidore Maletić, ‘The Role of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the EU’s Lifestyle Risk Policy’ in Alberto 
Alemanno and Amandine Garde (eds), Regulating Lifestyle Risks: The EU, Alcohol, Tobacco and Unhealthy Diets 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 202. 
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process itself.106 Since the principle was “of an essentially political nature” and involved 
exercises of political discretion as to the appropriate level of legislative intervention, 
monitoring compliance with that principle should take place prior to the entry into force of 
the measure in question.107 
This general shift towards proceduralisation and increased emphasis upon the legislative 
process also led to some speculation about the CJEU’s approach to conducting 
constitutional review of EU legislation in the post-Lisbon Treaty era.108 For some, the 
addition of a series of novel procedural obligations upon the EU institutions to consistently 
evaluate whether EU legislative proposals complied with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality could impact upon the CJEU’s approach to constitutional review.109 For 
example, Bermann posited that such obligations would result in an “analytic and 
documentary trail” being available to the Court should it wish to “take a harder look” at the 
output of the other EU institutions.110 In essence, the more information made available from 
the making of the initial legislative proposal will result in more evidence being accessible to 
the Court when checking its legality.111  
 
6.) Conclusion 
These reforms to the legal and political order of the EU bring one back to the core research 
question of the changing role of the CJEU over time. In the post-Lisbon Treaty era, how 
would the Court conduct constitutional review of primary EU legislation in both federalism 
and fundamental rights cases? Would any change in the reasoning of the Court materialize 
when compared to its previous record of consistently adopting a light-touch, tersely 
reasoned approach to scrutinising EU legislation? Given that legislative acts adopted under a 
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legislative procedure were now premised upon the principle of representative democracy, 
would they be entitled to (even more) deference from the CJEU? What impact, if any, would 
the proceduralisation of the legislative process and the concerted effort to strengthen the 
political safeguards of federalism have in this regard?  
With these questions in mind, the remainder of this thesis moves to examine the federalism 
and fundamental rights jurisprudence of the CJEU in the post-Lisbon Treaty era. It is 
contended that in both categories of constitutional review cases, a series shifts in the 
methodology and intensity of constitutional review may be detected.  
In marked contrast with its earlier jurisprudence, the Court has recently come to subject EU 
legislation to “high-intensity” review. In cases of serious interference with fundamental 
rights or core constitutional principles of the EU legal order, the CJEU has explicitly limited 
the scope of discretion afforded to the EU legislature and engaged in strict scrutiny of the 
substance of contested legislation.  
Beyond these rare examples of serious interference, the Court increasingly adopts a 
“process-oriented” approach to constitutional review. This is achieved by scrutinising the 
legislative process and evidence base upon which contested EU legislation was enacted to 
ensure that all relevant facts and circumstances were taken into consideration by the EU 
legislature. In recognition that the abovementioned trend towards proceduralisation has 
entrusted the political process with the primary responsibility for ensuring that the EU’s 
core constitutional rights and principles are respected, the Court’s process-oriented 
approach seeks to bolster that process and improve the ways in which the EU legislature 
takes its decisions. 
These developments in the methodology and intensity of constitutional review of EU 
legislation then form the basis for evaluating the contemporary role of the CJEU within the 
post-Lisbon Treaty European Union. By engaging in a finely calibrated, variable intensity 
approach to constitutional review, it is argued that the contemporary CJEU is one that takes 










The final two chapters of this thesis examine the jurisprudence of the CJEU in cases where it 
has been called upon to review the constitutionality of EU legislation on federalism and 
fundamental rights grounds. By focusing upon the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and 
proportionality enshrined in Article 5 TEU, the present chapter argues that there have been 
a series of shifts in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence in recent years.  
In a notable departure from past practice, the CJEU has shown an increased willingness to 
refer to the legislative process and evidence base upon which EU legislation was enacted 
when reviewing its constitutionality.1 Under this novel, “process-oriented” approach to 
constitutional review, the CJEU examines whether the EU legislature has complied with the 
procedural obligations laid down in the Treaties and scrutinises whether legislative choices 
are based upon sufficient evidence and reasoning.2 In particular, the CJEU has made 
reference to Protocol No.2 on the principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Impact 
Assessments and other preparatory documents used throughout the legislative process 
when reviewing whether the EU’s federalism principles have been complied with.  
In adopting such a process-oriented approach to constitutional review, the CJEU indicates to 
the EU institutions that the political process on the European level is primarily responsible 
for ensuring that the EU’s federalism principles are respected. The Court then typically 
defers to the substantive outcomes of that political process. It opts not to second-guess the 
merits of legislative choices by engaging in high-intensity or strict review of EU legislation for 
compliance with the principles enshrined in Article 5 TEU. Instead, the CJEU’s objective is to 
ensure that the political process on the federal level takes all relevant facts and 
 
1 Jacob Öberg, ‘The Rise of the Procedural Paradigm: Judicial Review of EU Legislation in Vertical Competence 
Disputes’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 248, 256; Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘Semiprocedural Judicial 
Review’ (2012) 6 Legisprudence 271. 




circumstances into account and operates in a manner that is responsive to federalism 
concerns.3 In so doing, the focus moves towards “improving the decision-making process of 
the EU institutions, rather than on second-guessing their substantive findings.”4  
These changes in the Court’s case law have not come about in isolation, but are to be viewed 
in light of recent trends towards enhanced proceduralisation of the EU legislative process. As 
Chapter 6 demonstrated, the EU’s legislative institutions have come under an increased 
number of procedural obligations in recent years. When preparing, proposing and 
considering draft EU legislation, the institutions are required to consult widely, obtain input 
from a variety of different actors and accompany such proposals with robust justification vis-
à-vis their compliance with the EU’s federalism principles.5 With the political safeguards of 
federalism strengthened, the Court plays an important, yet secondary, role as a “referee” 
within that multifaceted EU political process, “policing and maintaining the system of 
political and institutional checks that we ordinarily rely on to prevent or resolve most 
problems.”6 This approach “increases judicial scrutiny over the decision-making process of 
the EU institutions” whilst preventing the CJEU from “intruding into the realm of politics.”7 
2.) The Principle of Conferral Post Lisbon 
The claim that the contemporary jurisprudence of the CJEU evinces a shift towards process-
oriented review in federalism cases rests primarily upon changes to its reasoning around the 
principles subsidiarity and proportionality. This is consistent with the general thrust of 
reforms in both the Lisbon Treaty and Better Regulation initiatives, which have sought to 
“proceduralise” those constitutional principles governing the exercise rather than the 
existence of EU competences. 
a.) A Shift in Focus: From the Existence to the Exercise of EU Competences 
 
3 For a US perspective see Calvin R Massey, ‘Etiquette Tips: Some Implications of Process Federalism’ (1994) 18 
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 175, 211. 
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This shift in emphasis away from curtailing the existence of EU competences (conferral) 
towards placing meaningful limits upon the exercise of EU competences (subsidiarity and 
proportionality) was recently recognised by Advocate General (AG) Kokott. In the case of 
Poland v Parliament and Council, Poland challenged the validity of EU internal market 
legislation that regulated, inter alia, flavourings in tobacco products. In Poland’s view, the 
legislation in question went beyond the permissible scope of Article 114 TFEU, thus 
infringing the principle of conferral. Furthermore, it was alleged that aspects of the 
legislation infringed the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.8  
In rendering her opinion in the case, AG Kokott began by stating that the dispute at hand 
was different from previous Article 114 TFEU cases since it did not, in principle, question the 
suitability of Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis for the legislation per se. Instead, the case 
concerned only certain specific aspects of exercising that internal market competence.9 In 
her view, therefore, “legislative competence no longer plays such a central role as it 
previously did.” Instead, “[i]nterest is now focused on the question whether [the Directive] is 
compatible with the principle of proportionality. It is also necessary to clarify the 
requirements stemming from the principle of subsidiarity for provisions like those at 
issue.”10 
Despite this increased emphasis being placed upon subsidiarity and proportionality, it is 
nonetheless necessary to first examine how, if at all, the CJEU’s jurisprudence pertaining to 
the principle of conferral has altered in recent years.   
b.) The Story so Far 
The principle of conferral provides that the EU shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives 
set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the EU in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States.11 As discussed in Chapter 5, within the context of the EU’s core competence 
to enact harmonisation legislation, the CJEU has rendered the principle of conferral 
 
8 Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2016:323. 
9 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C‑358/14, Poland v Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:848 
para 2. 
10 ibid para 2. 
11 Article 5(2) TEU. 
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operational by stipulating a number of conditions that must be met before legislation may 
be enacted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.12  
In essence, in order to be “constitutionally valid”, the EU legislature must “make a plausible 
case that the act either helps to remove disparities between national provisions that hinder 
the free movement of goods, services or persons or that cause distorted conditions of 
competition.”13 Additionally, the legislature may demonstrate that EU legislation aims to 
prevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade arising from the divergent development 
of national rules, provided the emergence of such obstacles is likely and the EU measure is 
designed to prevent them.14 Without making such a plausible case, the Court will annul the 
measure in question as going beyond the scope of the EU legislature’s powers as set down in 
Article 114 TFEU.15 
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court’s jurisprudence was notable for 
engaging in low intensity review of EU legislation when determining whether these 
conditions had been satisfied. In a number of cases, the EU legislature seemed to be able to 
satisfy the Court that harmonization legislation fell within the scope of Article 114 TFEU (and 
thus complied with the principle of conferral) by simply inserting statements to that effect in 
the recitals to EU legislation.16 These recitals were routinely cited with approval by the CJEU, 
who opted not to subject the underlying assumptions or veracity of such statements to any 
meaningful degree of scrutiny. The consensus, therefore, was that the Court had not 
“traditionally shown a great deal of interest in closely examining the question whether a 
given exercise of legislative authority is or is not constitutionally justified by reference to 
the…[EU] Treaty's harmonization provisions.”17  
 
12 See Chapter 5, Section 5 
13 Bruno De Witte, ‘A Competence to Protect’ in Philip Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU 
Internal Market (Cambridge University Press 2012) 36. 
14 Case C-380/03, Germany v European Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2006:772 para 38. 
15 Case C-376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising One) ECLI:EU:C:2000:544. 
16 Stephen Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court’s Case Law Has Become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827. 
17 Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Robert Howse and George A Bermann (eds), ‘The Role of Law in the Functioning of 
Federal Systems’, The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the 
European Union (Oxford University Press 2001) 199. 
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This unsatisfactory state of affairs led to calls for the Court to demand more by way of 
justificatory evidence and reasoning as to why the conditions necessary for recourse to 
Article 114 TFEU had been satisfied.18 To recall from Chapter 5, the CJEU was urged to look 
beyond the recitals to the legislative act itself and to closely examine documents utilised 
throughout the legislative process such as explanatory reports and Impact Assessments 
(IA).19 In so doing, the Court could determine whether the EU legislature sufficiently 
considered and justified why its proposed action fell within the scope of Article 114 TFEU.20  
When viewed against these aspirations, something of a mixed picture emerges in the post-
Lisbon Treaty jurisprudence pertaining to the principle of conferral. On the one hand, there 
continue to be examples of the Court subjecting EU legislation to incredibly light-touch 
review where it is challenged on the basis of going beyond the constitutionally permissible 
limits of Article 114 TFEU. On the other, there are sporadic examples of the Court adopting a 
more process-oriented approach of the sort described above.  
c.) Continuity with the Past 
One of the key conditions which operationalises the principle of conferral within the context 
of Article 114 TFEU is that EU harmonisation legislation is aimed at, and designed to prevent, 
the “likely” emergence of future obstacles to trade caused by divergent national laws.21 In 
terms of what constitutes an obstacle to trade, the Court has held that the mere existence 
(or likely future emergence) of divergent national measures laying down requirements to be 
met by particular products are liable, in themselves, to constitute obstacles to the free 
movement of goods.22 With such a wide-ranging interpretation being consistently given to 
the concept of obstacles to trade, much depends on how the “likelihood” criterion is 
interpreted and applied by the Court.  
i.) Inuit 
 
18 Paul Craig, ‘The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 
395, 411. 
19 See Chapter 5, Section 6 
20 Craig (n 18) 412; Gareth Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (2015) 
21 European Law Journal 2, 18. 
21 Case C-210/03, Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Health, EU:C:2004:802 
para 30. 
22 Case C-491/01, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) 
Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd (BAT) ECLI:EU:C:2002:741 para 64. 
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Indications that not much had changed on this front after the Lisbon Treaty had entered into 
force came in the Inuit case.23 The applicants challenged the legality of an EU Regulation 
banning the placing of seal products on the internal market (except for those procured by 
traditional Inuit hunts) on the grounds that this went beyond the permissible scope of Article 
114 TFEU. In their view, the preamble to the Regulation contained only vague and general 
assertions regarding the disparities between national rules, the risk of infringements to 
fundamental freedoms, or distortion to competition. These were not sufficient to justify 
recourse to Article 114 TFEU. Furthermore, the recitals to the Regulation did not contain any 
specific information on which Member States had adopted - or were likely to adopt in the 
future - measures regulating seal products that would have created obstacles to trade.24  
In upholding the constitutionality of the EU legislation, the CJEU began by recalling its 
established, pre-Lisbon jurisprudence on the scope of Article 114 TFEU - thus confirming that 
the broad parameters of what was acceptable under that provision had not changed.25 The 
Court then found that the recitals to the Regulation were sufficient to justify recourse to 
Article 114 TFEU, since the EU legislature was only required to indicate the general situation 
which led to the adoption of the Regulation and to indicate the general objectives that it was 
intended to achieve.26 The legislature could not be criticised for only setting out that there 
were divergences between national rules and the consequent impact on the internal market 
in general terms. In particular, the EU legislature was not obliged to specify the number and 
identity of the Member States who had adopted or would adopt divergent national rules.27 
Furthermore, the Court was entitled to take into account statements made at the hearing by 
the Commission explaining why divergences in national laws existed or were likely to enter 
into force in the future.28 Since the general statement of reasons was sufficient, the 
Commission’s claims at the hearing served merely to clarify these claims and the Court was 
permitted to take account of such clarifications.29 
 
23 Case C‑398/13 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:535. 
24 ibid para 19. 
25 ibid paras 26-27. 
26 ibid para 29. 
27 ibid para 29. 
28 ibid paras 28, 30. 
29 ibid para 30. 
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As a consequence of Inuit, the EU legislature seemed to be required to only set out, in 
general terms, why it believed that recourse to Article 114 TFEU was justified. Furthermore, 
in the event that justification was lacking in the text of the legislation itself, this could be 
rectified by supplementary information and statements by the EU institutions at the oral 
hearing before the CJEU. Consequently, the EU legislature remained under a very limited 
burden to justify the constitutionality of its actions. The CJEU did not enquire into the 
legislative process leading to the adoption of the contested legislation. Nor did it scrutinise 
any justificatory evidence contained in legislative documents such as the explanatory 
memorandum or Impact Assessment.  
ii.) ESMA 
A further example of the Court continuing to engage in light-touch, tersely reasoned review 
of internal market legislation came in ESMA, where the claimants argued that the object of 
an EU legislative act was not genuinely to improve the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.30 According to settled case law, recourse to Article 114 
TFEU is permissible only “where it is actually and objectively apparent from the legal act that 
its purpose is to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market.”31 In the claimant’s view, EU legislation which empowered an EU agency, in the 
place of previously competent national authorities, to adopt measures that were legally 
binding upon natural and legal persons, did not have as its object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. 
The Court swiftly rejected this argument within the space of two paragraphs. It reached the 
conclusion that EU legislation of this nature could be based upon Article 114 TFEU by 
uncritically citing two recitals to the contested legislation. This “very light review”32 is well-
demonstrated by the Court’s finding that “recital 2 in the preamble to [the Regulation] states 
that the purpose of the regulation is to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market 
and to improve the conditions of its functioning, in particular with regard to the financial 
 
30 Case C-491/01, BAT (n 22) para 60. 
31 Case C‑270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Parliament and Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 113 and case law cited therein. 
32 Annette AM Schrauwen, ‘From the Board: Review of the Balance of Competences’ (2014) 41 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 127, 131. 
199 
 
markets.”33 Based on this assertion, the Court then held, without further explanation, that 
the harmonisation of rules governing such transactions was aimed at preventing the creation 
of obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market and the continuing application 
of discrepant national rules.34  
d.) Towards Process-Oriented Competence Review? 
 
In contrast to the approach taken in Inuit and ESMA, other judgments in the post-Lisbon 
Treaty era suggest a subtle shift in the direction of a more process-oriented type of review.   
i.) Vodafone 
In Vodafone, the applicants challenged the legality of an EU Regulation which capped the 
wholesale and retail costs for mobile phone roaming charges on the grounds that Article 114 
TFEU was not the correct legal basis for such action.35 In their view, the established 
conditions necessary for recourse to Article 114 TFEU had not been satisfied by the 
legislation at issue. 
In response, the Court referred to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the 
proposal for the Regulation. When read alongside the relevant recitals to the Regulation, the 
CJEU held that the level of retail charges for international roaming services was high at the 
time of the adoption of the contested legislation. Moreover, the relationship between costs 
and prices was not such as would prevail in fully competitive markets.36  
In light of this situation in the roaming charges market, the EU legislature had determined 
that Member States were coming under increased pressure to address the problem of high 
costs of retail roaming charges. In addition to the explanatory memorandum, the Court also 
cited the Impact Assessment (IA) for the proposed EU legislation for the first time in history. 
Based on these additional sources of justificatory evidence, the CJEU concluded that the EU 
 
33 Case C‑270/12, UK v Parliament and Council (n 31) para 114. 
34 ibid para 114. The swift rejection of the applicants’ arguments is all the more surprising when one considers 
that the Advocate General in the case took the view that the legislation went beyond the scope of Article 114 
TFEU. See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Case C‑270/12 UK v Parliament and Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:562. 
35 Case C-58/08, The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, ECLI:EU:C:2010:321. 
36 ibid para 39. 
200 
 
legislature “was actually confronted with a situation in which it appeared likely that national 
measures would be adopted aiming to address the problem of the high level of retail charges 
for [EU] wide roaming services” and that “such measures would have been likely to lead to a 
divergent development of national laws.”37 It was in light of those circumstances that the EU 
legislature sought to prevent the likely emergence of divergent national laws being enacted 
in the future which would disrupt the functioning of the internal market and distort 
competition. 38  
Ultimately, therefore, the CJEU was satisfied that the EU legislature had demonstrated that 
it had considered the existing and possible future situation in the Member States and 
adequately justified the need for a legislative response at the EU level. 
The Court’s reference to an Impact Assessment when engaging in constitutional review of EU 
legislation on competence grounds has been hailed as “revolutionary.”39 Alemanno notes 
that it is the first time that the CJEU has explicitly established a linkage between ex-ante 
legislative evaluation and ex-post judicial review.40 By stressing the importance of the 
travaux préparatoires, considering evidence from the legislative process and deferring to the 
merits of the outcome of that process, the Court adopted a distinctly process-oriented 
approach to review.”41 
ii.) The Tobacco Products Directive Litigation 
This shift towards process-oriented review was further emphasized in recent litigation over 
the Tobacco Products Directive, where the Court demonstrated an increased willingness to 
engage with the legislative process and evidence base when reviewing the constitutionality 
of internal market legislation.  
 
37 ibid para 45. 
38 ibid para 46. 
39 Xavier Groussot and Sanja Bogojević, ‘Subsidiarity as a Procedural Safeguard of Federalism’ in Loïc Azoulai 
(ed), The Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2014) 246. 
40 Alberto Alemanno, ‘A Meeting of Minds on Impact Assessment: When Ex Ante Evaluation Meets Ex Post 
Judicial Control’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 485; see also Rob van Gestel and Jurgen de Poorter, ‘Putting 
Evidence-Based Law Making to the Test: Judicial Review of Legislative Rationality’ (2016) 4 The Theory and 
Practice of Legislation 155, 170–171. 
41 José A Gutierrez-Fons, ‘Transatlantic Adjudication Techniques: The Commerce Clause and the EU’s Internal 
Market Harmonisation Clause in Perspective’ in Elaine Fahey and Deirdre Curtin (eds), A Transatlantic 
Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 41. 
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In Poland v Parliament and Council, the claimants challenged the validity of an EU Directive 
which prohibited the placing of tobacco products containing a “characterising flavour” such 
as menthol on the internal market.42 In their view, the EU legislature had failed to 
demonstrate that there were divergences between the national rules regarding the use of 
menthol as an additive in tobacco products when the EU legislation was adopted. 
Furthermore, there were no objective reasons capable of showing that divergences in 
national rules would likely arise in the future. Finally, the intervening Romanian government 
argued that the aim of the legislation was not to improve the conditions for the functioning 
of the internal market (Article 114 TFEU), but was primarily to ensure a high level of health 
protection, despite Article 168(5) TFEU excluding harmonisation in that field.43  
In finding that the legislation was validly based upon Article 114 TFEU, the Court referred to 
specific provisions of the Impact Assessment, along with recitals to the Directive, to find that 
there was, when the directive was adopted, “significant divergences between the regulatory 
systems of the Member States, given that some of them had established different lists of 
permitted or prohibited flavourings, whilst others had not adopted any specific rules on the 
matter.”44  
Decisive in the Court’s findings was the fact that EU legislature had taken into account the 
Partial Guidelines for Implementation of Articles 9 and 10 of the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) during the legislative process. These 
guidelines recommended that signatories to the FCTC “regulate, by prohibiting or restricting, 
ingredients that may be used to increase palatability in tobacco products’, including 
menthol.”45 
Despite being non-binding, the guidelines aimed at assisting the contracting parties to the 
FCTC with implementing the binding provisions of that Convention. In the CJEU’s view, the 
guidelines were based on the best available scientific evidence, the experience of the Parties 
 
42 Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and Council, (n 8). 
43 ibid paras 25-26. 
44 Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and Council, (n 8) para 57. See also Case C-547/14, Philip 
Morris Brands SARL and Others v Secretary of State for Health, ECLI:EU:C:2016:325, paras 98, 117, 132. 
45 Section 3.1.2.2, Partial Guidelines for Implementation of Articles 9 and 10 of the World Health Organisation 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted by the Conference of Parties to the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control at its fourth session in Punta del Este (2010), FCTC/COP/4(10), and amended at 
its fifth session in Seoul (2012), FCTC/COP/5(6). 
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to the Convention and were adopted by consensus by, inter alia, the EU and its Member 
States.46 They were intended to have a “decisive influence on the content of the rules 
adopted by the European Union” - a point confirmed by the EU legislature’s express decision 
to take them into account when adopting the contested Directive.47  Consequently, it was 
“foreseeable, with a sufficient degree of probability, that in the absence of measures at EU 
level, the relevant national rules could have developed in divergent ways, including with 
regard to the use of menthol.”48 By prohibiting the placing on the market of tobacco 
products with a characterising flavour, the EU legislation sought to guard against such 
divergences in the rules of the Member States by establishing a common, EU wide regulatory 
framework.49 In turn, this common regulatory framework for the composition of all tobacco 
products, including the prohibition of certain additives, sought to facilitate the smooth 
functioning of the internal market in compliant tobacco products.50  
e.) Evaluation 
 
The above overview demonstrates that the Court’s approach to reviewing EU legislation on 
conferral grounds has not always been consistent in the post-Lisbon Treaty era. 
On the one hand, cases such as ESMA and Inuit suggest continuity with the past. The Court 
took little interest in the legislative process or evidence base upon which the contested 
legislation was founded and swiftly concluded that no violation of the principle of conferral 
had occurred. On the other, recent judgments like Poland v Parliament and Council and 
Phillip Morris suggest a subtle shift in approach. Building upon its previous use of 
explanatory reports and Impact Assessments in Vodafone, the Court has indicated a 
willingness to defer to the substantive outcomes of the political process whenever the EU 
legislature can demonstrate that it has “done its work properly” by basing its choices upon 
relevant facts and circumstances.51 This is achieved by examining the legislative process to 
 
46 Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and Council, (n 8) para 46. 
47 ibid para 47. 
48 ibid paras 58, 60; Case C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands SARL and Others v Secretary of State for Health, (n 44) 
paras 99, 109-126. 
49 Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and Council, (n 8) para 60. 
50 ibid para 64. 
51 Lenaerts (n 2) 7. 
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ascertain whether sufficient justificatory evidence exists to support the EU legislature’s 
conclusion that its legislative choices fell within the permissible scope of Article 114 TFEU.  
Given that the EU legislature’s core competence to enact harmonisation legislation 
continues to be framed in open-ended, purposive terms as goals to be achieved, it is 
submitted that process-oriented review of this sort fits within the overall scheme of the EU 
Treaties.52 It provides a means of ensuring that the conditions which operationalise the 
principle of conferral have been sufficiently considered and respected by the EU legislature 
at all stages of the legislative process. At the same time, it does not normally put the Court in 
the difficult position of having to delineate hard, substantive limits between EU and Member 
State competences in areas such as the internal market, where such a division of powers is 
“inherently unstable” and unsuited to the drawing of bright line distinctions between the 
two levels of government.53 Nor does it require the Court to limit the scope of Article 114 
TFEU by carving out “impregnable bastions of national sovereignty” which have long proved 
elusive when legislating to ensure the functioning and effectiveness of the internal market.54 
What matters is that the conditions necessary for enacting legislation on the basis of Article 
114 TFEU have been considered by the legislature, and that sufficient evidence has been 
proffered to support its conclusions that these conditions have indeed been satisfied. 
Under this process-oriented approach to competence review, primary responsibility for 
determining where the boundaries of the EU legislature’s internal market powers lie rests 
with the political process. It is for the Commission (representing the EU interest), the Council 
(representing the Member States’ interests) and the European Parliament (representing the 
EU citizens’ interests) to consider whether proposed EU legislation satisfies the conditions 
which operationalize the principle of conferral in the internal market, and to justify their 
conclusions accordingly.55 
For its part, the Court retains ultimate responsibility on the basis of its Tobacco Advertising 
One line of jurisprudence for striking down EU legislation which clearly exceeds the 
 
52 Davies (n 20). 
53 Takis Tridimas, ‘Competence after Lisbon: The Elusive Search for Bright Lines’ in Diamond Ashiagbor, Nicola 
Countouris and Ioannis Lianos (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge University Press 
2012) 49; See also Öberg (n 1) 251–254. 
54 Tridimas (n 53) 49. 
55 See Articles 10(2) and 17(1) TEU. 
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boundaries of competence.56 However, unlike the pre-Lisbon Treaty situation depicted in 
Chapter 5, the CJEU today increasingly engages in “greater scrutiny of the political process 
that accompanies the adoption of the contested act.”57 By explicitly referring to Impact 
Assessments, explanatory memoranda, scientific studies etc. when reviewing the 
constitutionality of EU legislation on federalism grounds, the Court strives to “develop 
guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU 
adopt their decisions.”58 The role of the Court is to police the rules of the game, directing its 
powers of review towards “maintaining a vital system of political and institutional checks on 
federal power, not on policing some absolute sphere of state autonomy.”59  
3.) The Rise of Process-Oriented Proportionality Review 
 
As was noted above, the shift towards process-oriented review within the context of 
federalism disputes is most clearly demonstrated by the Court’s recent subsidiarity and 
proportionality jurisprudence. This reflects the Lisbon Treaty’s emphasis on strengthening 
the means of monitoring and enforcing those rules governing the exercise rather than the 
existence of EU competences.  
To recall, the principle of proportionality typically implicates courts in reviewing the 
substance of contested EU legislation so as to ensure that is suitable, necessary and, in some 
cases, strikes an appropriate balance between competing interests (proportionality in the 
strict sense).60 Within the context of reviewing EU legislation, the Court traditionally granted 
the EU legislature a wide margin of discretion, opting to review its policy choices in both 
federalism and fundamental rights cases against a low-intensity, manifestly disproportionate 
standard of review.61  
 
56 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising One (n 15). 
57 Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of the Evidence-Based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s 
Semiprocedural Review’ (2013) 1 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 327. 
58 Lenaerts (n 2) 3. 
59 Young (n 6) 1351. 
60 Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 
158. 
61 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) Chapter 19. 
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On the one hand, this approach was defended on the basis of considerations pertaining to 
the separation of powers, democratic legitimacy and institutional capacity/expertise.62 The 
Court should not substitute its judgment on complex technical, economic and political 
matters for that of the EU legislature.63 On the other, the reluctance to engage in anything 
but cursory review of EU legislation led some influential commentators to “encourage the 
Court to be more aggressive and demand fuller elaboration of just why the legislature has 
concluded that the measure in question is compatible with the dictates of proportionality 
and subsidiarity.”64 
In the sections which follow, it is argued that these demands for greater scrutiny of the 
justification proffered by the EU legislature has been heeded by the Court in recent years. 
This has been achieved through the adoption of an increasingly “process-oriented” approach 
to proportionality review in the post-Lisbon era. In essence, under this novel approach, the 
CJEU now requires the EU legislature to present and explain material relied upon during the 
law-making process in order to justify the proportionality of its actions.65  
 
a.) The Beginnings of a Shift in Approach: Spain v Council 
The first landmark case in which the CJEU adopted a process-oriented approach to 
proportionality review actually came prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 
Spain v Council.66 The case concerned EU legislation that reformed the rules on support 
schemes for cotton producers as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 
challenging this new support scheme, Spain argued that the amount of specific aid to be 
granted for cotton, and the rules on eligibility for the aid, were manifestly inappropriate. 
The Court began by reciting its classic formulation that proportionality review involves the 
Court in ensuring that EU legal acts do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and 
necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question. 
Furthermore, where there is a choice between different measures, recourse must be had to 
 
62 Öberg (n 1) 252–254. 
63 Case C-203/12, Billerud Karlsborg and Billerud Skärblacka EU:C:2013:664, para 35 and case law cited therein. 
64 Weatherill (n 16) 845. 
65 David Keyaerts, ‘Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs : Does the European Court of Justice Bark or Bite?’ in 
Mazmanyan and Vandenbruwaene (eds), The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance 
(Intersentia 2012) 280–282. 
66 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Case C-310/04, Spain v Council ECLI:EU:C:2006:179. 
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the least onerous, with the disadvantages caused not being disproportionate to the aims 
pursued.67 That said, in policy fields where the legislature enjoys a wide margin of discretion 
such as the CAP, the legality of EU measures can only be affected where they are manifestly 
inappropriate in terms of the objective pursued.68 
From this orthodox starting point, the Court added a novel aspect to its proportionality 
assessment. Even where the legislature enjoys broad discretion, the legislature must 
nevertheless show that in adopting the contested act they “actually exercised their 
discretion”, which “presupposes the taking into consideration of all the relevant factors and 
circumstances of the situation the act was intended to regulate’.69 “It follows”, held the 
CJEU, “that the institutions must at the very least be able to produce and set out clearly and 
unequivocally the basic facts which had to be taken into account as the basis of the 
contested measures of the act and on which the exercise of their discretion depended.”70 
When applying this “new test” the Court found that the proportionality principle had been 
infringed, since the EU law-maker had failed to sufficiently take account of basic facts in two 
respects.71 First, when conducting a preparatory study that formed the basis of the Council’s 
decision, labour costs were not taken into consideration.72 Second, by not assessing the 
potential socio-economic effects of the proposed reform of the cotton sector - particularly 
since similar studies had been carried out for other sectors of the economy.73 
In light of these shortcomings, the CJEU held that the legislature had not demonstrated that 
it had actually exercised its discretion in adopting the contested measure – something which 
would have involved the taking into consideration of basic facts. Consequently, the principle 
of proportionality had been infringed.74 
This line of reasoning is more clearly developed by the Advocate General (AG) in the case, 
who noted that while there was no legally binding obligation upon the EU legislature to 
 
67 ibid para 97. 
68 ibid para 98. 
69 ibid para 122. 
70 ibid para 123. 
71 On the novelty of the test see Xavier Groussot, ‘Case C-310/04, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European 
Union’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 761, 777. 
72 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Case C-310/04, Spain v. Council (n 66) paras 124-127. 
73 ibid paras 103, 128. 
74 ibid para 133. 
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conduct an Impact Assessment, the absence of any impact study meant that “certain choices 
made by the Commission and the Council appear arbitrary.”75 Furthermore, the lack of an 
Impact Assessment (IA) meant that the EU legislature had not been able to justify its actions 
convincingly during the course of the proceedings. 76  
The judgment in Spain v Council may be interpreted, therefore, as signaling to the EU 
legislature that its policy choices stand a greater chance of withstanding judicial scrutiny 
when they are adopted via a process that demonstrably considers all relevant facts and 
circumstances. As Alemanno puts it, “[a]ccording to the a contrario reasoning of the 
judgment, it seems that this would have enabled the Court to assess whether the EU 
institutions ‘had exceeded the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain 
the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation into question.’”77 In his view, “[w]hat 
better way for the EU legislature to prove ‘the taking into consideration of all the relevant 
factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to regulate’ than by 
producing an IA before the ECJ?”78  
This process-oriented understanding of the CJEU’s reasoning was confirmed by the European 
General Court (EGC) in Sungro, where it was held that in Spain v. Council “it was not the 
contested provisions themselves, but the failure to take account of all the relevant factors 
and circumstances, in particular by carrying out a study of the reform’s impact, before their 
adoption which was criticized from the point of view of an infringement of the principle of 
proportionality.”79 
b.) Legislation Must be Based on Objective Criteria 
During the years following Spain v Council, the Court did not explicitly demand that the EU 
legislature demonstrate that it “actually exercised its discretion” by “taking into 
consideration of all the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was 
 
75 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, C-310/04 Spain v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2006:179 para 94. For 
recognition of the non-binding nature of IA’s, see Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited v Secretary of State 
for Transport ECLI:EU:C:2010:419 para 30. 
76 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, C-310/04 Spain v Council, (n 75) para 94. 
77 Alemanno (n 40) 501. 
78 ibid. 
79 Joined Cases T-252/07, T-271/07, and T-272/07, Sungro, SA and Others ECLI:EU:T:2010:17 para 60. 
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intended to regulate.”80 Rather than using this terminology, the majority of cases where the 
Court adopted a process-oriented approach to proportionality review contained a 
requirement that the EU legislature demonstrate that it has based measures on “objective 
criteria.”  
i.) Vodafone & Luxembourg v Parliament and Council 
In the previously discussed Vodafone judgment, in addition to the question of competence, 
the Court also made extensive use of Impact Assessments and the explanatory memoranda 
when engaging in proportionality review.81  
Having recognised the broad discretion enjoyed by the EU legislature, the Court then added 
that, despite this broad discretion, the EU legislature must base its policy choices upon 
“objective criteria.” Furthermore, in assessing the burdens associated with different policy 
choices, the EU legislature “must examine whether objectives pursued by the measure 
chosen are such as to justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain 
operators.”82 On the basis of these criteria, it was for the Court to determine whether the 
Regulation breached the proportionality principle by imposing caps on both wholesale and 
retail roaming charges, as well as obliging service providers to give information about such 
charges to customers.83 
When it came to scrutinizing the appropriateness of the Regulation, the Court noted the 
“exhaustive study” carried out by the Commission that was summarised in the Impact 
Assessment. This demonstrated that the Commission had examined various different 
options, including the possibility of regulating retail charges only, wholesale charges only, or 
both. The legislature had also assessed the economic impact of those various different policy 
choices.84 A similar approach was taken in Luxembourg v Parliament and Council, where the 
Court noted during its proportionality assessment that the Commission had carried out an 
 
80 On the inconsistencies in the Court’s reasoning see Darren Harvey, ‘Towards Process-Oriented 
Proportionality Review in the European Union’ (2017) 23 European Public Law 93, 108–109. 
81 The Court referred to the impact assessments and explanatory memorandum in eight paragraphs of its 
judgment. Case C-58/08, Vodafone (n 35) paras 39, 43, 45, 55, 58, 59, 63, 65. 
82 ibid para 53. 
83 ibid para 54. 
84 ibid para 55. 
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Impact Assessment which examined various options before preparing a proposal for a 
Directive regulating airport charges.85 
Returning to Vodafone, the Court then found that the Regulation was appropriate for 
achieving the aim of protecting consumers from high charges, reaching this conclusion with 
reference to the Impact Assessment, explanatory memorandum and recitals to the 
Regulation. 86 Similarly, the Court had recourse to the explanatory memorandum and Impact 
Assessment at the necessity stage of the proportionality analysis, concluding that the 
regulation of both wholesale and retail prices did not go beyond what was necessary to 
achieve the stated objectives.87 Based on the evidence that the EU legislature had 
considered various alternatives throughout the legislative process, and in light of the EU 
legislature’s broad discretion in this area, the EU legislature “could legitimately take the view 
that regulation of the wholesale market alone would not achieve the same result as 
regulation such as that at issue, which covers at the same time the wholesale market and the 
retail market, and that the latter was therefore necessary.”88 Finally, in a rather confused 
paragraph, the Court concluded without further explanation that the Regulation was 
proportionate in the strict sense, even where it had negative economic consequences for 
some operators, since the intervention in the market was time limited and protected 
consumers against excessive prices.89 
ii.) Poland v Parliament and Council  
More recently, the CJEU has adopted a more coherent, process-oriented approach to 
reviewing EU legislation for compliance with this third aspect of the proportionality 
assessment. In the abovementioned judgment of Poland v Parliament and Council, the Court 
also had to determine whether an EU Directive outlawing menthol as a characterising 
flavour in tobacco products was disproportionate on account of the negative economic and 
social consequences that that prohibition would give rise.90 
 
85 Case C-176/09 Luxembourg v Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2011:290 para 65. 
86 Case C-58/08, Vodafone (n 35) paras 56-60. 
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In upholding the constitutionality of the EU legislation, the CJEU held that, despite enjoying 
broad discretion in the internal market field, “the EU legislature must base its choice on 
objective criteria and examine whether aims pursued by the measure chosen are such as to 
justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators.”91  
In embarking upon this analysis, the Court made reference to Protocol No.2 on the 
application of subsidiarity and proportionality for the first time in the history of its 
proportionality jurisprudence. According to the CJEU, Article 5 of that Protocol requires draft 
legislative acts to “take account of the need for any burden falling upon economic operators 
to be minimised and commensurate with the objective to be achieved.”92 In reviewing 
whether this obligation had been fulfilled, the Court noted that aspects of the ban would not 
come into force until 2020, thus giving businesses time to adapt to the changes. 
Furthermore, as the Impact Assessment had demonstrated, the changes would result in a 
decrease of cigarette consumption of 0.5-0.8% over a 5 year period. “Those elements show 
that the EU legislature weighed up, on the one hand, the economic consequences of that 
prohibition and, on the other, the requirement to ensure…a high level of human health 
protection…”93   
c.) Market Stability Reserve 
Most recently, the central tenets of process-oriented proportionality review as initially 
articulated by the Court in Spain v Council were followed by the CJEU in the Market Stability 
Reserve Case. 94 In that case, Poland claimed that an EU legislative Decision establishing a 
Market Stability Reserve (MSR) was contrary to the principle of proportionality. The aim of 
the MSR was to hold emissions trading allowances in the Reserve, rather than releasing 
them to be auctioned to market actors as normally envisaged by the EU’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS). By establishing the MSR and mandating that these allowances be held, the EU 
legislation sought to address malfunctions in the EU’s ETS policy.95 
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In Poland’s view, the EU legislation contravened the necessity criterion of the proportionality 
test and imposed excessive charges on entities participating in the ETS, since it would result 
in achieving higher emissions reduction targets than those required by the EU’s international 
commitments.96 
In substantiating these claims, Poland pointed to several flaws in the EU legislative process, 
including: an inadequate Impact Assessment which did not sufficiently consider the impact 
of the Decision on Member States; non-transparent negotiations leading to the adoption of 
the Decision, and substantially amending the original Commission proposal without carrying 
out a full assessment of the impact of the proposed reforms.97 
In reviewing the constitutionality of the legislation, the CJEU considered Poland’s 
proportionality argument and wider arguments concerning the EU legislative process 
together. In so doing, it held that, notwithstanding the broad discretion enjoyed by the EU 
legislature, the EU institutions “must be able to show before the Court that in adopting the 
act they actually exercised their discretion, which presupposes the taking into consideration 
of all the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to 
regulate.”98 With explicit reference to its previous judgment in Spain v Council, the Court 
continued that the EU legislature must, at the very minimum, be able to produce and clearly 
set out the basic facts that “had to be taken into account as the basis of the contested 
measures of the act and on which the exercise of their discretion depended.”99 
In concluding that the EU legislature did take all available facts and circumstances into 
account during the legislative process - and thus exercised its discretion properly - the CJEU 
made extensive reference to preparatory reports and the Impact Assessment. In the Court’s 
view, these documents demonstrated that the Commission had considered various different 
options when seeking to address problems with the existing ETS and “examined in detail a 
whole series of social and economic aspects connected to the various options 
considered.”100  
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Furthermore, whilst confirming that Impact Assessments are non-binding upon the 
Parliament and Council, those institutions had nonetheless demonstrated through 
documents submitted to the CJEU that “the legislature also took into account other findings 
that became available during negotiations prior to the adoption of the contested 
decision.”101 This was demonstrated by the fact that the EU institutions had organized 
meetings of experts and workshops in order to give guidance to the debates in the Council 
and Parliament, many of which were open to the public.102 Moreover, it was clear from the 
documents submitted to the Court that during meetings in the Council, experts presented 
their appraisals of the effects of different policy options. This proved that “the deliberations 
on the proposal for a decision were supplemented by the factual basis on which the 
delegates of all Member States relied in order to define their position during those 
meetings.”103  
It followed, therefore, that the EU legislature had adequately demonstrated that it had 
actually exercised its discretion, taking into consideration of all the relevant factors and 
circumstances. It had demonstrably considered various alternatives to the proposal and 
based its policy choices upon sufficient justificatory evidence.104 
d.) Evaluation 
 
When taken as a whole, it is contended that this body of jurisprudence represents a shift 
towards an increasingly process-oriented approach to proportionality review. Rather than 
closely scrutinising the merits of the discretionary policy choices of the EU legislature, the 
Court places greater emphasis upon the EU legislative process when verifying whether the 
principle of proportionality has been complied with.105 Cases like Vodafone, Market Stability 
Reserve and Poland v Parliament and Council “herald more stringent ‘procedural’ review of 
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(2012) 6 Legisprudence 257, 257. 
213 
 
proportionality in terms of verifying compliance with this principle on the basis of the 
documents issued by the Union institutions…”106 
Moreover, these judgments further emphasise that, in the post-Lisbon era, the political 
process on the EU level is primarily responsible for ensuring that all relevant facts and 
circumstances are taken into account when determining whether proposed legislation is 
suitable, necessary and proportionate. Subsequently, the focus of the judicial enquiry is not 
chiefly into whether EU legislation breached the principles enshrined in Article 5 TEU per se, 
but whether the EU legislature has sufficiently considered these principles during the 
legislative process and provided justificatory evidence to this effect.107  
By having recourse to preparatory documents and the evidence base upon which EU 
legislation was enacted, the Court provides “important incentives to the EU legislator to 
investigate alternative mechanisms and policies seriously.”108 The Court’s role is therefore to 
check that the EU legislature has done its work properly and based its policy decisions on 
adequate justificatory evidence, rather than to second guess the merits of those policy 
choices through robust substantive review.109 As Hofmann puts it: 
“Increasingly…in the context of review of legislative acts of the Union, the CJEU does 
not review the substance of an act but instead checks whether the institutions can 
prove that they themselves reviewed the proportionality of a measure before 
adopting it.”110 
This not only enhances judicial scrutiny over EU legislation when compared to the pre-Lisbon 
Treaty case law of the Court, but also prevents the CJEU from illegitimately encroaching 
upon the policymaking prerogatives of the EU legislature.111 This ensures respect for the 
separation of powers in a contemporary EU where legislative acts are underpinned by the 
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principle of representative democracy stemming from the Parliament and Council 
respectively.112 
4.) Emphasising the Political Safeguards of Federalism: Subsidiarity in the Post-Lisbon Era 
We now turn to consider recent judgments of the CJEU in which EU legislation has been 
reviewed for compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. To recall, Article 5(3) TEU 
provides: 
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level 
or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”113 
Alongside the principles of conferral and proportionality in Article 5 TEU, subsidiarity was 
intended “to function as a constitutional safeguard of federalism that should limit the 
exercise of powers granted to the European Union.”114As was documented in Chapter 5, the 
Court’s subsidiarity jurisprudence has been widely criticized in the literature on the grounds 
that the principle has traditionally been interpreted too narrowly. In a number of cases, the 
Court effectively found that whenever the EU institutions were competent to act within the 
scope of the internal market under Article 114 TFEU, they automatically complied with the 
subsidiarity principle. This resulted in minimal judicial scrutiny of whether EU legislation 
complied with the substance of the subsidiarity principle.115 
In addition, the Court engaged in very low-intensity review of whether the EU legislature had 
considered the subsidiarity implications of its legislative choices and provided adequate 
reasoning to that effect. The result was that the EU legislature was placed under a very 
limited burden to justify the constitutionality of its discretionary policy choices in light of the 
principle of subsidiarity. It was contended that this failure to subject EU legislation to 
meaningful review stemmed from the pro-integrationist bias of the CJEU. The Court was said 
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to be reluctant to frustrate the furthering of European integration by engaging in robust 
judicial scrutiny of EU legislation that was often passed after complex and difficult 
negotiations.  
Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs can be seen in the conclusions of a working group on 
Subsidiarity in the European Convention, which raised the point that “judicial review carried 
out by the Court of Justice concerning compliance with the principle of subsidiarity could be 
reinforced.”116 In the end, however, major proposals for reform were rejected. The idea of 
establishing a system of ex-ante judicial review of legislative proposals for their compliance 
with subsidiarity were not taken up. Nor was the establishment of a specialized Court tasked 
with dealing with competence and subsidiarity matters.117 
Instead, the Lisbon Treaty reforms and Better Regulation initiatives opted for increased 
proceduralisation of the EU legislative process as a means of strengthening the monitoring 
and enforcement of the subsidiarity principle.118 As discussed in the previous chapter, the EU 
legislature must now consider the subsidiarity implications of proposed legislation and 
justify its policy choices in light of a series of criteria relevant to the subsidiarity enquiry. 
Moreover, national parliaments now play a role under Protocol No.2 on the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality as the “watchdogs of subsidiarity.”119  
Once again, it is contended that this proceduralisation of the legislative process has been 
seized upon by the Court in the post-Lisbon era, with recent subsidiarity judgments evincing 
a subtle shift in the direction of process-oriented review. The trend here is somewhat less 
pronounced than it was in relation to the principle of proportionality discussed above. 
Nonetheless, the CJEU has clearly come to emphasise the core elements of a process-
oriented approach to subsidiarity review of EU legislation in recent years. For the first time 
in its history, the Court has explicitly stated that primary responsibility for ensuring 
subsidiarity compliance lies with the EU legislative process. It has further confirmed that its 
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contemporary role is to examine whether the EU legislature considered all facts and 
circumstances relevant to the subsidiarity enquiry throughout the legislative process.  
a.) Early Indications of a Change in Approach 
 
If the pre-Lisbon Treaty subsidiarity jurisprudence of the Court was widely derided as 
ineffective, the opinion of AG Maduro in the abovementioned Vodafone case suggests 
members of the Court taking subsidiarity review more seriously than hitherto.120 In the AG’s 
view, the decision to regulate a matter at the EU rather than national level requires 
justification in the light of the principle of subsidiarity. Therefore, it would have to be 
established that the EU legislature was in a better position than the national legislator to 
regulate roaming charges in the case at hand.121 “[T]he judgment to be made under the 
principle of subsidiarity is not about the objective pursued but whether the pursuit of that 
objective requires [Union] action. Certain [Union} objectives…may be better pursued by the 
Member States (with the consequence that the exercise of that competence is not 
justified.)”122 In Maduro’s view, what was required was:  
 
“[A] reasonable justification for the proposition that there is a need for [Union] 
action. This must be supported by more than simply highlighting the possible benefits 
accruing from [Union] action. It also involves a determination of the possible 
problems or costs involved in leaving the matter to be addressed by the Member 
States. In requiring this, the Court is not substituting its judgment for that of the 
[Union] legislator but simply compelling it to take subsidiarity seriously.”123 
The Court did not follow the AG’s expansive approach to interpreting the scope of the 
subsidiarity principle in Vodafone. Instead, it limited itself to a characteristically terse 
examination of the substance of the Directive, concluding that the EU legislation aimed to 
contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market and to allow companies to 
operate within a single coherent regulatory framework. Basing itself solely upon a recital to 
the Regulation, the Court found that the regulation of both wholesale and retail prices was 
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required in order to ensure such a smooth functioning of the market.124 In concluding that 
no violation of the subsidiarity principle had been established, the Court held that the 
interdependence between wholesale and retail prices meant that “the Community 
legislature could legitimately take the view that it had to intervene at the level of retail 
charges as well. Thus…the objective pursued by that regulation could best be achieved at 
Community level.”125 
The reasoning here has come in for familiar criticism from some quarters on accounts of the 
Court’s “reluctance to review the substantive issues of the subsidiarity principle”126 Despite 
its concision, however, the reasoning of the CJEU in Vodafone indicated that the standard of 
review in subsidiarity cases would henceforth be whether the EU legislature could 
“legitimately take the view” that action could be best obtained at the EU level. This approach 
has since been confirmed by the CJEU in Estonia v Parliament and Council.127 
In other words, the question for the Court is not whether contested EU legislation complies 
with the principle of subsidiarity per se, but whether the legislative process and factual 
record sufficiently supports the EU legislature’s “legitimate view” that legislation complied 
with the principle. This subtle hint in the direction of a more process-oriented approach to 
subsidiary review suggested that, henceforth, the CJEU would be prepared to enquire into 
the reasoning and evidence base utilised by the EU legislature to ascertain whether, on the 
basis of this evidence, the EU legislature could reasonably conclude that legislation on the 
EU level was required. 
b.) Process-Oriented Subsidiarity Review and the Role of the Political Process 
 
Recent case law concerning constitutional review of EU legislation for compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity builds upon this hint and adopts an increasingly process-oriented 
approach to review in the post-Lisbon era.128 This is demonstrated by the Court’s recent 
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judgments surrounding the abovementioned Tobacco Products Directive. In these cases, the 
Court held for the first time in its history that:  
 
“[a]n initial review of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is undertaken, at a 
political level, by national Parliaments in accordance with the procedures laid down 
for that purpose by Protocol (No 2). Subsequently, responsibility for that review lies 
with the EU judicature, which must verify both compliance with the substantive 
conditions set out in Article 5(3) TEU and compliance with the procedural safeguards 
provided for by that Protocol.”129 
 
In reviewing whether the contested EU legislation complied with the substantive aspects of 
subsidiarity, the Court held that henceforth it must “determine whether the EU legislature 
was entitled to consider, on the basis of a detailed statement, that the objective of the 
proposed action could be better achieved at EU level.”130 Accordingly, the Commission, 
Council, European Parliament and National Parliaments all have a role to play in ensuring 
that EU legislation complies with the subsidiarity principle. Moreover, the decision to pursue 
objectives on the EU as opposed to Member State level must be justified on the basis of a 
detailed statement. 
Subsequently, in light of the broad discretion enjoyed by the EU legislature, judicial review is 
limited in scope. It is for the Court to examine “whether those institutions were able to rely 
on an adequate factual basis for their appraisal of the question of subsidiarity in a specific 
case and whether they committed a manifest error of assessment in this regard”131  
In engaging in such review, the CJEU first found that the legislation pursued a twin objective 
of facilitating the smooth functioning of the internal market for tobacco products while 
ensuring a high level of protection of human health (especially for young people).132 Despite 
Poland’s plausible contention that the second of these objectives could be better attained at 
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the level of the Member States, the Court held that pursuing it at national level would likely 
entrench and/or create a scenario in which some Member States permitted, and others 
prohibited, placing flavoured tobacco products on the internal market.133 This would be 
fundamentally incompatible with the Directive’s first objective of improving the functioning 
of the internal market for tobacco and related products.134 Consequently, the 
interdependence of the two objectives meant that “the EU legislature could legitimately 
take the view that it had to establish a set of rules for the placing on the EU market of 
tobacco products with characterising flavours and that, because of that interdependence, 
those two objectives could best be achieved at EU level.”135 
Moreover, when it came to examining the adequacy of the EU legislature’s justification for 
action in light of the principle of subsidiarity, the CJEU held that the Commission’s proposal 
for the EU legislation and its impact assessment include sufficient information showing 
clearly and unequivocally the advantages of taking action at EU level rather than at national 
level.136 As a result, it was “established to the requisite legal standard that that information 
enabled both the EU legislature and national Parliaments to determine whether the proposal 
complied with the principle of subsidiarity…”137  
Finally, in further emphasizing the central role played by the political process in ensuring 
respect for the EU’s federal balance of competences, the CJEU noted that Poland had 
participated in the EU legislative process in accordance with the arrangements laid down in 
the EU Treaties. That process had produced the contested legislation in the case at hand, 
which was addressed to Poland in the same way as all other Member States who were 
represented in the Council.138 Consequently, Poland was precluded from complaining that 
the EU legislature (Parliament and Council) “did not place it in a position to know the 
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It is submitted that this line of reasoning contains many of the core components of process-
oriented review as discussed in this chapter. As the CJEU makes clear, subsidiarity 
compliance is largely left to the political process to consider and resolve, with input from 
national parliaments alongside the EU’s legislative institutions.140 The Court’s task is then to 
ensure that the political safeguards of federalism in the EU function properly. This is done by 
examining the legislative process and evidentiary basis upon which the EU legislature based 
its conclusions that policy objectives would be better achieved at the EU rather than the 
Member State level.  
This is further supported by the Court’s novel doctrine that when it comes to subsidiarity 
review, its task is to “examine whether the EU legislature was entitled to consider, on the 
basis of a detailed statement, that the objective of the proposed action could be better 
achieved at EU level.”141 Rather than substituting its judgment by engaging in strict scrutiny 
of the substance of EU legislation, the Court directs its attention towards ensuring that the 
EU legislature has done its work properly.  
That said, there is no doubt that the CJEU’s reasoning in these recent subsidiarity cases 
remains concise. Scarce explanation is provided as to why the Commission proposal and 
accompanying Impact Assessment contain sufficient information demonstrating the benefits 
of EU as opposed to Member State action. There is very little overt discussion of what 
constitutes “detailed evidence” for the purposes of appraising subsidiarity compliance. Nor 
is the “requisite legal standard” in such cases explained in any detail by the Court. For Wyatt, 
the Court’s approach in recent subsidiarity cases continues to be “undemanding and 
uncritical.”142 
On the one hand, one must not lose sight of the fact that the manner in which the 
subsidiarity principle is drafted in the Treaties renders it exceptionally difficult to 
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operationalise through hard legal criteria suitable for judicial review.143 As discussed in 
chapter 5, decisions on whether the EU or Member State level is best placed to regulate a 
given matter are unquestionably matters of political judgement and comparative efficiency 
that depend on many non-legal factors.144 Moreover, the judiciary is not well placed in terms 
of democratic legitimacy or institutional capacity to undertake the kind of “comprehensive, 
subjective, and non-legal assessment of social, or political factors” that subsidiarity seems to 
demand.145  
On the other, scholars have long contended that more could be done to subject EU 
legislation to more meaningful subsidiarity review by focusing upon the legislative process 
and reasoning of the EU institutions.146 In this regard, a more demanding process-oriented 
approach to review would involve the CJEU in examining whether the EU legislature 
genuinely considered the capacity of the Member States to attain the objectives of the 
proposed legislation and adequately explained its reasons for concluding that the EU level 
was best suited to act.147 The EU legislature should be compelled to demonstrate that it 
“articulated the choices at hand, enumerated the arguments for and against Union 
harmonization and explained how the balancing exercise between different values—such as 
national diversity, localism, and democracy—and the need for maintaining the internal 
market was undertaken.”148 
Despite continuing to suffer from a number of shortcomings, recent developments in the 
direction of process-oriented subsidiarity review as identified above represent an 
encouraging step in the right direction. Given the doctrinal and normative difficulties with 
placing meaningful, substantive limits upon the exercise of EU legislative power, process-
oriented review “may be the only way of judicially enforcing principles that have a clear 
political nature, such as the principle of subsidiarity.”149 By referring to explanatory 
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memoranda, Impact Assessments etc. when engaging in subsidiarity review, the Court 
emphasises that its role is not one of placing hard legal limits upon the exercise of EU 
competences, but on ensuring that the EU legislature provides sufficient justification capable 
of demonstrating subsidiarity compliance. 
The opinion of AG Kokott in the Tobacco Products Directive arguably contains the blueprint 
for this nascent process-oriented approach. In the AG’s view, “where compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity is under examination, it must be clear from the statement of reasons 
for the EU measures whether the Union legislature gave sufficient consideration to 
questions relevant to the principle of subsidiarity and, if so, what conclusions it reached with 
regard to subsidiarity.”150 Moreover, in light of the EU legislature’s boilerplate statement in a 
recital to the Directive that the legislative objectives could be better achieved at the EU 
level, the AG noted that such wording was “not exactly a shining example of the frequently 
invoked technique of ‘better regulation’ to which the EU institutions have for some time 
been committed.”151 Whilst these shortcomings would not necessarily, in themselves, mean 
that the EU legislature had failed to demonstrate subsidiarity compliance, it was nonetheless 
“not precisely clear what reasoning it followed with regard to the issue of subsidiarity or 
how comprehensively it addressed that subject.”152  
Ultimately, however, the AG was satisfied that the EU legislature had adequately considered 
the subsidiarity implications of the proposed legislation and provided sufficient evidence to 
justify its choice that the objectives could be best achieved at the EU level. Once again, this 
was done by examining the EU legislative process and considering the explanatory 
memorandum and impact assessment upon which the EU legislature based its decisions.153 
This approach is strikingly similar to that adopted by the CJEU when it comes to 
proportionality review in recent years. In essence, the AG is demanding that, within the 
context of subsidiarity review, the EU legislature demonstrate that it considered all relevant 
facts and circumstances and examined alternative options before adopting the legislation in 
question. Provided that it has done so, the CJEU will defer to the outcome of the political 
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process with regards to the principle of subsidiarity. By adopting a robust stance on the need 
for the EU legislature to demonstrate that it had taken subsidiarity considerations seriously 
throughout the legislative process, AG Kokott adopts “an approach that focuses on 
improving the decision-making process of the EU institutions, rather than on second-
guessing their substantive findings.”154  
5.) What Role for Federal Proportionality? 
The final issue to be considered when examining the CJEU’s post-Lisbon Treaty federalism 
jurisprudence is federal proportionality. As Chapter 5 highlighted, the insertion of the 
proportionality principle into the Treaties via Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty was 
considered by many to have added a “federal” dimension to the principle. By situating 
proportionality alongside conferral and subsidiarity in Article 5 TEU, it was suggested that 
the Court should henceforth use proportionality as a means of umpiring the EU’s federal 
order of competences.155  
This federal dimension to the proportionality principle was to be distinguished from the 
liberal or rights protecting understanding of the principle as traditionally utilised in EU law. 
For some, it would also serve as a more useful ground of constitutional review than the 
ambiguous and somewhat unworkable subsidiarity principle.156 Rather than engaging with 
the sort of comparative efficiency calculus that subsidiarity demands, the CJEU was urged to 
utilise a federal variant of the proportionality principle to review whether EU legislation 
disproportionately restricted national autonomy.157 
Prior to the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court did not explicitly engage in any 
degree of scrutiny of EU legislation for compliance with federal proportionality. In contrast, 
recent case law suggests that the CJEU is beginning to develop a federal dimension to its 
proportionality jurisprudence.  
Before moving to examine the relevant case law, an important caveat must be kept in mind. 
Many of the cases discussed above clearly possess a federal dimension already. Indeed, the 
 
154 Lenaerts (n 2) 15. 
155 Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 184. 
156 Garreth Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time’ (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 63. 
157 Schütze, ‘Subsidiarity after Lisbon’ (n 117) 532–533. 
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very raison d'être for inserting the principles contained in what is now Article 5 TEU into the 
EU legal order was to “limit federal intervention” by curtailing EU legislative power and thus 
protect the powers of the Member States.158 Had the CJEU annulled the EU legislation in 
question above for violating the principles of conferral, subsidiarity or proportionality, this 
would have resulted in the Member States being free to continue to regulate roaming 
charges, tobacco flavourings, electronic cigarettes etc. While cases such as Vodafone 
seemed to focus upon the excessive burden placed upon economic operators, it has 
nonetheless been pointed out that the role played by proportionality in such cases is 
(implicitly) also that of a “constitutional tool designed to protect the Member States from an 
EU ‘competence creep.”159 
That said, the novelty in some of the post-Lisbon Treaty cases stems from the CJEU’s 
willingness to entertain claims that EU legislation imposes excessive social, economic or 
other costs on the Member States when engaging in constitutional review on the basis of 
Article 5 TEU principles. 
a.) Balancing Different Interests Involved 
 
The strongest indication that the Court would take the federal dimension to proportionality 
more seriously than hitherto came in AG Maduro’s abovementioned opinion in Vodafone. 
According to AG Maduro, the CJEU should examine whether EU legislation addressing 
excessive roaming charges was proportionate in light of the aims of Article 114 TFEU and 
consumer protection “when balanced against the loss of autonomy on the part of Member 
States and the interference with the rights of the claimants.”160 Proportionality thus required 
the CJEU to also ascertain whether achieving internal market objectives at the EU level could 
be justified in light of the resulting “loss of Member State autonomy involved in the 
approach chosen by the legislature.”161  
Once again, the Court did not follow this line of reasoning. Instead, as discussed above, it 
adopted a process-oriented approach to reviewing whether the contested EU legislation 
 
158 Edward T Swaine, ‘Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice’ (2000) 41 
Harvard International Law Journal 1, 5–6. 
159 Lenaerts (n 2) 10. 
160 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C‑58/08, Vodafone (n 121) para 37. 
161 ibid para 44. 
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imposed a disproportionate burden upon individual economic operators and not the 
Member States. 
More recently, however, the CJEU has taken an approach to federal proportionality that is 
somewhat different from that advocated by influential quarters in the academic literature. 
Rather than focusing on whether EU legislation has unnecessarily restricted national 
regulatory autonomy, the Court considers whether EU legislation imposes excessive social, 
economic or other costs on a specific Member State or States. 
In Estonia v Parliament and Council, Estonia challenged the constitutionality of EU legislation 
regulating certain financial reporting obligations of small and medium sized businesses. In 
the claimant’s view, the legislation infringed the principle of proportionality on the grounds 
that, inter alia, the EU legislature did not take account of its particular situation as a Member 
State which is advanced in electronic administration.162  Similarly, in Poland v Parliament and 
Council, Poland (supported by Romania) challenged the constitutionality of the Tobacco 
Products Directive on federal proportionality grounds. In their view, prohibiting the placing 
of mentholated tobacco products on the EU internal market would impose disproportionate 
social and economic costs such as lost jobs and revenue in Member States, like Poland, 
where there was significant manufacturing and consumption of mentholated tobacco 
products.163 
In response to these arguments, the CJEU adopted an identical form of reasoning in both 
cases, holding (for the first time in Estonia v Parliament and Council) that the contested EU 
legislation:  
“[Has] an impact in all Member States and requires that a balance between the 
different interests involved is ensured, taking account of the objectives of that 
Directive. Therefore, the attempt to strike such a balance, taking into account not the 
particular situation of a single Member State, but that of all EU Member States, 
cannot be regarded as being contrary to the principle of proportionality.”164 
 
162 Case C‑508/13, Estonia v Parliament and Council (n 127). 
163 Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and Council, (n 8) para 73. 
164 Case C‑508/13, Estonia v Parliament and Council (n 127) para 39; Case C-358/14, Poland v European 
Parliament and Council, (n 8) para 103. 
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It is submitted that this reference to striking a balance and taking account of the situation in 
all member states suggests some form of judicial scrutiny on federal proportionality grounds 
may emerge in the future. Admittedly, the passage from these two judgments provides no 
indication to the EU legislature of what striking such a balance in this context should entail. 
Further guidance on this score was arguably provided in the Market Stability Reserve case, 
where the CJEU held that “the legislature does not have to take into consideration the 
particular situation of a Member State where the EU measure has an impact in all Member 
States and requires that a balance between the different interests involved is ensured, 
taking account of the objectives of that measure.”165  
From this, it seems that EU legislation which disproportionately impacts upon one Member 
State will not suffice. However, the reasoning here could be interpreted as leaving open the 
possibility for a number of Member States to contend that the EU legislature did not 
sufficiently consider the economic, social or other impacts of proposed EU legislation. Once 
again, a process-oriented approach to review in this instance could be envisaged. The Court 
would scrutinise the EU legislative process and evidence base upon which policy decisions 
were based in order to ascertain whether the EU legislature considered the economic, social 
or other impacts that the proposed EU legislation would have upon the Member States.  
While the Court has not yet explicitly made this link in the abovementioned jurisprudence, 
adopting such a process-oriented approach to review in these circumstances would also give 
added bite to the EU legislature’s obligations under Article 5 of Protocol No.2 on the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. According to that provision, draft legislative 
acts must contain a detailed statement making it possible for the political process to 
appraise the proposal’s compliance with the principles of subsidiarity. This statement should 
contain, among other things, some assessment of the proposal's financial impact and ensure 
that any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the EU and national 
governments, be minimised and commensurate with the objective being pursued.166 
b.) National Identity and the Federal Order of Competences 
 
 
165 Case C-5/16, Poland v Parliament and Council (MSR), (n 94) para 167. 
166 Protocol No. 2 Article 5. 
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One final point to consider in relation to contemporary constitutional review of EU 
legislation on federalism grounds is the role that Article 4(2) TEU may come to play in the 
future. According to this provision, which was added to the EU legal order by the Lisbon 
Treaty:  
“The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as 
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their 
essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” 
 
To date, the majority of cases in which this provision has been utilised by the CJEU have 
entailed Member State derogations from the fundamental freedoms of the EU internal 
market.167 Much rarer have been instances in which Article 4(2) TEU has been used to 
contest the constitutionality of EU legislation. The question here is whether EU legislation 
that pursues a legitimate objective (e.g. the functioning of the internal market) could 
nevertheless be unconstitutional on the grounds that it encroached upon Member State 
competences in sensitive areas related to their “fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional.”168 
In this regard, AG Kokott has recently stated, for the first time in the history of the Court’s 
case law, that a “stricter judicial review of subsidiarity may be necessary where an EU 
measure exceptionally affects matters of national identity of the Member States (Article 4(2) 
TEU).”169 However, in the case at hand, there was “absolutely no suggestion of this and the 
review standard of a manifest error of assessment can therefore be retained.”170  
Whilst the CJEU did not pick up on this aspect of the AG’s opinion in its judgment, the 
reasoning of AG Kokott nonetheless suggests that the CJEU may come to abandon its 
orthodox position of deferring to the outcomes of the political process in all circumstances. 
 
167 Barbara Guastaferro, ‘Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the 
Identity Clause’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 263, 300. 
168 ibid 300–308. 
169 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C‑358/14, Poland v Parliament and Council, (n 9) para 148. 
170 ibid para 148. 
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On this view, the CJEU would abandon its light-touch approach to subsidiarity review and 
move to engage in high intensity or strict review of EU legislation whenever that legislation 
allegedly encroached upon aspects of national identity of the Member States. Accordingly, 
the role of the Court would ordinarily be to ensure that the political process operated 
effectively and considered all facts and circumstances relevant to the EU’s federalism 
principles when legislating. Only when that political process had produced outcomes which 
carried serious implications for national identity as set down in Article 4(2) TEU would the 
CJEU move to engage in robust scrutiny of the substance of the legislation in question.  
As we shall see in Chapter 8, this sort of calibrated, variable intensity approach to 
constitutional review has recently been developed by the CJEU within the context of 
fundamental rights review. In cases of serious infringements with fundamental rights, the 
CJEU stands ready to abandon its typical approach of affording the EU legislature a wide 
margin of discretion and engaging in light touch review. In its place, the CJEU engages in high 
intensity review of the substance of contested legislation and stands ready to strike down EU 
legislation that places severe restrictions upon fundamental rights. Consequently, a degree 
of doctrinal coherence is beginning to emerge across the federalism and fundamental rights 
case law of the CJEU in the post-Lisbon Treaty era.   
6.) Conclusion 
Chapter 7 has demonstrated how the CJEU has come to adopt a process-oriented approach 
to reviewing whether EU legislation has complied with the EU’s federalism principles 
enshrined in Article 5 TEU. This shift in the jurisprudence has occurred against the 
background of increased proceduralisation in the EU legislative process in recent years. The 
EU institutions are now placed under a series of procedural obligations to consult widely, 
consider various policy options and justify their legislative choices in light of the principles 
enshrined in Article 5 TEU. In return, the Court has increasingly had recourse to the 
procedures under Protocol No.2, along with Impact Assessments, explanatory memoranda, 
scientific studies etc. utilised throughout the EU legislative process when conducting 
constitutional review. 
In areas of open-ended, purposive competence such as the internal market, the Court 
emphasises that the political process on the EU level (including input from national 
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parliaments) is primarily responsible for policing the balance of competences between the 
EU and its Member States.171 Rather than “second-guessing the merits of the substantive 
choices made by the EU legislator”, the Court opts to ensure that the EU institutions have 
“done their work properly” by requiring that the EU legislature demonstrate that it “has 
taken into consideration all the relevant interests at stake.”172 When compared with 
previous eras in the history of the European integration project, the Court has come to 
demand more by way of justificatory evidence from the EU legislature when examining 
whether the principles contained in Article 5 TEU have been respected.173 In this way, 
“judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a 
strict ‘process review.”174 
Consequently, the CJEU’s role in the post-Lisbon Treaty EU legal order is not to strictly 
umpire the EU’s federal balance of powers by delineating hard boundaries between EU and 
Member State competence. Instead, the Court adopts a process-oriented approach to 
constitutional review in federalism cases, ensuring that the political safeguards of federalism 
function effectively.175  
Whilst the default position in federalism cases is that the outcome of the political process 
will be entitled to considerable judicial deference, the Court emphasises that it will to step in 
and annul EU legislation where it clearly exceeds the bounds of legislative competence, or 
manifestly infringes the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Constitutional review 
thus seeks to bolster the political safeguards of federalism whilst providing some ultimate, 
substantive backstop to EU legislative power.176 More recently, the Court has also hinted 
that the ordinary position of deference may be abandoned and strict scrutiny of the 
substance of EU legislation may be appropriate within the context of federalism cases. This 
may occur whenever EU legislation affects matters pertaining to the national identity of the 
Member States (Article 4(2) TEU). 
 
171 Groussot and Bogojević (n 39) 251; Young (n 6) 1654–1655. 
172 Lenaerts (n 2) 7. 
173 Thomas Von Danwitz, ‘Rule of Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ, The’ (2013) 37 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1311, 1328–1330. 
174 Lenaerts (n 2) 4. 
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This nascent, process-oriented approach to constitutional review corresponds to recent 
changes to the legal and political order of the EU, and fits within the overarching objectives 
of the Lisbon Treaty reforms.  
As was noted in Chapter 6, these reforms did not intend to establish two mutually exclusive 
spheres of EU and Member State competence. Nor did they seek to redefine the EU’s 
internal market competence or fundamentally restructure the powers of the CJEU. Whilst it 
is true that a key aim of the Lisbon Treaty was to bring about a clearer delineation of 
competences between the EU and its Member States, this was counterbalanced by a desire 
amongst the Treaty’s drafters to retain a substantial degree of flexibility within the EU’s core 
legislative competences. Moreover, the procedural reforms in Procedural No.2 clearly 
emphasised that controlling and monitoring the exercise of EU legislative competence would 
be largely entrusted to the political rather than judicial safeguards of federalism.177 Finally, 
process-oriented review provides a means of enhancing judicial scrutiny of EU legislation 
whilst not illegitimately encroaching upon the policymaking prerogatives of the EU 
legislature - thus ensuring respect for the separation of powers in an era EU legislative acts 
are now underpinned by the principle of representative democracy.178 
When considered in its entirety, the “procedural turn” in the post-Lisbon case law reveals a 
Court that is responsive to the wider legal and political context in which it now operates. Far 
from operating in accordance with its own agenda or in an “activist” manner that is divorced 
from the constitutional framework of the EU Treaties, the contemporary federalism 
jurisprudence supports the claim that the CJEU now operates as a veritable constitutional 
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Fundamental Rights Review after the Lisbon Treaty 
 
1.) Introduction  
The final chapter of this thesis follows on from Chapter 7 and examines the post-Lisbon Treaty 
jurisprudence of the CJEU when reviewing the constitutionality of EU legal acts in light of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). It contends that the CJEU has come to develop a highly-
calibrated, variable intensity approach to review in cases of alleged infringements of 
fundamental rights. In a novel development, the Court has held that in cases where EU legal 
acts infringe upon the essence of fundamental rights, they will be annulled on that basis alone. 
This means that infringements of the essence of rights contained in the Charter cannot be 
justified by balancing the pursuit of objectives in the EU general interest against fundamental 
rights. Additionally, the Court has held that in cases where EU legal acts result in “serious” 
interferences with fundamental rights, the typically wide discretion of the EU legislature will be 
“reduced” and proportionality review will be “strict.”1  
Consequently, the Court has indicated to the EU legislature that whenever interferences with 
fundamental rights pass a particular threshold of gravity, the ordinary rule of judicial deference 
to the outcomes of the political process will be moderated. In such cases, the CJEU will engage 
in “high-intensity” review of the substance of the contested legal act in order to ascertain 
whether its provisions are limited to what is “strictly necessary” to achieve the objectives 
pursued. 
These recent shifts in fundamental rights cases have resulted in a degree of doctrinal coherence 
beginning to emerge across the CJEU’s post-Lisbon Treaty constitutional review jurisprudence. 
When it comes to serious restrictions of fundamental rights or incursions into core 
constitutional principles such as the national identity of the Member States, the Court will 
 
1 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 paras 47-48. 
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engage in much more intensive or strict scrutiny of the substance of EU legislation.2 Outwith 
the rather exceptional scenario of serious interferences with such rights and principles, the 
Court increasingly has recourse towards process-oriented review. In line with developments in 
its federalism jurisprudence discussed in Chapter 7, a number of recent fundamental rights 
judgments are to be noted for their examination of the legislative process and evidence base 
leading to the enactment of the contested EU legal act. Rather than second guessing the merits 
of the balance struck by the EU legislature between objectives of EU general interest and (non-
absolute) fundamental rights, the CJEU reviews whether the EU institutions themselves 
considered all relevant facts and circumstances when attempting to strike such a balance. 
Drawing once again upon preparatory documents, policy proposals and other aspects of the 
law-making process, the CJEU seeks to ensure that the political process considered the 
fundamental rights implications of its proposed actions before enacting them into law.3 
 
2.) Clarifying the Scope of the Enquiry 
Before moving to develop these arguments in full, it is first necessary to clarify the scope of the 
present enquiry into the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence. In this regard, the above use 
of the term EU legal acts - as opposed to EU legislation - is deliberate. As we shall see when 
discussing the case law, the CJEU does not vary the intensity of its proportionality review of 
fundamental rights infringements on the basis of the legislative character of the contested act. 
Instead, the key variables are whether the measure compromises the essence of a protected 
fundamental right, the seriousness of the interference with such a right, and the nature of the 
right concerned.4  
The approach taken by the Court with regards to the structure and intensity of proportionality 
review in fundamental rights cases is consistently applied to all acts of general application. 
Therefore, when examining how the CJEU conducts constitutional review of EU legislation in 
 
2 ibid; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C‑358/14, Poland v Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:848 
para 148. 
3 Case C-101/12, Herbert Schaible v Land Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:2013:661; Case C-356/12, Wolfgang 
Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern, ECLI:EU:C:2014:350. 
4 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (n 1) para 47. 
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the post-Lisbon Treaty era, it is appropriate to consider judgments that do not involve 
challenges to EU legislative acts adopted in accordance with a legislative procedure. In other 
words, judgments containing fundamental rights review of an EU legal act of general 
application are directly relevant to the question of how the CJEU conducts constitutional review 
of EU legislation in the post-Lisbon Treaty era.5  
This may be contrasted with the analysis in the previous chapter, where the shift towards 
process-oriented review is based almost entirely upon constitutional review of EU legislative 
acts for compliance with the EU’s federalism principles. There are two main reasons for this. 
First, the key legal bases in the Treaties which empower the EU institutions provide for the 
adoption of legislative acts adopted in accordance with a legislative procedure.6 Second, the 
procedural obligations enshrined in Protocol No.2 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty – including the 
role of national parliaments in subsidiarity monitoring – applies exclusively to post-Lisbon 
Treaty legislative acts.7 
Consequently, the present analysis into how the CJEU conducts constitutional review of EU 
legislation on both federalism and fundamental rights grounds consists of: (i) federalism 
jurisprudence involving only legislative acts; and (ii) fundamental rights jurisprudence involving 
a variety of EU legal acts, the reasoning from which is nonetheless directly applicable to 
fundamental rights review of EU legislative acts. 
3.) In Search of an Appropriate Standard of Review in Fundamental Rights Cases 
Having clarified the scope of the enquiry, we can now turn to the Court’s contemporary 
fundamental rights jurisprudence. 
As was noted in Chapter 6, the elevation of the CFR to the same legal status as the EU Treaties 
resulted in the EU legal order having a written bill of fundamental rights for the first time in its 
 
5 The focus remains acts of general application, whether they be legislative acts or other types of legal acts 
adopted by the EU institutions. Review of EU legal acts addressed to specific individuals or groups of individuals 
shall not be examined.  
6 See Article 114(1) TFEU, read in light of Article 289(3) TFEU. See also the legislative competences of the EU 
institutions in specific areas of the internal market which also provide for the adoption of legislative acts only, e.g. 
Articles 43(2), 46, 48, 50(1), 53(1) and 56(2) TFEU.   
7 Article 12(a) TEU; Protocol No.2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. 
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history. This constitutional entrenchment of fundamental rights gave rise to speculation over 
the future of rights adjudication in the EU moving forward.8 For the purposes of the present 
analysis, the core question to be resolved was whether the CJEU would come to engage in more 
intensive fundamental rights review of EU legislation than it had done in the pre-Lisbon Treaty 
era depicted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.9  
The starting point for this analysis is the limitation clause contained in Article 52(1) CFR, which 
provides: 
“Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”10 
On the one hand, the Explanations to the Charter provide that the wording of this clause is 
based on the existing case law of the Court.11 In support of this assertion, the Explanations cite 
a judgment from the early 2000s, which provided, in line with established case law, that 
“restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of fundamental rights…provided that those 
restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and 
do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, disproportionate and unreasonable 
interference undermining the very substance of those rights.”12 
It was conceivable, therefore, that the post-Lisbon Treaty approach to fundamental rights 
review would represent continuity with the past. As was discussed in earlier chapters, the 
requirement that Community/Union legal acts not constitute disproportionate and intolerable 
 
8 Sara Iglesias Sánchez, ‘The Court and the Charter: The Impact of the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty on the 
ECJ’s Approach to Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1565, 1565–1568. 
9 For a discussion of this issue see Xavier Groussot and Thor Petursson, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Five 
Years on: The Emergence of a New Constitutional Framework?’ in Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz and Stephen 
Weatherill (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument : Five Years Old and Growing (Hart 
Publishing 2015) 147–149. 
10 Article 52(1) CFR. 
11 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2007] OJ C 303/17, 16. 
12 Case C-292/97, Kjell Karlsson and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2000:202, para 45. 
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interferences impairing the substance of the right in question operated as a very weak standard 
of review.13 Moreover, in applying this standard, the Court typically engaged in light-touch, 
tersely reasoned review of measures that restricted or somehow interfered with fundamental 
rights. In a number of cases, the Court swiftly concluded that such restrictions were 
proportionate provided they did not infringe the essence or substance of the right in question.14 
The result, which was criticised in the literature, was low intensity review of legal acts that 
allegedly restricted fundamental rights.  
On the other hand, some argued that the structure and substance of the Charter’s provisions, 
coupled with its elevation to the same legal status as the EU Treaties, could (and should) result 
in more rigorous fundamental rights review by the Court than hitherto.15 For example, the 
obligation to “respect the essence of those rights and freedoms” contained in Article 52(1) CFR 
was said to be capable of being interpreted in such a way as to subject EU legal acts to more 
meaningful scrutiny. Commenting upon the Lisbon Treaty reforms, Craig urged the Court to 
abandon its traditional approach (restrictions were proportionate and lawful provided they did 
not infringe the essence of the right) and instead interpret Article 52(1) CFR to mean that “any 
limitation must respect the essence of the right, and that even if it does it will still only be 
lawful if proportionate, necessary, and in the general interest.”16  
Additionally, scholars called on the Court to strengthen fundamental rights protection in the 
post-Lisbon era by engaging in more intensive proportionality review of EU legal acts that 
encroached upon rights protected by the Charter. As Weiß has argued, “the standards of 
proportionality determine the effective level of human rights protection. The higher the 
scrutiny a court applies to proportionality assessment when reviewing acts of public power 
against human rights, the more meaningful proportionality requirements become as effective 
 
13 See Chapter 3, Section 6 
14 Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press 2010) 224. 
15 Wolfgang Weiß, ‘The EU Human Rights Regime Post Lisbon: Turning the CJEU into a Human Rights Court?’ in 
Sonia Morano-Foadi and Lucy Vickers (eds), Fundamental Rights in the EU: A Matter of Two Courts (Hart Publishing 
2015) 71; Damian Chalmers, ‘Judicial Authority and the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 448, 459. 
16 Craig (n 14) 224. 
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restraints to public power.”17 On the issue of standards and intensities of review, Advocate 
General Bobek has recently stated there are “two broad constitutional arguments that support 
the need for a more searching review of measures of EU institutions.”18 First, the 
aforementioned elevation of the Charter to binding primary law status had “brought 
fundamental rights review of EU acts to the fore.”19 Second, in light of the EU’s failed accession 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)20, the lack of “external” fundamental 
rights review of EU legal acts means that the task of reviewing the output of the EU institutions 
falls exclusively to the Court of Justice.21 “In discharging that mandate, the high level of 
protection aimed at by the Charter entails the necessity of carrying out a full and efficient 
internal review of EU law and of the acts of EU institutions.”22 
4.) Early Signs of a Shift in Approach 
 
The first indication of how the CJEU would conduct fundamental rights review of EU legislation 
in the post-Lisbon era came in Volker und Markus Schecke. The claimants in the case had been 
in receipt of financial aid from EU funds administered under the auspices of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Under the applicable Council Regulation, Member States were to 
ensure the annual publication of the names of beneficiaries of the funds and the amounts 
received per beneficiary. Further details on the types of information to be contained in such 
publications were provided by a Commission Regulation, including the municipality where the 
beneficiary resided or was registered and the postal code identifying the municipality. 
Furthermore, the Regulation stipulated that such information was to be made available on a 
single website per member state so that the names of beneficiaries, municipality, amount of 
award etc. could be accessed via a search tool.23 
 
17 Weiß (n 15) 71. 
18 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH & Co KG v Freistaat Sachsen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:169, 
para 43. 
19 ibid para 43. 
20 Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454 2. 
21 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH & Co. KG v Freistaat Sachsen, (n 18) para 43. 
22 ibid para 44. 
23 For an overview see Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR  and Hartmut Eifert v 




The case therefore concerned a challenge to two EU legal acts of general application (Council 
Regulation and Commission Regulation) that did not constitute legislative acts adopted in 
accordance with a legislative procedure.24 Nonetheless, both for the reasons set out above in 
the introduction, and the impact that the judgment has had upon subsequent case law and 
academic commentary, the reasoning of the CJEU in Schecke merits consideration at this 
juncture.  
a.) Volker und Markus Schecke 
According to the CJEU, the Council and Commission Regulations interfered with the right to 
respect of private life (Article 7 CFR) and the closely related right to the protection of personal 
data (Article 8(1) CFR) of those in receipt of financial aid and who had had their personal details 
made publicly available.25 However, the rights contained in Article 7 and 8 CFR were not 
absolute and must be examined in light of their social function.26 This meant that the 
abovementioned limitation clause contained in Article 52(1) CFR was applicable, with any 
restriction of the rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 CFR having to be provided for by law, 
respect the essence of those rights and, subject to the principle of proportionality, be necessary 
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU.27 
In conducing this examination, the Court found that the infringements of Articles 7 and 8 CFR 
were provided by law and pursued an objective of general interest recognized by the EU. The 
publication of the information sought to “[enhance] transparency regarding the use of 
Community funds in the [CAP] and [improve] the sound financial management of these funds, 
in particular by reinforcing public control of the money used.”28 When viewed in light of the EU 
Treaties’ provisions on transparency, the aim of increasing the transparency of the use of CAP 
funds was held to pursue an objective of general interest recognised by the EU.29 The 
 
24 Article 289(3) TFEU. 
25 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Schecke (n 23) paras 47, 58, 64. 
26 ibid para 48. 
27 ibid paras 64-65. 
28 Joined Cases C-92/09 Volker und Markus Schecke (n 2) para 66 and 67. 
29 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Schecke (n 23) paras 68-71, citing Articles 1 and 10 TEU and Article 15 TFEU,. 
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Regulations at issue were also appropriate for achieving this legitimate aim, since publishing 
the names of beneficiaries and amounts received increased transparency and thus increased 
public control over the use of public funds.30  
However, when it came to the necessity of the Regulations, the applicants contended that the 
legitimate aims of the Regulations could be achieved by means that were less restrictive to 
their rights, such as publishing anonymised statistics of amounts received by beneficiaries.31 
This led the CJEU to hold that it was necessary to: 
“[D]etermine whether the Council…and the Commission balanced the European Union’s 
interest in guaranteeing the transparency of its acts and ensuring the best use of public 
funds against the interference with the right of the beneficiaries concerned to respect 
for their private life in general and to the protection of their personal data in 
particular.32  
Then, the Court held for the first time within the context of fundamental rights review of EU 
legal acts that “derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must 
apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.”33 It was thus necessary for the EU institutions, 
before adopting the measures in question, to ascertain whether publication via a single freely 
consultable website did not go beyond what was necessary for achieving the legitimate aims 
pursued.34 
When viewed against this standard, the CJEU found that the Council and the Commission had 
failed to strike such a balance between the EU’s general interest in transparent use of public 
funds and the fundamental rights protected in Articles 7 and 8 CFR. There was “nothing to 
show” that when adopting the contested Regulations, the Council and Commission took into 
consideration methods of publishing the information which would have caused less 
interference with the rights of the beneficiaries enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 CFR. According to 
 
30 ibid para 75. 
31 ibid para 73. 
32 ibid para 77. 
33 ibid para 77 (emphasis added). 
34 ibid para 79. 
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the Court, limiting the publication of names of beneficiaries to the periods in which they 
received aid, or to the frequency or nature and amount of aid received, would have been less 
restrictive of the rights in question.35 Moreover, such limitations would not frustrate the overall 
objective of providing citizens with accurate information on the administration of funds.36 
In light of these alternatives, the EU institutions “ought thus to have examined, in the course of 
striking a proper balance between the various interests involved, whether publication by name 
limited in the manner indicated…above would have been sufficient to achieve the objectives of 
the European Union legislation at issue in the main proceedings.”37 It followed that the EU 
legislature had failed to properly balance the objectives of the EU legal acts against the rights 
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 CFR, thus breaching the principle of proportionality.38 
b.) Evaluation 
The judgment in Volker und Markus Schecke represents “a more procedural approach” to 
reviewing the proportionality of EU legal acts that restrict fundamental rights, reflecting “a 
newer trend discernible in the Court’s proportionality control.”39 According to Beijer, the Court 
annulled the contested Regulations due to the quality (or lack thereof) of the decision-making 
process.40  
Rather than conducting its own balancing exercise of the rights and interests involved, the CJEU 
identified measures that could have achieved the same objective whilst having a less restrictive 
impact upon the rights in question. It then found that the EU legislature had not given sufficient 
consideration to these less restrictive alternatives during the legislative process; meaning that 
the balance between rights and objectives in the general interest had not been sufficiently 
 
35 ibid paras 81-82. 
36 ibid para 83. 
37 ibid para 83. 
38 ibid para 86. 
39 Weiß (n 15) 76. 
40 Malu Beijer, ‘Procedural Fundamental Rights Review by the Court of Justice of the European Union’ in Eva Brems 
and Janneke Gerards (eds), Procedural Review in European Fundamental Rights Cases (Cambridge University Press 
2017) 177; Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of the Evidence-Based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-
Tov’s Semiprocedural Review’ (2013) 1 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 327, 335. 
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considered prior to enacting the policy choice into law.41 It was this failure to demonstrate the 
consideration of alternatives as part of the overall balancing exercise between rights and 
objectives, rather than the merits of the balance ultimately struck itself, that was decisive for 
the Court.42 
  
Notably, the CJEU made no direct reference to the lack of an Impact Assessment or any other 
type of evidence when concluding that there was “nothing to show” that the EU institutions 
had considered less restrictive policy options during the legislative process. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that the inability of the EU legislature to produce evidence demonstrating how 
fundamental rights were sufficiently considered prior to enacting the policy into law had a 
profound impact upon the Court’s decision to annul the contested legal acts.43  
A contrario, it can reasonably be concluded that if the EU legislature had demonstrated with 
reference to aspects of the legislative process (e.g. Impact Assessment, amendments to the 
proposal following deliberations, preparatory reports etc.) that: (i) it had considered alternative 
approaches to data publication that were less restrictive of Charter rights; and (ii) on balance, 
had concluded that these less restrictive measures were nevertheless unable to effectively 
achieve the EU objectives of transparency in public spending, the Court would have been much 
more reluctant to interfere with the outcome of the political process.44  
This also seems to be the view of the Commission. In an internal document providing 
operational guidance on taking Fundamental Rights into account in Impact Assessments, the 
Commission notes that the judgment in Schecke “requires EU institutions to prove — in the 
light of the fundamental rights protected by the Charter — that they have carefully considered 
different policy options and have chosen the most proportionate response to a given 
 
41 Admittedly, by identifying policy options that are capable of achieving the overall objective whilst being less 
restrictive to the rights in question, the Court is making a substantive assessment, see Beijer (n 40) 198. 
42 Alemanno (n 40) 335. 
43 Mark Dawson, The Governance of EU Fundamental Rights (Cambridge University Press 2017) 75; Alemanno (n 
40) 335–336. 




problem.”45 Consequently, a proper assessment of any impact that proposed legislation will 
have upon fundamental rights in the preparatory phases of new legislation will “not only 
contribute to finding the most appropriate solution to a given problem, but will also strengthen 
the defence of EU legislation against legal challenges before the European Court of Justice.”46 
The judgment of the CJEU in Schecke, coupled with the response of the Commission, provides 
the foundation for an increasingly process-oriented approach to fundamental rights review of 
EU legislation in the post-Lisbon Treaty era. Much like the trend identified in Chapter 7 in 
relation to federalism cases, the default position of the Court is one of deference to the 
outcome of the EU political process whenever an accommodation is made between objectives 
of general interest and (non-absolute) fundamental rights. Rather than second guessing the 
merits of the balance struck by the EU legislature by engaging in robust proportionality review, 
the CJEU opts instead to examine whether the EU institutions considered all relevant facts and 
circumstances when attempting to strike such a balance. This is achieved by examining the 
legislative process - drawing once again open preparatory documents, expert studies, policy 
proposals and even the public deliberations of the institutions – in order to ascertain whether 
the EU legislature sufficiently considered the fundamental rights implications of its proposed 
actions before enacting them into law.47 
5.) Provided by Law and Respecting the Essence of Rights 
The next major development to be considered in this regard relates to the obligation in Article 
52(1) CFR that EU legal acts which limit fundamental rights respect the “essence” of those 
rights.48 As was noted above, the pre-Lisbon Treaty jurisprudence of the Court contained many 
 
45 Commission Staff Working Paper, Operational Guidance on taking account of Fundamental Rights in Commission 
Impact Assessments, SEC (2011) 567 4. 
46 ibid 5. 
47 Case C-101/12, Schaible (n 3); Case C-356/12, Glatzel (n 3). 
48 Although Article 52(1) CFR first requires that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms in the 
Charter must be “provided for by law”, this condition has played a very minor role when it comes to fundamental 
rights review of EU legislation. In virtually all cases, the CJEU has been able to point to a Regulation, Directive or 
Decision of the EU institutions which has had an impact upon Charter rights, thus satisfying the “provided by law” 
requirement. It shall therefore not be considered further here. Steve Peers and Sacha Prechal, ‘Scope and 
Interpretation of Rights and Principles’ in Steve Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights:  A 
Commentary (2014) 1470–1474. 
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examples of the Court concluding that restrictions upon fundamental rights were proportionate 
provided they did not impair the substance of the right in question.  
a.) Schrems 
Despite limited case law on this point, the landmark judgment in Schrems suggests a 
considerable shift in the Court’s reasoning with regards to this “essence of rights” condition.49 
Whereas the proportionality principle plays a role in determining whether EU legislation that 
interferes with fundamental rights may nevertheless, on balance, be justified, the CJEU held in 
Schrems that interferences with the essence of fundamental rights cannot be justified under 
any circumstances. This means that where EU legislation infringes the essence of fundamental 
rights contained in the Charter, it will be annulled on that basis alone. There will be no need to 
review whether the EU legislature stuck an appropriate balance between fundamental rights 
and EU objectives in the general interest. 
In Schrems, the CJEU annulled a Commission Decision that determined that the United States’ 
(US) Safe Harbour Privacy Principles guaranteed an adequate level of fundamental rights 
protection when data is transferred from the EU to organisations established in US.50  
According to an EU Directive on the processing and free movement of personal data, Member 
States (whose national authorities are responsible for processing data in accordance with EU 
law) may only transfer such data to third countries where that third country ensures an 
adequate level of protection of fundamental rights.”51 Under the same Directive, the 
Commission was entitled to find that third countries ensured an adequate level of protection of 
personal data where, on the basis of domestic law and international agreements that third 
country had entered into (particularly with the EU), the private lives and basic rights of 
individuals were protected.52 By recognising that the United States Safe Harbour Principles 
 
49 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
50 ibid. 
51 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281, 
p. 31–50, Article 25(1). 
52 ibid Article 25(6). 
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ensured an adequate level of protection for the transfer of data from the EU to organisations 
established in the US, the Commission Decision meant that national authorities should allow 
data transfers to the US (subject to certain exceptions).53  
Following well-publicised revelations that US companies (who claimed to abide by the Safe 
Harbour Principles) were passing personal data to the US National Security Agency (NSA), 
Schrems argued that the US did not ensure adequate protection of his personal data held in its 
territory. Consequently, the relevant national authorities (Ireland) should have prevented his 
data from being transferred the United States. Moreover, the Commission Decision finding that 
the US did ensure adequate protection should be annulled for infringing the right to the 
protection of personal data and private life, enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 CFR respectively.54 
b.) Compromising the Essence of Fundamental Rights 
In reviewing the legality of the Commission Decision in light of Articles 7 and 8 CFR, the CJEU 
held that a third country (US) must ensure, by reason of its domestic law or international 
commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights that is essentially equivalent to that 
guaranteed within the EU.55 In this regard, the US Safe Harbour Principles constituted a system 
of self-certification that applied only to US companies handling personal data from the EU and 
did not apply to US authorities.56 Moreover, US law could override the Safe Harbour Principles 
for reasons of national security or public interest, meaning that US companies were required to 
disregard the Principles and comply with US laws mandating that personal data be disclosed for 
reasons of national security etc.57 US authorities thus possessed a wide-sweeping power to 
access personal data transferred from the EU to the US and to process it in ways which were 
incompatible with the purposes for which it was initially transferred.58 This general derogation 
 
53 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related 
frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (notified under document number C(2000) 
2441), [2000] OJ L 215/7, Recital 2 and Article 3. 
54 Case C-362/14, Schrems (n 49) paras 26-36, 67. 
55 ibid paras 73-74. 
56 ibid para 82. 
57 ibid paras 84-86. 
58 ibid para 90. 
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from the Principles enabled interference with the fundamental rights of the persons whose 
personal data is transferred from the EU to the US.59  
Turning to the Commission Decision itself, the CJEU found that it contained insufficient 
information on the measures through which the US ensured adequate protection of 
fundamental rights. There were no findings on how the US limited interferences with 
fundamental rights by national authorities and no references to how the US system provided 
effective legal protection against interferences with rights. Existing procedures were either 
limited in scope or applicable only to US companies’ compliance with the Safe Harbour 
Principles. They were not applicable to the US authorities themselves.60 
According to the Court, interferences with the rights to privacy and protection of personal data 
guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 CFR must lay down “clear and precise rules governing the scope 
and application of a measure and imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose 
personal data is concerned have sufficient guarantees enabling their data to be effectively 
protected against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use of that data.”61  
In the present case, however, the US system authorized, on a general basis, the storage of all 
personal data of persons whose data had been transferred from the EU to the US without 
differentiation, limitation or exception. There were also no objective criteria determining limits 
of the access given to public authorities or its subsequent use.62 This led the CJEU to conclude 
that “legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the 
content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter”63  
Similarly, legislation not providing any possibility for an individual to pursue legal remedies 
relating to interferences with his or her personal data, coupled with the lack of effective review 
 
59 ibid para 87. 
60 ibid paras 83, 88-89. 
61 ibid para 91. 
62 ibid para 93. 
63 ibid para 94 (emphasis added). 
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procedures of the activities of US authorities, “does not respect the essence of the fundamental 
right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.”64 
c.) Preventing the Justification of Blatant Rights Infringements 
Notably, in reaching this conclusion the CJEU did not engage in any form of proportionality 
review of the Commission Decision (or indeed the derogations from the Safe Harbour Principles 
in the US) to determine whether interferences with the rights protected by Articles 7 and 8 CFR 
could be justified. Instead, it found that such wide-sweeping powers of interference with 
personal data, coupled with a complete lack of safeguards and review mechanisms, meant that 
the essence of Articles 7, 8 and 47 CFR had been compromised, and the Commission Decision 
was annulled on that basis. 
Even though the Court did not expand on the meaning or scope of the “essence” concept, its 
reasoning strongly suggests that entirely depriving an individual of the protection given by the 
fundamental right to effective judicial protection (Article 47 CFR) constituted an interference 
with the essence of this right.65 This is because the right holder is offered no protection, since 
she does not have any remedies whatsoever at her disposal with which to seek protection of 
her rights.66 This is further supported by the CJEU’s finding in Schrems that, in light of Article 47 
CFR, the “very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with 
provisions of EU law is inherent in the existence of the rule of law.”67 “In a democratic society 
based on rule of law, members of society should not be left entirely without remedies against 
acts which have a legal effect on them.”68 Similarly, the CJEU found an interference with the 
essence of fundamental rights because data subjects (people whose personal data is collected, 
held or processed) were “completely stripped of their privacy since any of their electronic 
 
64 ibid para 95 (emphasis added). 
65 Outwith the context of fundamental rights review of EU legislation, see Case C‑216/18 PPU, LM 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:586. 
66 Maja Brkan, ‘The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order: Peeling the Onion to Its Core’ 
(2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 332, 353. 
67 Case C-362/14, Schrems (n 49) para 95. 
68 Brkan (n 66) 353. 
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communications could be read by public officials, leaving them no space to keep even the most 
private of information.”69  
Overall, therefore, blatant violations of fundamental rights by the EU institutions in 
circumstances where the right holder has no legal means at all of challenging interferences 
with their rights will constitute interferences with the essence of Charter-based rights. In such 
(extraordinary) circumstances, there is no scope for such interferences to be justified through 
proportionality balancing with reference to objectives in the general interest.70 Furthermore, 
there is no need for the CJEU to have recourse to the legislative process (as it did in Schecke) to 
ascertain whether the EU institutions considered all relevant facts and circumstances when 
balancing different rights and interests. The substantive outcomes of the political process will 
not enjoy deference from the reviewing Court. Where EU legislation infringes the essence of 
fundamental rights contained in the Charter, it will be annulled on that basis alone. This 
suggests a considerably more robust approach to fundamental rights review in the post-Lisbon 
Treaty era. 
6.) Variable Intensity Review in Fundamental Rights Cases 
Findings by the CJEU that EU legal acts interfere with the essence of fundamental rights 
protected by the Charter have been rare. To date, Schrems remains the only case where an EU 
legal act has been annulled on this basis alone. In the vast majority of cases, the Court finds that 
there has been no interference with the essence of rights, but that the right in question has 
been restricted to a certain extent by an EU legal act. The key issue to resolved in these 
circumstances is whether such restrictions may be justified in accordance with the remainder of 
Article 52(1) CFR i.e. the proportionality principle. 
a.) Digital Rights Ireland  
 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid 364. 
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At this stage, the contemporary jurisprudence of the Court evinces a finely-calibrated, flexible 
and variable intensity approach to reviewing whether EU legislation has disproportionately 
interfered with fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter.71  
This is clearly illustrated by the Court’s landmark judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, where the 
EU Data Retention Directive was annulled for disproportionately interfering with the rights to 
private life and the protection of personal data (Articles 7 and 8 CFR respectively).72 The 
Directive in question obliged telephone communication service providers to store users’ data 
relating to their private life and communications for a minimum of six months and a maximum 
of two years. Moreover, this data could then be accessed by competent national authorities for 
the purposes of crime investigation and prevention. Finally, all such data could be retained and 
used without the subscriber or registered user’s consent or knowledge.73 
In striking down the Directive as unconstitutional, the Court found that the scope and content 
of the type of data to be retained, and the extensive powers of national authorities to access 
and process such data, constituted “wide-ranging” and “particularly serious” interferences with 
Articles 7 and 8 CFR.74 However, this interference did not affect the essence of those rights, 
since the Directive did not permit the acquisition of knowledge of the content of the electronic 
communications per se.75 Accordingly, the Directive was in principle capable of being justified in 
light of the principle of proportionality, provided it pursued a legitimate objective, was 
appropriate and did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve its objectives.76 Then, for the 
first time in its jurisprudence, the CJEU held that: 
“With regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions, where 
interferences with fundamental rights are at issue, the extent of the EU legislature’s 
 
71 For a recent endorsement of this point from a member of the Court see Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, 
Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH & Co. KG v Freistaat Sachsen, (n 18) para 41. 
72 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (n 1). 
73 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data 
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks [2006] OJ L 105, p. 54. 
74 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (n 1) paras 32-37. 
75 ibid paras 39-40. 
76 ibid para 45. 
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discretion may prove to be limited, depending on a number of factors, including, in 
particular, the area concerned, the nature of the right at issue guaranteed by the 
Charter, the nature and seriousness of the interference and the object pursued by the 
interference.”77 
 
The CJEU further stated that the extent and seriousness of the interference with the rights 
protected by Articles 7 and 8 CFR meant that “the EU legislature’s discretion is reduced, with 
the result that review of that discretion should be strict.”78 This novel line of reasoning in the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence represents a marked shift in the intensity of fundamental rights review of 
EU legislation. 79 To recall, according to established, pre-Lisbon Treaty case law, the EU 
legislature must be allowed a “wide discretion” whenever it is called upon to make choices of a 
political, economic or social nature and required to undertake complex assessments and 
evaluations. As a result, proportionality review was restricted to considering whether contested 
legislation was “manifestly disproportionate” in relation to the objectives pursued.80 Moreover, 
in the vast majority of cases, the CJEU subjected acts of general application to “low-intensity” 
review, often provided very limited reasoning for its (inevitable) findings that the contested act 
was valid.  
 
In contrast, in Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU indicated for the first time not only that the 
discretion of the EU legislature could be reduced in cases of alleged infringements of 
fundamental rights, but also that the standard of proportionality review would be intensified as 
a result. Rather than deferring to the outcomes of the political process and engaging in low-
intensity review, the judgment of the Court confirmed that it would engage in “high intensity” 
proportionality review of the EU legislation whenever it resulted in serious interferences with 
fundamental rights. As AG Bobek recently put it, recent judgments highlight that 
 
77 ibid para 47 (emphasis added). 
78 ibid para 48 (emphasis added). 
79 Thomas Von Danwitz, ‘Rule of Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ, The’ (2013) 37 Fordham International 
Law Journal 1311, 1330–1333. 
80 Case C-491/01, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd 
and Imperial Tobacco Ltd (BAT) ECLI:EU:C:2002:741 para 123. 
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proportionality review “can be carried out with varying degrees of strictness, thus varying the 
amount of deference given to the legislator.”81   
This variable approach to both the scope of discretion afforded to the EU legislature and the 
intensity of proportionality review in fundamental rights cases has been confirmed in 
subsequent case law. For example, in Sky Österreich the Court held when reviewing EU 
legislation in light of the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 CFR) that that right was not 
absolute, but must be viewed in light of its social function. Based on the wording of Article 16 
CFR, the freedom to conduct a business could be limited in a number of different ways by the 
EU legislature in order to pursue objectives in the general interest.82 Notably, the Court then 
proclaimed that “[t]hat circumstance is reflected, inter alia, in the way in which Article 52(1) of 
the Charter requires the principle of proportionality to be implemented.”83  
One possible way of interpreting this line of jurisprudence is that different types or intensities 
of proportionality review should be adopted by the Court depending on the nature of the rights 
in question.84 In other words, EU legal acts interfering with the right to privacy or the protection 
of personal data should be subject to more searching review by the CJEU (Articles 7 and 8 CFR) 
than interferences with the freedom to conduct a business or the right to property (Articles 16 
and 17 CFR). Commenting upon this possibility (whilst noting the ambiguities in the CJEU’s 
reasoning), Peers et al. state that “if the Court believes that different types of proportionality 
test should apply where different charter rights are involved (as it expressly stated in Sky), it 
should explain its reasoning and the implications of such a distinction further, and must ensure 
that it applies this distinction consistently.”85 
The problem with this approach, however, is that neither the Charter in general, nor Article 
52(1) CFR in particular, distinguish between Charter rights or mandate varying intensities of 
 
81 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH & Co. KG v Freistaat Sachsen, (n 18) para 41; see 
also Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C‑358/14, Poland v Parliament and Council, (n 2) para 148 at fn 84. 
82 Case C‑283/11, Sky Österreich GmbH  v Österreichischer Rundfunk ECLI:EU:C:2013:28 paras 45-46. 
83 ibid para 47; Case C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands SARL and Others v Secretary of State for Health, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:325, paras 153-155. 
84 Peers and Prechal (n 48) 1484. 
85 ibid 1485. 
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review on the basis of the nature of the right.86 “[I]it is worth noting that there is no hierarchy 
of qualified rights under the Charter. Given that all qualified rights stand on an equal footing, 
conflicts between them must be solved by striking the right balance.”87  
When viewed in light of the case law as a whole, it is submitted that the better view is that the 
intensity of proportionality review conducted by the CJEU depends upon the seriousness of the 
interference with a fundamental right. Whenever EU legal acts “seriously” interfere with 
fundamental rights protected by the Charter, the EU legislature’s discretion will be reduced and 
proportionality review will be “strict”. On this view, the nature of the right (right to privacy, 
right to protection of personal data, freedom to conduct a business, right to property, right to 
equality before the law etc.) is irrelevant. Serious interferences will result in the CJEU utilising 
the proportionality principle in order to determine whether the legislation in question is 
“strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued.”88 Conversely, whenever 
EU legal acts interfere with Charter rights to a negligible or very limited extent (i.e. not meeting 
the threshold of “seriousness”), the EU legislature will be afforded a wider margin of discretion 
and proportionality review will be conducted in a less intensive fashion.89  
This much is made clear when one considers that in post-Lisbon cases like Sky Österreich90, 
Schwarz91 and Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (RPO)92, the Court did not find that there had been 
a serious restriction of the fundamental rights engaged in those disputes (the right to freely 
conduct a business, to privacy and to equal treatment respectively). Consequently, the scope of 
discretion afforded to the EU legislature in these cases was not explicitly restricted and the 
Court did not deploy the high intensity, strictly necessary standard of review that it had in 
Digital Rights Ireland.93 Similarly, in a number of cases where EU legislation has placed minimal 
 
86 The exception being absolute rights such as the right not to be tortured, subject to inhuman and degrading 
treatment or enslaved. See Articles 1, 4, 5 and 52(3) CFR. 
87 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional 
Law Review 375, 392–393. 
88 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (n 1) para 62. 
89 Case C-12/11, Denise McDonagh v Ryanair Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2013:43; Case C-544/10, Deutsches Weintor eG v Land 
Rheinland-Pfalz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:526. 
90 Case C‑283/11, Sky Österreich (n 82) para94. 
91 Case C-291/12, Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum, ECLI:EU:C:2013:670 paras 31-53. 
92 Case C-390/15, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (RPO) and others ECLI:EU:C:2017:174 paras 52-72. 
93 Case C‑283/11, Sky Österreich (n 82) para 50; Case C-291/12, Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum, (n 91) para 40. 
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restrictions upon fundamental rights, the CJEU has continued to afford the EU legislature a wide 
margin of discretion and adopted its traditional, manifestly disproportionate standard of 
review.94  
b.) Serious Interferences with Fundamental Rights and High-Intensity Review 
These developments necessarily require one to consider how the CJEU determines whether 
restrictions upon fundamental rights meet the threshold of being “particularly serious” and, 
where they do, how EU legislation is then reviewed in light of the principle of proportionality?  
Returning to the judgment in Digital Rights Ireland helps to resolve some of these questions. 
Having held that the discretion of the EU legislature would be reduced and the intensity of 
proportionality review enhanced, the CJEU found that the data retention Directive pursued 
objectives of general EU interest; namely, to contribute to the fight against serious crime, 
international terrorism and, ultimately, to public security.95  
Whilst this was of the “utmost importance in order to ensure public security…such an objective 
of general interest, however fundamental it may be, does not, in itself, justify a retention 
measure such as that established by Directive 2006/24 being considered to be necessary for the 
purpose of that fight.”96 Building upon its findings in Schecke, the CJEU noted that, when 
viewed in light of the right to private life, the protection of personal data requires derogations 
and limitations to that right to apply insofar as they are strictly necessary.97  
In reviewing whether this was the case, the CJEU engaged in close scrutiny of the substance of 
the Directive, noting that the rules on retention covered all means of electronic communication 
of all subscribers or registered users of electronic communications networks. This meant that 
the Directive potentially allowed for interference with the rights of the entire European 
population, since the data of persons with no connection to organized or serious crime could be 
 
94 Case C-157/14, Société Neptune Distribution v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, ECLI:EU:C:2015:823 para 
76 and case law cited therein. 
95 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (n 1) paras 41-44. 
96 ibid para 51. 
97 ibid paras 52-53. 
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retained by relevant national authorities without exception.98 There were also no meaningful 
limits in the Directive to regulate the access to, and subsequent use of, personal data by 
national authorities. Finally, the rule that all data must be retained for a minimum of 6 months 
and a maximum of 24 months was not based on any objective criteria and failed to distinguish 
between different types or uses of personal data.99  
As a result, the Directive did not set down clear and precise rules governing the extent of the 
interference with rights contained in Articles 7 and 8 CFR. The Directive led to wide-ranging and 
particularly serious interference with fundamental rights. Moreover, such interference was not 
precisely circumscribed by provisions aimed at ensuring that it was actually limited to what was 
“strictly necessary.”100 
c.) Restrictions on the Right to Liberty 
A similar approach was recently taken in the J.N case, where an EU Directive allowed Member 
State authorities to detain third country nationals who applied for international protection in 
order to protect national security or public order.101 These powers of detention were 
challenged on the grounds that they interfered with Article 6 CFR, which provides that 
everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.102  
In the Courts view, detaining applicants for reasons of national security did indeed place a limit 
upon the right to liberty. However, the relevant provisions of the Directive did not interfere 
with the essence of that right, since the Member States were only empowered to detain 
applicants on the basis of his/her individual conduct, under exceptional circumstances and 
subject to a number of conditions laid down in the Directive itself.103  
 
98 ibid para 56. 
99 ibid paras 58-64. 
100 ibid para 65. 
101 Article 8(3), Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection [2013] OJ L 180,  p. 96–116. 
102 Article 6 CFR. 
103 Case C-601/15 PPU, J N v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:2016:84 para 52. 
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Accordingly, the CJEU moved to examine whether the restrictions imposed by the Directive 
could be justified in accordance with the principle of proportionality.104 In so doing, it swiftly 
concluded that the Directive’s aims of protecting national security and public order constituted 
an objective of general interest to the EU, and that the powers of detention provided therein 
were appropriate for achieving this aim.105 Turning to whether such powers of detention were 
necessary, the CJEU cited Digital Rights Ireland when emphasising that “in view of the 
importance of the right to liberty enshrined in Article 6 of the Charter and the gravity of the 
interference with that right which detention represents, limitations on the exercise of the right 
must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.”106  
In applying this heightened degree of proportionality review to the relevant provisions of the 
Directive, the Court found that the powers of detention were subject to a series of conditions 
which created a strictly circumscribed legal framework. Not only were the grounds justifying 
detention exhaustively set down in the Directive, but such detention was explicitly restricted to 
situations where it proved necessary on the basis of an individual assessment of each case, and 
only if less coercive measures could not be applied effectively.107 Applicants were to be 
detained for as short a period as possible and a number of legal and procedural safeguards had 
to be observed throughout, including providing in writing the reasons of fact and law justifying 
the detention and setting up judicial review mechanisms to appraise the legality of decisions to 
detain.108 Finally the Directive was found to be in conformity with international guidelines and 
recommendations on detention as it pertained to applications for asylum and international 
protection.109 As a result, the provisions allowing for the detention of applicants was justified as 
being strictly necessary to pursue the objectives of national security and public order.110  
d.) Towards Coherence in Constitutional Review of EU Legislation 
 
104 ibid paras 49-50. 
105 ibid paras 53, 55. 
106 ibid para 56; See also Case C-18/16, K v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:2017:680 para 40. 
107 Case C-601/15, J. N. (n 103) paras 57-61. 
108 ibid para 62. 
109 ibid para 63. 
110 ibid paras 67, 82. 
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When considered alongside Digital Rights Ireland, the recent judgments in J.N and K confirm 
that whenever EU legal acts lead to serious interferences with fundamental rights contained in 
the Charter, the EU legislature’s discretion will be reduced and proportionality review will be 
strict. In terms of what constitutes a “serious” interference with fundamental rights, this will 
largely depend upon the facts of each individual case. Nonetheless, these examples (albeit 
limited in number) provide some guidance. It is clear that empowering authorities to deprive 
liberty or to have widespread and largely unchecked access to personal data would meet this 
threshold. Whilst further case law is needed to clarify this point, it seems axiomatic that such 
restrictions are of a considerably greater magnitude than, say, limiting the freedom to conduct 
a business by prohibiting the advertising of electronic cigarettes in certain media.111 
Crucially, in these cases of serious interference, the Court has not to date examined the EU 
legislative process in any detail. There has been no consideration of whether the EU legislature 
considered less restrictive alternatives during the legislative process. Nor does the CJEU seem 
particularly interested in whether the EU legislature can demonstrate that it took all relevant 
facts and circumstances into account when adopting the legislation in question. Instead, the 
Court engages in strict or “high-intensity” review of the substance of the contested EU legal act 
to ascertain whether it is suitable for attaining its stated objective and does not go beyond 
what is strictly necessary to achieve it. In so doing, the CJEU places much emphasis on the 
existence of objective limits, safeguards and review mechanisms within the contested EU legal 
act, rather on whether measures less restrictive of the right in question were available or 
considered by the legislature.112  
A degree of doctrinal coherence is thus beginning to emerge across the CJEU’s constitutional 
review jurisprudence. When it comes to serious restrictions of fundamental rights, clear 
violations of the EU’s federalism principles or incursions into aspects of national identity (Article 
 
111 Case C‑477/14, Pillbox 38 (UK) Ltd v The Secretary of State for Health, ECLI:EU:C:2016:324, paras 109-118. 




4(2) TEU), the ordinary rule of deference to the discretionary policy choices of the EU 
legislature is replaced by strict, merits-based scrutiny of EU legislation.113 
In other words, the default rule in contemporary federalism and fundamental rights cases of 
not second-guessing the merits of the legislature’s policy choices seems to be displaced by 
intensive, substantive review of legislation. In cases of serious interference, the Court is less 
willing to simply check that the EU legislature has “done its work properly” throughout the 
legislative process by considering alternatives that are less restrictive to the rights or principles 
in question.114 Instead, the Court stands ready to closely examine whether the substance of EU 
legislation is appropriate and contains sufficient limits, safeguards and review mechanisms  to 
satisfy the high hurdle of being “strictly necessary” to pursue objectives of general interest to 
the EU. 
In all other cases where contested EU legislation restricts or somehow interferes with 
fundamental rights or the EU’s federalism principles, the Court appears to be adopting an 
increasingly process-oriented approach to review. Despite some inconsistencies in the 
jurisprudence, the overall trend depicted in Chapters 7 and 8 has been one of the CJEU making 
increased reference to the legislative process and evidence base upon which EU legislation was 
enacted in such cases. 
7.) What Role for Process-Oriented Review in Fundamental Rights Cases? 
 
That being said, the CJEU was evidently reluctant in the abovementioned J.N and K cases to 
engage in a similarly robust, merits-based review of the overall balance struck between the 
pursuit of national security objectives and the protection of fundamental rights (proportionality 
stricto sensu). The same intensification of substantive review at the suitability and necessity 
stages of the proportionality analysis described above was not replicated at the third step in the 
enquiry. Instead, the CJEU concluded swiftly without any meaningful degree of scrutiny that the 
EU legislature had struck a proportionate balance between the right to liberty and the 
 
113 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (n 1); Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case 
C‑358/14, Poland v Parliament and Council, (n 2) para 148. 




protection of national security and public order.115 This leads to some uncertainty over whether 
the CJEU’s novel stance on reducing the scope of discretion and engaging in strict 
proportionality review will be consistently applied across all three parts of the proportionality 
test.  
a.) The Problem with High Intensity, Stricto Sensu Review 
In this regard, the third, stricto sensu stage in the proportionality enquiry has proved the most 
controversial in the literature, since it typically involves “a balancing of the benefits gained by 
the public and the harm caused to the constitutional right.”116 The test “compares the positive 
effect of realizing the law’s proper purpose with the negative effect of limiting a constitutional 
right. This comparison is of a value-laden nature. It is meant to determine whether the relation 
between the benefit and the harm is proper.”117 For these reasons, proportionality stricto sensu 
has raised concerns about the judiciary encroaching upon the legislature’s prerogative to 
identify, accommodate and balance competing rights and interests in sensitive policy fields.118 
 
Given that the contested legislation in J.N and K sought to strike a balance between national 
security/public order objectives and the fundamental right to liberty, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the CJEU was extremely cautious in reviewing the merits of the balance struck by the EU 
legislature here. There are certainly good reasons based upon the separation of powers, 
democratic legitimacy and sensitivity to the policy issues involved for judicial deference in such 
cases.119 
Nonetheless, sensitivity to these issues need not result in the sort of low-intensity, cursory 
review of the sort performed in J.N and N. As AG Bobek has recently contended, proportionality 
 
115 Case C-601/15, J. N. (n 103) paras 68-70; Case C-18/16, K. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, (n 106) 
paras 47-49. 
116 Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
340; Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of Proportionality Analysis in European Law (Hotei Publishing 2015) 36–41.  
117 Barak (n 116) 343 (footnoted omitted). 
118 Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Review in Administrative Law’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L Lindseth and 
Blake Emerson (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Second edition, Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 407, 415. 
119 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C‑558/07, The Queen, on the application of SPCM SA, CH Erbslöh KG, 
Lake Chemicals and Minerals Ltd and Hercules Inc v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:142 paras 72-78. 
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review of EU legislation that encroaches upon fundamental rights “ought to include all the 
three stages.”120 In his view, the fact that the EU legislature is typically entitled to a wide margin 
of discretion when enacting policy choices into law does not necessarily mean that 
proportionality review should be restricted to only considering the suitability and necessity of 
the contested EU legal act.121 Instead, a full, three-step approach to proportionality review 
should be conducted in every case, with the key variable being the intensity of review across all 
three components i.e. suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu.122  
This would mean that in every case where the EU legislature enjoys a wide discretion, review by 
the CJEU should be “limited to ascertaining whether the measure is not manifestly 
inappropriate for attaining the objectives pursued; whether it does not go manifestly beyond 
what is necessary to attain them; or whether it does not entail manifestly disproportionate 
disadvantages with regard to such objectives.”123 By the same logic, one would expect that in 
situations where interferences with fundamental rights are serious and the EU legislature’s 
discretion is reduced, the Court would similarly intensify all three stages of its enquiry. Review 
would therefore seek to establish whether the measure is strictly appropriate for attaining the 
objectives pursued; is strictly necessary to attain them and is strictly proportionate in light of 
the disadvantages caused in pursuing such objectives. 
The great problem with taking such an intensive, merits-based approach to the third step in the 
proportionality test, however, was already identified above: it could result in unwarranted 
judicial interference with the legislature’s responsibility for policymaking. By engaging in strict 
scrutiny of the overall balance struck between general objectives and non-absolute 
fundamental rights, the CJEU would in effect be conducting a novel rebalancing of these issues 
for itself. This would be particularly problematic in the post-Lisbon Treaty era where EU 
legislative acts adopted in accordance with a legislative procedure are underpinned by the 
principle of representative democracy.124 
 
120 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH & Co. KG v Freistaat Sachsen, (n 18) para 41. 
121 For a similar argument see Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 601–609. 
122 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH & Co. KG v Freistaat Sachsen, (n 18) para 41. 
123 ibid para 42 (emphasis original). 
124 Article 10 TEU; Article 289 TFEU. 
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b.) Towards a Process-Oriented Solution 
It is submitted that the adoption of a process-oriented approach to the third, stricto sensu stage 
of proportionality review provides a solution here. Recalling the abovementioned judgment in 
Schecke, the CJEU opted in that case to focus upon the legislative process to ascertain whether 
the EU legislature had actively considered all relevant facts and circumstances when striking a 
balance between general objectives and fundamental rights.  
In other words, the Court did not conduct a novel rebalancing of the rights and interests at 
stake for itself. At the same time, though, the CJEU did not simply conclude that the overall 
balance struck by the legislature was proportionate without subjecting this to any degree of 
scrutiny at all. Instead, by adopting a process-oriented approach to review, the CJEU found that 
the EU legislature had not taken the care to consider all relevant facts and circumstances 
(including policy options that were less restrictive upon fundamental rights) when enacting the 
contested legislation. The legislature thus unable to demonstrate that it had “properly 
balanced” the competing rights and interests at stake when adopting the contested 
Regulations.125  
Applying this approach to serious interferences with fundamental rights, the Court could 
subject the contested legislation to high-intensity, strict scrutiny at the suitability and necessity 
stages, whilst taking a process-oriented approach at the third step in the enquiry. This would 
strike the appropriate balance between ensuring that such legislation was strictly necessary to 
achieve the objectives in question whilst preventing the Court from overstepping the 
boundaries of its judicial function by engaging in a novel, rebalancing of the rights and interests 
at stake. At the same time, it would subject the choices of the EU legislature to more 
demanding stricto sensu scrutiny than the extremely light touch approach taken hitherto in J.N 
and K.  
 
125 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Schecke (n 23) paras 76-86. 
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Taking such a process-oriented approach at the stricto sensu stage is already supported by 
(some) post-Lisbon Treaty case law.126 A good example here is Schaible, where the claimants 
challenged an EU Regulation obliging keepers of livestock to identify individual animals and 
keep up to date, electronic records of their animals.127 The Regulation was enacted in order to 
reform the previously existing system of animal identification and registration following an 
outbreak of foot and mouth disease. In the applicant’s view, the new, more stringent rules on 
identification and record keeping were excessive and constituted a disproportionate 
interference with the right to freely pursue a business (in this case breeding animals for 
commercial purposes) as protected under Article 16 CFR.128  
The Court began by finding the Regulations’ rules to be appropriate for pursuing the legitimate 
objectives of health protection, controlling epizootic diseases and the welfare of animals.129 
Moving to the necessity of the Regulation, the CJEU repeated its classic position that the EU 
legislature must be allowed a wide margin of discretion in light of the political, economic and 
social choices it was called upon to take in the agricultural sector. The standard of 
proportionality review would therefore be reduced to examining only whether the EU 
legislature had manifestly exceeded the bounds of its discretion.130  
However, in a direct reference to its post-Lisbon Treaty federalism jurisprudence discussed in 
Chapter 7, the Court stated that the EU legislature “must base its choice on objective criteria 
and, in assessing the burdens associated with various possible measures, it must examine 
whether the objectives pursued by the measure chosen are such as to justify even substantial 
negative consequences for certain economic operators.”131  
In reviewing whether the EU legislature had discharged this obligation effectively, the Court 
turned to the legislative process and evidence base upon which the contested legislation was 
 
126 For an example of the CJEU engaging in a rather detailed consideration of the merits of the balance struck by 
the EU legislature see Case C‑283/11, Sky Österreich (n 82). 
127 Case C-101/12, Schaible (n 3); See also Case C-356/12, Glatzel (n 3). 
128 Case C-101/12, Schaible (n 3) paras 22-23. 
129 ibid paras 30-42. 
130 ibid paras 47-48. 
131 ibid para 49 (citing to that effect Vodafone paragraph 53). . 
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enacted. In so doing, it found, on the basis of specific reports, consultations and scientific 
studies that the Commission took into account when proposing the Regulation, that the need 
for new rules in this area was supported by overwhelming evidence. Furthermore, based on the 
recommendations put forward in these reports, the EU legislature was entitled to take the view 
that the strict system of identification and registration enacted was necessary to achieve the 
overall aims of the legislation.132  
Finally, when it came to the overall balance struck between EU objectives of general interest 
and the fundamental right to conduct a business (proportionality stricto sensu), the Court once 
again turned to the legislative process. Regarding the allegedly excessive nature of the financial 
burdens placed on farmers, the Court noted that there was “nothing in the documents before 
the Court that calls into question the contention of the Council and of the Commission that the 
financial aspects of the new system…were widely discussed during the legislative process and 
that the costs and advantages of that system were weighed up.”133 It was also clear from a 
Commission report to the Council that the EU legislature had taken the decision to phase the 
new Regulation in over a period of time in light of initial start-up costs calculated by the EU 
Joint Research Centre.134 Lastly, the EU legislature had sought to mitigate the costs to farmers 
by allowing them access to financial aid from EU funds. The availability of such funds was “an 
important factor that [the EU legislature] took into account in its decision-making process.”135 
Ultimately, therefore, the EU legislature had demonstrated that it duly considered the financial 
burden that farmers would bear as a result of the new system and weighed the various 
interests involved when trying to strike a fair balance between them.136 
Admittedly, the legislation under review in Schaible did not constitute a serious interference 
with the right to freely conduct a business. Nonetheless, when considered alongside the Court’s 
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reasoning in cases like Schecke137 and Glatzel138, it is evident that a process-oriented approach 
to stricto sensu proportionality review would be possible in such circumstances. Rather than 
engaging in close judicial scrutiny of the merits of the balance struck by the EU legislature, the 
Court focused its examination on whether the EU legislature had taken all relevant facts and 
circumstances into account when taking its decision. This allowed the CJEU to avoid 
overstepping the boundaries of acceptable judicial practice by strictly reviewing the merits of 
the balance struck between competing rights and objectives of general interest. As Lenaerts 
puts it, the CJEU is “more respectful of the prerogatives of the political institutions of the EU if it 
rules that, when adopting the contested act, those institutions failed to take into consideration 
all the relevant interests at stake, than if it questions their policy choices by reference to its 




Chapter 8 has considered the post-Lisbon Treaty jurisprudence of the CJEU when reviewing EU 
legislation against fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Whilst 
the sample size of cases remains relatively small, it was contended that the contemporary 
jurisprudence reveals a finely calibrated, variable intensity approach to fundamental rights 
review. The CJEU has indicated that the discretion afforded to the EU legislature and 
subsequent intensity of constitutional review will vary according to the severity of the 
interference with the right(s) in question. 
In a marked departure from its pre-Lisbon Treaty position, the Court has come to demand that 
EU legislation respect the essence of fundamental rights and has struck down legislation where 
it fails to do so. Furthermore, in cases of serious interference with fundamental rights, the 
default position of judicial deference to the substantive outcomes of the political process has 
been moderated. Following the landmark judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, the Court will 
 
137 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Schecke (n 23). 
138 Case C-356/12, Glatzel (n 3). 
139 Lenaerts (n 114) 15. 
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reduce the discretion available to the EU legislature in such circumstances and subsequently 
engage in high intensity review of the substance of the contested legislation.  
The result of these developments is that a degree of doctrinal coherence is beginning to 
emerge across the Court’s post-Lisbon jurisprudence regarding constitutional review of EU 
legislation. In both federalism and fundamental rights cases, the Court will strictly scrutinise the 
substance of EU legal acts that: (i) place serious restrictions on fundamental rights; (ii) blatantly 
infringe the EU’s federalism principles enshrined in Article 5 TEU; or (iii) encroach upon the 
national identity of the Member States. 
Beyond these rather exceptional instances of serious interference, the Court has adopted a 
process-oriented approach to fundamental rights review in a number of post-Lisbon Treaty 
cases. In much the same way as process-oriented review has been deployed in federalism 
disputes discussed in Chapter 7, the Court has indicated that the EU legislature will ordinarily be 
entitled to considerable deference in fundamental rights cases. The CJEU refrains from second-
guessing the merits of discretionary policy choices by engaging in intensive review of the 
balance struck by the EU legislature between general policy objectives and Charter-based 
fundamental rights. Instead, the Court examines whether, in reaching particular outcomes, the 
EU legislature has done its work properly and taken all relevant facts, circumstances and 














The Constitutional Court of a More Mature EU Legal Order 
 
This thesis has analysed the changing role of the Court of Justice of the European Union over 
time from the perspective of its task of reviewing the legality of measures of EU law. Despite 
much being written on the CJEU and its seminal contribution to the development of 
European integration, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the ways in which the 
Court conducts constitutional review of legislation. Whereas the assertion that the CJEU has 
gradually assumed a number of functions analogous to national constitutional courts is 
widely accepted, a key part of its constitutional role has not yet been fully explored. In 
particular, there has yet to be any systematic consideration of how the CJEU’s task of 
reviewing the constitutionality of EU legislation has shifted over time and, more broadly, 
what this tells us about the contemporary role of the CJEU. 
1.) The Emergence of a Distinct System of Constitutional Review of EU Legislation  
In addressing these gaps in the literature, the first major claim made by the present study is 
that the Court’s assumption of powers to conduct constitutional review of EU legislation has 
stemmed from a series of changes to the legal and political order of the EU over time.  
When viewed in comparative perspective, national courts entrusted with reviewing the 
constitutionality of legislation typically engage in two distinct tasks. The first is to resolve 
boundary disputes between different levels of government in legal orders that divide power 
along federal or other lines. The second is to adjudicate upon alleged infringements of 
fundamental rights by those wielding public power.1 
It is clear that the drafters of the original ECSC and EEC Treaties did not initially intend for 
the CJEU to perform tasks of this nature within the Community legal order. Instead, the 
Court’s powers of judicial review were founded upon the principles of French administrative 
law, which limited its ability to scrutinise the factual determinations and discretionary policy 
choices of the Community institutions. This restriction of the Court’s power was deliberate 
 
1 Mark Tushnet, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation’ in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Legal Studies (Oxford University Press 2005). 
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and stemmed from the fear that a powerful European court could frustrate the aims of 
furthering European integration through law by engaging in robust judicial scrutiny of the 
legality of Community measures. 
The consequence was that the CJEU was initially conceived of as being akin to national 
administrative courts whose principal task was to review the legality of executive-type 
measures enacted by the Community’s law-making institutions (primarily the Commission 
and Council). It was certainly not viewed as playing a role analogous to powerful national 
constitutional and supreme courts in national legal systems.2 Not only was there no 
constitutionally entrenched bill of fundamental rights in the EEC Treaty, but the original 
system of judicial review was not directed towards addressing the sorts of division of 
competences issues that are typically dealt with by national courts engaged in constitutional 
review.  
Gradually, the system of judicial review in the Community/Union began to break free of its 
restrictive, administrative law foundations. By focusing upon a series of changes to the twin 
concepts of constitutionalism and legislation, it was contended that: (i) creative CJEU 
jurisprudence pertaining to general principles of law; and (ii) successive rounds of Treaty 
amendment, led to the gradual emergence of a veritable system of constitutional review of 
EU legislation.  
Of particular importance in this regard was the addition of the principles of conferral, 
subsidiarity and proportionality to the EU legal order via what is now Article 5 TEU. By 
curtailing the existence and exercise of EU legislative competences, these principles aimed 
at upholding the EU’s federal order of competences.3 Moreover, they empowered the CJEU 
to review EU legislation for compliance with novel, constitutionally entrenched limits upon 
legislative power. The addition of these federalism principles was then complemented by 
the elevation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the same legal status as the EU 
Treaties by the Treaty of Lisbon.4  
 
2 Anne Boerger-De Smedt, ‘Negotiating the Foundations of European Law, 1950–57: The Legal History of the 
Treaties of Paris and Rome’ (2012) 21 Contemporary European History 339. 
3 Armin Von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, ‘The Federal Order of Competences’ in Armin Von Bogdandy and 
Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2009). 
4 Article 6(3) TEU. 
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Alongside these developments in EU constitutionalism, there have also been a number of 
substantial amendments to: (i) the procedures and institutions involved in the adoption of 
EU legislation; (ii) the sources of democratic legitimacy underpinning EU legislation; and (iii) 
the hierarchy of norms within the EU legal order. Most significant in this regard was the shift 
from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the Council and the empowerment of the 
European Parliament within the EU legislative process.5  
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU legislation is now formally defined for 
the first time as all EU legal acts that are adopted in accordance with a designated legislative 
procedure. Under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, EU legislation is now enacted via a 
process that involves a proposal from the Commission and the joint adoption by the 
European Parliament and Council.6 Moreover, EU legislation adopted in this way is now 
explicitly founded upon the principle of representative democracy, with the European 
Parliament and Council representing the interests of European citizens and the Member 
States respectively.7 
When taken together, these reforms to the twin concepts of constitutionalism and 
legislation have transformed the CJEU’s powers to review the legality of EU legal acts. 
Today, unlike any other period in its history, the CJEU is tasked with reviewing the validity of 
EU legislation against a series of constitutionally entrenched federalism and fundamental 
rights principles.  
2.) Shifts in the Methodology and Intensity of Constitutional Review 
In addition to tracing these changes to the system of constitutional review and the concept 
of legislation, the second major claim of this thesis is that the methodology and intensity of 
constitutional review have also shifted over the years. 
In advancing this claim, a comprehensive, chronological analysis of the Court’s federalism 
and fundamental rights jurisprudence was provided. In so doing, it was argued that the 
Court consistently adopted a light-touch, tersely reasoned approach to constitutional review 
throughout much of its history. In numerous cases, the Community/Union legislature was 
 
5 See generally Alexander Türk, The Concept of Legislation in European Community Law: A Comparative 
Perspective (Kluwer Law International 2006). 
6 Article 289(3) TFEU. 
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afforded a wide margin of discretion and the Court adopted a very deferential standard of 
constitutional review. In both federalism and fundamental rights cases, the CJEU did not 
engage in any meaningful degree of scrutiny of contested measures of EU law; often 
concluding within a few short paragraphs that such measures were valid. Whilst 
considerations pertaining to the separation of powers, institutional capacity and expertise 
partly explained the prevalence of light-touch review, it was further contended that the 
dynamics of the Community law-making process exerted an influence here.  
Throughout the early decades of European integration, the legislative process in the 
Community was dominated by unanimity voting in the Council. This meant that legislative 
output depended almost entirely upon the ability of national ministers to reach agreement 
with one another. It also considerably restricted the number of challenges to the validity of 
Community legal acts before the CJEU. With limited input from the European Parliament 
and strict standing requirements being placed upon individuals seeking to challenge the 
legality of acts of general application, Community legislation was rarely challenged before 
the Court. Political consensus in the Council served to shield the majority of European legal 
acts from judicial challenge.8 Furthermore, prior to the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the EU 
legal order lacked many of the constitutionally entrenched limits upon the existence and 
exercise of legislative power that one typically finds in national constitutional orders. In 
summarising this state of affairs, the pre-Maastricht Treaty period was described as an era 
of “low-intensity constitutionalism” in the Community.9 
This body of case law was then contrasted with the contemporary, post-Lisbon Treaty 
jurisprudence of the Court. It was argued that a series of significant shifts in the way in 
which the CJEU now conducts constitutional review of EU legislation may be detected. 
In cases of serious interference with fundamental rights or other core constitutional 
principles, the substantive outcomes of the EU political process are no longer entitled to 
considerable judicial deference. The CJEU has declared, for the first time in its history, that 
in certain circumstances the discretion of the EU legislature will be reduced. As a 
 
8 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C‑58/08, The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd 
and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, ECLI:EU:C:2009:596, para 1. 
9 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the 
Authority of Constitutionalism’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 332. 
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consequence, the Court will engage in “high-intensity review” or “strict scrutiny” of the 
substance of contested EU legislation in order to determine whether restrictions upon such 
rights and principles were justified.10 
Beyond these cases of serious interference, the Court increasingly adopts a process-oriented 
approach to constitutional review. Greater attention is now paid to the legislative process 
and evidence base upon which EU legislation was enacted, with the Court consistently 
making use of procedural obligations stemming from the EU Treaties and non-binding Better 
Regulation initiatives.11 In so doing, the Court scrutinises whether the EU legislature has 
considered all relevant facts and circumstances when reaching its decisions.12 
By adopting such a process-oriented approach to constitutional review, the CJEU indicates 
to the EU institutions that the political process on the European level is primarily 
responsible for ensuring that the EU’s federalism and fundamental rights principles are 
respected. The Court then typically defers to the substantive outcomes of that political 
process. It opts not to second-guess the merits of legislative choices by engaging in high-
intensity review of EU legislation. Instead, the CJEU’s objective is to ensure that the 
institutions involved in the EU legislative process operate in a manner that is responsive to 
pertinent federalism and fundamental rights issues. In so doing, the focus moves towards 
“improving the decision-making process of the EU institutions, rather than on second-
guessing their substantive findings.”13  
3.) Reappraising the Role of the Court of Justice 
The final contribution of the present thesis is to consider the contemporary role of the CJEU 
in light of these recent changes to the methodology and intensity of constitutional review. It 
will be recalled that scholars have often identified three historical strands in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, each of which reveals something about the CJEU’s changing role over time.14   
 
10 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
11 Protocol No.2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. 
12 K Lenaerts, ‘The European Court of Justice and Process-Oriented Review’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European 
Law 3. 
13 ibid 15. 
14 Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘The Changing Constitutional Role of the European Court of Justice’ (2006) 34 
International Journal of Legal Information 223; Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ [1991] Yale 
Law Journal 2403. 
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During the first, “foundational” period in the Community, the CJEU “constitutionalized” the 
EEC Treaty via the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, implied powers and fundamental 
rights.15 This period of constitutionalisation was followed by a second epoch in which the 
Court sought to overcome legislative inertia on the European level by providing judicial 
solutions to problems that were meant to be addressed by the Communities’ law-making 
institutions.16 The landmark development during this period was the judicial creation of a 
principle of mutual recognition in the internal market.17 
In response to this body of case law, many criticised the Court for engaging in unwarranted 
judicial activism, understood in the sense of illegitimately departing from the text and plain 
meaning of the Treaties.18 In addition, the Court was cited as having played a pro-
integrationist role during these two periods, first by laying the foundations for the 
community legal order and then driving the European integration process forward through 
creative Treaty interpretation.19  
Then, with the legislative process on the European level gathering momentum, the role of 
the Court is said to have changed once again, as it moved on to a new, third era. According 
to Lenaerts, following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the CJEU came to be less 
assertive in driving the European integration process forward. Instead, it came to view its 
role primarily as one of “upholding the ‘checks and balances’ built into the EU constitutional 
legal order of States and peoples, including the protection of fundamental rights.”20   
Whilst the claim that the CJEU came to assume greater constitutional responsibilities 
around the time of the Maastricht Treaty is widely accepted in the literature, this thesis has 
argued that not much actually changed with regards to the Court’s approach to conducting 
constitutional review of EU legislation. Absent a few notable exceptions (e.g. Tobacco 
 
15 Weiler (n 14) 2410–2431. 
16 Koen Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks: A Study on Judicial Legitimacy’ (2013) 36 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1302, 1308. 
17 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesrnonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42. 
18 Patrick Neil, The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism (European Policy 
Forum/Frankfurter Institut 1995); Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A 
Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking (M Nijhoff ; Distributors, for the US and Canada, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 1986). 
19 Karen J Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, ‘Judicial Politics in the European Community: European 
Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision’ (1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies 535. 
20 Lenaerts (n 16) 1309. 
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Advertising One) the Court largely failed to subject EU legislation to any meaningful degree 
of judicial scrutiny on federalism or fundamental rights grounds in the period between the 
Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties.21 Despite further constitutionalising the system of judicial 
review by adding novel, judicially enforceable limits upon EU legislative power, low intensity 
review persisted.  Consequently, the EU legislature remained under a limited burden to 
justify the constitutionality of its actions before the Court.  
This state of affairs was compared to the Court’s consistent practice of subjecting Member 
State laws and practices to strict judicial scrutiny whenever they contradicted the 
fundamental economic freedoms of the internal market. Unlike its established position vis-
à-vis EU legislation, the Court frequently considered whether there were any less restrictive 
measures available when reviewing national laws that impeded the EU Treaties’ provisions 
on free movement. For some, this double standard of review (i.e. low intensity review of EU 
legislation, robust review of national measures) revealed a continuing bias in favour of 
furthering European integration in the Court’s case law.22 Some even went so far as to 
suggest that the Court was continuing to engage in judicial activism (albeit of a slightly 
different kind) by failing to give meaningful effect to the Maastricht Treaty’s newly added 
constitutional principles that sought to place limits upon EU legislative power.23 
4.) The Constitutional Court of a More Mature EU Legal Order 
Having demonstrated that the Court’s post-Lisbon case law represents a significant 
departure from past practice, it is submitted that those accounts that continue to charge 
the CJEU with behaving in an activist or pro-integrationist fashion require further 
consideration. In particular, claims that the Court operates in accordance with its own logic 
and pursues an agenda that is somewhat divorced from the constitutional framework of the 
EU Treaties may require reappraisal.24 At the very least, future studies on the Court must 
now account for recent trends in the practice of constitutional review of EU legislation – 
 
21 Case C-380/03, Germany v European Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2006:772. 
22 Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 
158, 172. 
23 Gabriél A Moens and John Trone, ‘The Principle Of Subsidiarity in EU Judicial And Legislative Practice: 
Panacea Or Placebo?’ (2015) 41 Journal of Legislation 65, 80–85. 
24 For a recent treatment of these issues see Thomas Horsley, The Court of Justice of the European Union as an 
Institutional Actor: Judicial Lawmaking and Its Limits (Cambridge University Press 2018). 
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something which much of the existing literature on the CJEU and its contribution to 
European integration over time has not yet done. 
In offering an alternative perspective on the contemporary role of the CJEU, it is submitted 
that the abovementioned shifts in the constitutional review jurisprudence of the Court have 
not come about in isolation. Instead, they have arisen in response to wider changes to the 
EU’s legal and political order over the past decade.  
In this regard, both the Lisbon Treaty reforms and the rise in Better Regulation initiatives 
have placed the EU legislature under an increased number of procedural obligations to 
consult widely, consider alternative policy options and accompany all legislative action with 
statements as to their compliance with the EU’s core constitutional rights and principles. By 
utilising these tools as a means of scrutinising the legislative process and evidence base of 
EU legislation when determining its constitutionality, the turn towards process-oriented 
review comes in response to an increased degree of “proceduralisation” of the EU legislative 
process in recent years.25  
Similarly, the move towards high-intensity review in cases of serious infringements of 
fundamental rights is wholly consistent with the elevation of the Charter to the apex of the 
EU constitutional order. Moreover, the Court’s recent willingness to modulate the intensity 
of constitutional review in light of the nature and seriousness of rights infringements is 
directly linked to changes in the subject matter of litigation in the post-Lisbon era. Unlike 
the technical, economically oriented regulation that formed the subject matter of many past 
disputes, the modern-day CJEU is increasingly called upon to review the constitutionality of 
EU legislation dealing with highly sensitive, politically charged issues.26 This is most evident 
in cases where the Court has engaged in high intensity review of EU legislation that allows 
national authorities to detain third country nationals who apply for international protection 
in order to protect national security or public order.27 
 
25 Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of the Evidence-Based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s 
Semiprocedural Review’ (2013) 1 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 327. 
26 R Daniel Kelemen, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 79 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 117, 119. 
27 Case C-601/15 PPU, J N v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:2016:84. 
271 
 
Consequently, by developing a finely-tuned, variable intensity approach to constitutional 
review, recent developments demonstrate a Court that is responsive to the wider legal and 
political context in which it now operates. Whereas the Court has long been criticised for 
failing to subject EU legislation to meaningful judicial scrutiny, recent case law establishes 
that it now takes its responsibility for constitutional review more seriously. In so doing, the 
CJEU has come to demand more by way of justification from the EU legislature in order to 
justify the constitutionality of its actions in areas where the EU’s federal order of 
competences and fundamental rights are at stake. As a result, it has finally come to operate 
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